Gitea's SSRF protection relies on hostmatcher.NewDialContext() to validate resolved IPs at the TCP dial level for webhook and migration clone URLs. However, three code paths in migration asset downloads and OAuth avatar updates use raw http.Get() calls without this filtering, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file reads via the file:// scheme. This vulnerability allows attackers with migration permissions or control over OAuth sources to cause Gitea to fetch internal cloud metadata (e.g., AWS IMDSv1 credentials) or local files (e.g., /etc/gitea/app.ini) and store them as release assets, bypassing the intended SSRF protections.

An attacker with migration permissions or control over OAuth avatar URLs can exploit this vulnerability to perform SSRF attacks that bypass Gitea's hostmatcher protections. This enables unauthorized reading of internal cloud metadata services (such as AWS or GCP instance metadata endpoints), local files containing sensitive configuration and secrets, and internal network services. The stolen data can be exfiltrated via release assets in the migrated repository or OAuth avatar updates, potentially exposing credentials and secrets critical to the target environment.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Until an official fix is available, restrict migration permissions to trusted administrators only and carefully review OAuth2 source configurations. Avoid migrating repositories from untrusted sources. Monitor vendor advisories for updates and apply patches once released to ensure hostmatcher filtering is applied consistently to all HTTP requests in migration and OAuth code paths.