CVE-2026-96455: Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini · Missing Authentication
Affects Pollen Robotics Reachy MiniSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.8 High.
Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 20% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 23 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.
What to do
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Pollen RoboticsReachy Mini | Affected
| Fixed in– |
PyPIreachy_minipkg:pypi/reachy_miniOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in– |
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
The vendor partially mitigated browser-based exploitation by restricting CORS origins in version 1.8.2, but this does not prevent direct network exploitation. Until an official fix is released, restrict network access to the robot's daemon to trusted hosts only and avoid connecting the robot to untrusted wireless networks.
Description
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
References
- github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0 (opens in a new tab)