This vulnerability in OpenClaw allows a local same-host caller who can reach the proxy-facing Gateway port to supply forged identity headers that are normally reserved for the trusted proxy. This occurs in same-host trusted-proxy deployments where the feature is enabled and reachable. The vulnerability does not alter the trusted-operator model but can lead to acceptance of forged operator identities depending on configuration. The issue is fixed starting with version 2026.5.18. Mitigations include network-level restrictions and configuration hardening to limit access to the trusted-proxy ingress and disable the feature if unnecessary.

If exploited, a local attacker on the same host who can access the proxy-facing Gateway port may impersonate trusted operators by forging identity headers. This could lead to unauthorized actions being performed with elevated operator privileges. The actual impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether untrusted inputs can reach the affected proxy path. No known exploits are reported in the wild.

A fix is available in OpenClaw version 2026.5.18. Users should upgrade to this version to remediate the vulnerability. Until then, restrict access to the trusted-proxy ingress by binding it behind the actual proxy and firewall to prevent direct same-host access. Additionally, narrow channel and tool allowlists, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.