Investigating a Multi-Stage PowerShell Loader
A multi-stage PowerShell loader campaign was identified involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell scripts hosted on Vercel infrastructure. The loaders retrieve and execute payloads such as Grape.exe, UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and draw.io.exe. Obfuscation techniques include Base64 encoding, XOR with the key 'Write', and dynamic IEX command construction. Victims see a decoy 'Verification complete!' message disguised as Google.com during execution. The initial infection vector is unknown, indicating these URLs serve as second-stage delivery points in the attack chain.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This campaign involves suspicious PowerShell content served from an IP address (203.188.171.166) and domain (dorenzaa.com), both hosted on Vercel infrastructure. The PowerShell loaders extract and execute multiple payloads locally. Analysis shows multiple obfuscation layers including Base64 encoding, XOR-based obfuscation with the key 'Write', and dynamically constructed IEX commands to hide execution. A decoy message is presented to victims to mask malicious activity. Multiple Vercel instances host additional loader scripts and executables. The initial infection vector remains unidentified, suggesting these URLs are second-stage delivery points in a multi-stage attack chain.
Potential Impact
The campaign enables execution of multiple payloads on victim systems through obfuscated PowerShell loaders, potentially allowing attackers to deploy malicious executables locally. The obfuscation and decoy messaging complicate detection and analysis. The initial infection vector is unknown, which limits understanding of full attack scope. No known exploits in the wild have been reported for this campaign at this time.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is applicable as this is a multi-stage loader campaign rather than a software vulnerability. Defenders should block or monitor access to the identified domains and IP addresses (e.g., dorenzaa.com and 203.188.171.166) and investigate any PowerShell execution involving the described obfuscation techniques and payload hashes. Since the initial infection vector is unknown, focus on detection and containment of the second-stage payload delivery is recommended.
Indicators of Compromise
- domain: dorenzaa.com
- hash: d8620f4df9e0159a8db675868b4ed9a205638c847439f52cf1c88541d0655a64
- hash: 3eaf786bfb4ae5688b347511f98d74c948b7dc0749558acbdc6bbe33dcfa3a61
- hash: b385111d6599a30210b7be8f7674a163
- hash: b02d6b80c14bc5556bd7eaa6f1bc502b59818f90
- hash: 0cd022f31b436d6c83ddc1b5c14d47dc
- hash: 5efe9666ca501077aefc818dae7be59f
- hash: 2fdc615e948222bec395f988bebcea4da854756d
- hash: 65e1bb0b0594e9264747640aead433a7bd4fe4fd
- hash: 4366679a4fea2c1bf7e29290f8e162e0db9d0707030b5b99ce870195afeb3782
- hash: a25bbc466416f65726c5e3f587f69515dd003f114c1eab29fdfca7b52fbd74b1
- hash: dbaf04df50088031ea64a9879c1adeee8b7e551c79dc247fa1bb4de5b263f7b4
- hash: e04487377e4f976ac18e7c1c5b22bc85e03b4423e73fd490e9d1641758faac81
- hash: f139bd347cba0b197c97ca084c224d8c779bdb9116a5327e9cf30b0f72a59530
- hash: fe693cc07c5d8a4d479e987e64ffb7473bd79066f3505e7f2c8f0b86815d0f08
- url: https://dorenzaa.com/
Investigating a Multi-Stage PowerShell Loader
Description
A multi-stage PowerShell loader campaign was identified involving heavily obfuscated PowerShell scripts hosted on Vercel infrastructure. The loaders retrieve and execute payloads such as Grape.exe, UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and draw.io.exe. Obfuscation techniques include Base64 encoding, XOR with the key 'Write', and dynamic IEX command construction. Victims see a decoy 'Verification complete!' message disguised as Google.com during execution. The initial infection vector is unknown, indicating these URLs serve as second-stage delivery points in the attack chain.
AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This campaign involves suspicious PowerShell content served from an IP address (203.188.171.166) and domain (dorenzaa.com), both hosted on Vercel infrastructure. The PowerShell loaders extract and execute multiple payloads locally. Analysis shows multiple obfuscation layers including Base64 encoding, XOR-based obfuscation with the key 'Write', and dynamically constructed IEX commands to hide execution. A decoy message is presented to victims to mask malicious activity. Multiple Vercel instances host additional loader scripts and executables. The initial infection vector remains unidentified, suggesting these URLs are second-stage delivery points in a multi-stage attack chain.
Potential Impact
The campaign enables execution of multiple payloads on victim systems through obfuscated PowerShell loaders, potentially allowing attackers to deploy malicious executables locally. The obfuscation and decoy messaging complicate detection and analysis. The initial infection vector is unknown, which limits understanding of full attack scope. No known exploits in the wild have been reported for this campaign at this time.
Defensive Guidance
No official patch or fix is applicable as this is a multi-stage loader campaign rather than a software vulnerability. Defenders should block or monitor access to the identified domains and IP addresses (e.g., dorenzaa.com and 203.188.171.166) and investigate any PowerShell execution involving the described obfuscation techniques and payload hashes. Since the initial infection vector is unknown, focus on detection and containment of the second-stage payload delivery is recommended.
Technical Details
- Author
- AlienVault
- Tlp
- white
- References
- ["https://malwr-analysis.com/2026/08/08/investigating-a-multi-stage-powershell-loader/"]
- Adversary
- null
- Pulse Id
- 6a79de355f436f32f159929b
- Threat Score
- null
Indicators of Compromise
Domain
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
domaindorenzaa.com | — |
Hash
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
hashd8620f4df9e0159a8db675868b4ed9a205638c847439f52cf1c88541d0655a64 | — | |
hash3eaf786bfb4ae5688b347511f98d74c948b7dc0749558acbdc6bbe33dcfa3a61 | — | |
hashb385111d6599a30210b7be8f7674a163 | — | |
hashb02d6b80c14bc5556bd7eaa6f1bc502b59818f90 | — | |
hash0cd022f31b436d6c83ddc1b5c14d47dc | — | |
hash5efe9666ca501077aefc818dae7be59f | — | |
hash2fdc615e948222bec395f988bebcea4da854756d | — | |
hash65e1bb0b0594e9264747640aead433a7bd4fe4fd | — | |
hash4366679a4fea2c1bf7e29290f8e162e0db9d0707030b5b99ce870195afeb3782 | — | |
hasha25bbc466416f65726c5e3f587f69515dd003f114c1eab29fdfca7b52fbd74b1 | — | |
hashdbaf04df50088031ea64a9879c1adeee8b7e551c79dc247fa1bb4de5b263f7b4 | — | |
hashe04487377e4f976ac18e7c1c5b22bc85e03b4423e73fd490e9d1641758faac81 | — | |
hashf139bd347cba0b197c97ca084c224d8c779bdb9116a5327e9cf30b0f72a59530 | — | |
hashfe693cc07c5d8a4d479e987e64ffb7473bd79066f3505e7f2c8f0b86815d0f08 | — |
Url
| Value | Description | Copy |
|---|---|---|
urlhttps://dorenzaa.com/ | — |
Threat ID: 6a79f49ebf8831d53900df7e
Added to database: 08/10/2026, 15:56:14 UTC
Last enriched: 08/10/2026, 16:33:02 UTC
Last updated: 08/10/2026, 17:47:44 UTC
Views: 7
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