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Investigating a Multi-Stage PowerShell Loader

Source AlienVault OTX General

0

Description

A threat hunting investigation identified suspicious PowerShell content served from an IP address (203.188.171.166) and domain (dorenzaa.com), both retrieving ZIP archives from Vercel-hosted infrastructure. The PowerShell loaders extract and execute payloads locally, including Grape.exe, UltraToolliteSetup.exe, and draw.io.exe. Analysis revealed heavily obfuscated PowerShell stages utilizing Base64 encoding, XOR-based obfuscation with the key 'Write', dynamically constructed IEX commands, and hidden PowerShell execution. A decoy 'Verification complete!' message disguised as Google.com was presented to victims during execution. Multiple Vercel instances hosted additional artifacts including loader scripts and executables. The initial infection vector remains unidentified, suggesting these PowerShell-hosting URLs represent second-stage delivery points in a multi-stage attack chain.

Indicators of compromise

Domains 1

  • dorenzaa.com

URLs 1

  • https://dorenzaa.com/

Hashes 14

  • d8620f4df9e0159a8db675868b4ed9a205638c847439f52cf1c88541d0655a64
  • 3eaf786bfb4ae5688b347511f98d74c948b7dc0749558acbdc6bbe33dcfa3a61
  • b385111d6599a30210b7be8f7674a163
  • b02d6b80c14bc5556bd7eaa6f1bc502b59818f90
  • 0cd022f31b436d6c83ddc1b5c14d47dc
  • 5efe9666ca501077aefc818dae7be59f
  • 2fdc615e948222bec395f988bebcea4da854756d
  • 65e1bb0b0594e9264747640aead433a7bd4fe4fd
  • 4366679a4fea2c1bf7e29290f8e162e0db9d0707030b5b99ce870195afeb3782
  • a25bbc466416f65726c5e3f587f69515dd003f114c1eab29fdfca7b52fbd74b1

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