VulnerabilityPublished 28 Oct 2025Updated 31 Jul 2026

CVE-2025-40048: linux-azure · uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask in Linux kernel

Affects linux-azureSource GCVE Database

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High · fixed in 5.15.0-1110.119~20.04.1 : patch linux-azure soon.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 09:15 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

7.5High

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

EPSS: 0.6% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 50% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch: Available – fixed in 5.15.0-1110.119~20.04.1, 5.15.0-1100.109~20.04.1, 5.15.0-1100.107~20.04.2 +2

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Scope: Unchanged
Confidentiality: None
Integrity: None
Availability: High

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: None: The vulnerable system can be exploited without any interaction from any user.
Scope: Unchanged: An exploited vulnerability can only affect resources managed by the same security authority. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are either the same, or both are managed by the same security authority.
Confidentiality: None: There is no loss of confidentiality within the impacted component.
Integrity: None: There is no loss of integrity within the impacted component.
Availability: High: There is total loss of availability, resulting in the attacker being able to fully deny access to resources in the impacted component; this loss is either sustained (while the attacker continues to deliver the attack) or persistent (the condition persists even after the attack has completed). Alternatively, the attacker has the ability to deny some availability, but the loss of availability presents a direct, serious consequence to the impacted component (e.g., the attacker cannot disrupt existing connections, but can prevent new connections; the attacker can repeatedly exploit a vulnerability that, in each instance of a successful attack, leaks a only small amount of memory, but after repeated exploitation causes a service to become completely unavailable).

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 Oct 2025
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponised: Public exploit code exists in Metasploit or Exploit-DB, or CISA SSVC reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

ghsa-hw92-4498-rgw4

What to do

Upgrade to a fixed release listed under Affected software.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
linux-azure	Affected <5.15.0-1100.107~20.04.2 <5.15.0-1110.119~20.04.1 <5.15.0-1100.109~20.04.1 <5.15.0-170.180~20.04.3 <5.15.0-1094.97~20.04.1	Fixed in 5.15.0-1100.107~20.04.2 5.15.0-1110.119~20.04.1 5.15.0-1100.109~20.04.1 5.15.0-170.180~20.04.3 5.15.0-1094.97~20.04.1

AI-suggested

The described fix involves removing driver-side changes to the interrupt mask to let user space fully control it. No alternative mitigations are described in the provided data.

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask Remove the logic to set interrupt mask by default in uio_hv_generic driver as the interrupt mask value is supposed to be controlled completely by the user space. If the mask bit gets changed by the driver, concurrently with user mode operating on the ring, the mask bit may be set when it is supposed to be clear, and the user-mode driver will miss an interrupt which will cause a hang. For eg- when the driver sets inbound ring buffer interrupt mask to 1, the host does not interrupt the guest on the UIO VMBus channel. However, setting the mask does not prevent the host from putting a message in the inbound ring buffer. So let’s assume that happens, the host puts a message into the ring buffer but does not interrupt. Subsequently, the user space code in the guest sets the inbound ring buffer interrupt mask to 0, saying “Hey, I’m ready for interrupts”. User space code then calls pread() to wait for an interrupt. Then one of two things happens: * The host never sends another message. So the pread() waits forever. * The host does send another message. But because there’s already a message in the ring buffer, it doesn’t generate an interrupt. This is the correct behavior, because the host should only send an interrupt when the inbound ring buffer transitions from empty to not-empty. Adding an additional message to a ring buffer that is not empty is not supposed to generate an interrupt on the guest. Since the guest is waiting in pread() and not removing messages from the ring buffer, the pread() waits forever. This could be easily reproduced in hv_fcopy_uio_daemon if we delay setting interrupt mask to 0. Similarly if hv_uio_channel_cb() sets the interrupt_mask to 1, there’s a race condition. Once user space empties the inbound ring buffer, but before user space sets interrupt_mask to 0, the host could put another message in the ring buffer but it wouldn’t interrupt. Then the next pread() would hang. Fix these by removing all instances where interrupt_mask is changed, while keeping the one in set_event() unchanged to enable userspace control the interrupt mask by writing 0/1 to /dev/uioX.

Impact

This vulnerability can cause denial of service conditions where user-mode processes hang indefinitely waiting for interrupts that never arrive due to the race condition in interrupt mask handling. There is no impact on confidentiality or integrity, but availability is severely affected as processes may become unresponsive.

Summary

The CVE-2025-40048 vulnerability in the Linux kernel's uio_hv_generic driver stems from the driver modifying the interrupt mask concurrently with user space, which should have exclusive control over this mask. This race condition can cause the user-mode driver to miss interrupts because the driver might set the mask bit when it should be clear, leading to a hang in user space processes waiting for interrupts (e.g., pread() calls). The root cause is that the host may place messages in the inbound ring buffer without sending an interrupt if the mask is set, and if user space is not ready or waiting, it can hang indefinitely. The fix removes all driver logic that changes the interrupt mask except for the set_event() function, allowing user space to fully manage the interrupt mask by writing to /dev/uioX.

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Exploitation evidence

What to do

Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 30 Jul 2026, 16:22 UTC

Technical details

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