## Summary `@dicebear/core` builds avatar SVGs from caller-supplied options. The numeric `rotate` option is interpolated into an SVG `transform` attribute without XML-escaping. It is typed as a number, but nothing checks the type at runtime, so a string value passes straight through and can break out of the attribute to inject arbitrary SVG markup. This is the same root cause as CVE-2026-33311 (GHSA-mr9r-mww3-v6gv), which escaped the string options `backgroundColor`, `fontFamily`, and `textColor` but did not cover `rotate`. `@dicebear/initials` has the same gap in its numeric `fontSize` and `fontWeight` options. ## Impact Cross-site scripting (CWE-79). When the generated avatar is rendered inline (for example via `innerHTML`) or served as `image/svg+xml` and opened directly, injected markup such as an `<image onerror>` handler runs script in the page's origin. Exploitation requires the application to pass untrusted input into one of these options: - `rotate` (`@dicebear/core`) - `fontSize`, `fontWeight` (`@dicebear/initials`) In most integrations these options are set by the developer and only `seed` is user-controlled, so the vulnerable configuration is uncommon. Applications that use trusted, hardcoded values for these options are not at risk. ## Patches Fixed in `@dicebear/core` 9.4.3 and `@dicebear/initials` 9.4.3: the values are now XML-escaped before being written into the SVG, matching the CVE-2026-33311 fix. Upgrade to 9.4.3 or later. The 5.x through 8.x lines share the same flaw but are end-of-life and will not receive a backport; upgrade to 9.4.3. The 10.x line is not affected. ## Workarounds If you cannot upgrade, coerce the affected options to a number before passing them to `createAvatar`: ```js rotate: Number(userInput) || 0, ``` ## Credits Reported by @rz1027.