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VulnerabilityPublished

CVE-2026-71247: Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts, used by the live document-signing UI, allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields

Source GCVE Database

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Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium.

Data as of 3 Nov 2026, 22:58 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
6.5Medium
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.2% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 22% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 5 Aug 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 3 Nov 2026.

What to do

AI-suggested

Since the newer V2 signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) includes protections against this issue, migrating to or enforcing the use of the V2 signing path is recommended. Until an official fix is released, restrict ASSISTANT role permissions or avoid using the vulnerable V1 signing path to prevent exploitation.

Description

Documenso's sign-field-with-token.ts component in the live document-signing UI allows a recipient with the ASSISTANT role to fetch and complete fields of any later-or-equal-order recipient in the same envelope without proper restrictions. This includes the ability to upsert signature records for fields not owned by the acting recipient, enabling an assistant to forge another signer's signature in sequential-signing documents. A newer signing path (sign-envelope-field.ts) mitigates this by blocking assistants from completing signature fields, but this protection is absent in the vulnerable V1 path.

References

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