In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: clamp route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS tcp_select_initial_window() assumes that callers never pass an MSS smaller than 1, but route-derived advmss values can violate that assumption. A too-small explicit RTAX_ADVMSS is one way to get there, but it is not the only one. The same divide-by-zero can also be reached through the "default advmss" path when RTAX_ADVMSS is left at 0 and the effective advmss is later driven down by route MTU and min_adv_mss. Introduce a tcp_dst_advmss() helper that clamps route advmss to TCP_MIN_MSS before TCP consumes it, and use it in the TCP paths that derive advmss from dst metrics. This keeps the effective MSS from dropping to zero before tcp_select_initial_window() rounds the receive window.