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VulnerabilityPublished Updated

CVE-2026-5394: pimcore/pimcore · Pimcore Platform - SQL Injection

Affects pimcore/pimcoreSource GCVE Database

0
Authoritative record:CVE-2026-5394· High 7.0

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.0 High : upgrade to 12.3.7 soon.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 05:11 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
7.0High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 37% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 12.3.7, 11.5.17, 2026.1.3
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 27 Apr 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponised: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade pimcore/pimcore to 12.3.7; pimcore/pimcore to 11.5.17; pimcore/pimcore to 2026.1.3.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Packagistpimcore/pimcoreAffected
  • >=12.0.0-RC1 <12.3.7
Fixed in
  • 12.3.7
Packagistpimcore/pimcoreAffected
  • <11.5.17
Fixed in
  • 11.5.17
Packagistpimcore/pimcoreAffected
  • >=2026.1.0 <2026.1.3
Fixed in
  • 2026.1.3

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

AI-suggested

If you cannot patch yet, restrict import and save operations of DataObject class definitions to fully trusted administrators only. Avoid importing untrusted JSON definitions containing compositeIndices.

Description

My name is Oscar Uribe, Security Researcher at Fluid Attacks. I am reaching out because we have identified a security vulnerability in Pimcore 12.3.3 that we would like to report to you so we can coordinate a responsible disclosure together. As part of our standard disclosure measures, we follow a timeline (outlined at https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/policy), which is aligned with ISO/IEC 29147:2018 and ISO/IEC 30111:2019. In short, the timeline works as follows: we ask for acknowledgment of the report within a few days of your first accessing it, and from there, we are happy to coordinate a joint disclosure date with you, typically within 90 days of the initial discovery. This gives your team reasonable time to assess, develop, and release a fix. We have reserved the CVE ID **"CVE-2026-5394"** for this issue, and the advisory will eventually be published at [https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons](https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/dragons). We are committed to coordinating the timing of that publication with you. Please feel free to reach out if you have any questions about the report, the process, or the timeline. We are glad to work with you on this. ## Description An authenticated administrative user who can import or save DataObject class definitions can inject attacker-controlled composite index metadata and trigger unintended SQL execution in the backend. The vulnerable flow accepts `compositeIndices` from imported JSON, stores the values without strict validation, and later concatenates them directly into `ALTER TABLE ... DROP INDEX` and `ALTER TABLE ... ADD INDEX` statements executed through Doctrine DBAL. Although the original report focused on `compositeIndices.index_key`, independent code review shows that the strongest and most reliable injection point is `compositeIndices.index_columns`, because it is inserted verbatim inside the `ADD INDEX (...)` clause. This permits injection of additional `ALTER TABLE` subclauses against Pimcore object tables without relying on stacked queries. ## Vulnerability ### Root cause 1. Source: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Service::importClassDefinitionFromJson()` accepts `compositeIndices` directly from imported JSON. 2. Assignment: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition::setCompositeIndices()` does not enforce an allowlist for index names or column names. - The only special handling is a ManyToOne relation rewrite to `__id` and `__type`, which is not a security control. 3. Sink: - `Pimcore\Model\DataObject\Traits\CompositeIndexTrait::updateCompositeIndices()` builds raw SQL with string concatenation and executes it via `$this->db->executeQuery(...)`. 4. Missing protection: - `quoteIdentifier()` is used for the `SHOW INDEXES` query, but not for the dynamic `ALTER TABLE` statements. - No server-side schema validation restricts `index_key` or `index_columns` to known safe identifier characters. ### Confirmed source-to-sink path 1. `importClassDefinitionFromJson()` decodes attacker-controlled JSON and forwards `compositeIndices`. 2. `setCompositeIndices()` stores those values without sanitizing identifier content. 3. `ClassDefinition::save()` reaches `ClassDefinition\Dao::update()`. 4. `Dao::update()` calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for: - `object_store_<classId>` - `object_query_<classId>` 5. `Localizedfield\Dao` also calls `updateCompositeIndices()` for: - localized query tables - localized store tables ### Why this is exploitable The vulnerable `ADD INDEX` statement is built as: ```php 'ALTER TABLE `'.$table.'` ADD INDEX `' . $key.'` ('.$columnName.');' ``` `$columnName` is produced from `implode(',', $columns)` and is not quoted or validated. A malicious `index_columns` element such as: ```text slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- ``` produces SQL of the form: ```sql ALTER TABLE `object_query_<id>` ADD INDEX `c_poc_idx` (slider), DROP COLUMN `oo_className` -- ); ``` This remains a single `ALTER TABLE` statement, so the base vulnerability does not depend on multi-statement support. The attacker can inject additional DDL clauses affecting the target Pimcore object table. ### Impact The issue allows a privileged attacker to alter backend SQL behavior during class-definition import/save and modify schema on Pimcore object tables associated with the affected class. Practical impact includes: - unauthorized schema modification on object query/store tables - backend denial of service by breaking expected table layout - data integrity impact for DataObject storage and queries `index_key` is also concatenated into SQL without proper identifier escaping, but the most defensible exploitation path is through `index_columns`. Relevant code: - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:92-137` - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:994-1006` - `models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php:30-85` - `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:217-218` - `models/DataObject/Localizedfield/

References

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