CVE-2026-97228: Rapid7 Platform · Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Data Query Logic
Affects Rapid7 PlatformSource CVE Database V5
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 2.7 Low : upgrade to 0.6.2 when convenient.
Data as of 8 Nov 2026, 23:24 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 16% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 0.6.2
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 25 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 8 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade Rapid7 Platform to 0.6.2.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Rapid7Platform | Affected
| Fixed in
|
GitHubPlatformpkg:github/PlatformOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
AI-suggested
A fix is available in Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP version 0.6.2, which addresses the issue by using parameterized GraphQL variables for the export_id parameter. Users should upgrade to version 0.6.2 or later to remediate this vulnerability. No additional mitigation actions are required as the vulnerability does not elevate privileges or cross tenant boundaries.
Description
Rapid7 Bulk Export MCP versions 0.2.5 through 0.6.1 suffer from a GraphQL query injection issue in the export-status component (`get_export_status` in `src/export_manager.py`), whereby the `export_id` value — an unvalidated MCP tool argument reaching the function via the `check_rapid7_export_status` and `download_rapid7_export` tools — is interpolated directly into the GraphQL query string. A crafted `export_id` containing quote and brace characters can terminate the intended `export(id: "...")` selection early and append attacker-controlled root-level selections (for example, schema introspection), producing a single well-formed GraphQL document that is then sent to the Rapid7 export API under the operator's own API key. Notably, this issue does not grant an existing actor any access they do not already have: every injected query executes within the operator's own already-authenticated API scope, using the operator's own valid API key, and cannot cross a tenant or account boundary. A directly-malicious operator gains nothing they could not already do by calling the API directly; the realistic exposure is limited to a compromised or careless upstream MCP client, or indirect prompt injection forwarding an unvalidated identifier. This is fixed in version 0.6.2, which passes `export_id` as a parameterized GraphQL variable (`$exportId: ID!`).