Hono: `mount()` and `app.mount()` can forward a path that bypasses middleware scoped inside the mount prefix
Affects honoSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 5.3 Medium : upgrade to 4.13.16 when convenient.
Data as of 13 Nov 2026, 00:06 UTC
Thin evidence
One scorer or none| CNA (GitHub_M) | CVSS 3.1 | 5.3 |
|---|
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.13.16
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:NExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 12 Nov 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 12 Nov 2026.
What to do
Upgrade hono to 4.13.16.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npmhono | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary `mount()` and `app.mount()` remove the mount prefix from the request path and forward the rest to the mounted application. Two mistakes in that step let a crafted request reach a route of the mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware, such as an authentication check on `/app/admin/*`. The outer application routes on the original path, so the middleware does not run. ### Details 1. **Dynamic prefix** (all affected versions): for a mount such as `/api/:tenant/*`, the prefix was removed by the length of the route pattern, not of the matched prefix. A request with a longer or shorter first segment is cut in the middle, so `/api/a/xxxxx/admin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`. 2. **Re-normalization** (since 4.12.21): the forwarded path was built from the decoded request path and assigned to `url.pathname`, which turns a decoded backslash into `/` and collapses `..`. `/app/public%5C..%5Cadmin/secret` reaches the mounted application as `/admin/secret`. The fix removes the prefix segment by segment from the raw pathname, using the matched parameter values for its length. Route patterns that cannot be handled safely now throw: duplicate parameter names and a wildcard inside the last segment such as `/assets*`. A trailing slash in an `app.mount()` prefix no longer removes an extra segment. ### Impact An unauthenticated client can reach a route of a mounted application that the outer application protects with path-scoped middleware. This affects applications that use `mount()` or `app.mount()` and rely on middleware registered on a sub-path inside the mount prefix for authentication or authorization. ### Workarounds Register the authentication middleware inside the mounted application.