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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-96456: Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini · Race Condition

Affects Pollen Robotics Reachy MiniSource CVE Database V5

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Mentioned vulnerabilities

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.3 Medium.

Data as of 5 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.3Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 16% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 23 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 6 Nov 2026.

What to do

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Pollen RoboticsReachy MiniAffected
  • <=1.11.0
Fixed in–
PyPIreachy_minipkg:pypi/reachy_miniOther threatsAffected
  • <=1.11.0
Fixed in–

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

Until a fix is available, limit Bluetooth exposure and avoid using the Reachy Mini in untrusted environments. Monitor vendor communications for updates on remediation.

Description

The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication. The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other. Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced. This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.

References

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