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Io.netty:netty codec http2: Netty: HTTP/2 decompression leaks ByteBuf reference count when the decompressor channel is already closed (Direct memory leak / OOM DoS) (CVE-2026-56819)

0
High
Published: 07/31/2026 (07/31/2026, 16:51:50 UTC)
Source: GCVE Database
Product: io.netty:netty-codec-http2

Description

### Summary A remote, unauthenticated peer can leak one direct `ByteBuf` per HTTP/2 `DATA` frame in applications that enable HTTP/2 content decompression via `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener`. When a `DATA` frame is processed for a stream whose decompressor has already been closed, `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` retains the frame buffer but never releases it on the error path, so its reference count never returns to zero. Repeating this over a long-lived HTTP/2 connection exhausts direct memory and crashes the JVM with `OutOfMemoryError` — a denial of service. ### Details In `codec-http2/src/main/java/io/netty/handler/codec/http2/DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java`, `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` does: ```java // around line 433 decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain()); ``` The argument `data.retain()` is evaluated **before** `writeInbound(...)` executes, incrementing the buffer's reference count (`refCnt: 1 -> 2`). The very first statement of `EmbeddedChannel.writeInbound(...)` is `ensureOpen()` (`EmbeddedChannel.java:360`), which throws `ClosedChannelException` when the decompressor's internal `EmbeddedChannel` has already been closed. When that happens: - the `DATA` payload has been `retain()`ed but never entered the pipeline, so the decoder's `finally { release() }` never runs; - the surrounding `catch (Throwable t)` block in `decompress(...)` (around line 451) does **not** release the extra reference; - the input buffer therefore can never reach refCnt 0, and its (typically direct) memory is leaked. The decompressor channel is closed on a reachable path: `Http2Connection` `onStreamRemoved` → `Http2Decompressor.cleanup()` → `EmbeddedChannel.finishAndReleaseAll()` (`DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java:125-133` and `418-420`). A peer that sends `DATA` frames for a stream whose decompressor has already been cleaned up (e.g. continuing to send `DATA` after `END_STREAM` / stream removal) thus leaks one direct `ByteBuf` per frame. **Affected code**: `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java`, method `Http2Decompressor.decompress(...)` — the `decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain())` call (line ~433) and its `catch (Throwable t)` block (line ~451), which lacks a `data.release()` rollback. **Suggested fix**: track whether `writeInbound` succeeded and roll back the extra `retain()` only when the data never entered the pipeline: ```java boolean writeSucceeded = false; try { decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain()); writeSucceeded = true; // pipeline now owns the release if (endOfStream) { decompressor.finish(); } return 0; } catch (Throwable t) { if (!writeSucceeded) { data.release(); // roll back the extra retain(); data never entered pipeline } if (t instanceof Http2Exception) { throw (Http2Exception) t; } throw streamError(stream.id(), INTERNAL_ERROR, t, ...); } ``` | Case | writeSucceeded | catch action | Reason | |------|:---:|---|---| | `ensureOpen()` throws (this bug) | `false` | `data.release()` | data never entered pipeline | | handler throws internally | `true` | no release | decoder `finally` already released | | `finish()` throws | `true` | no release | `writeInbound` already succeeded | ### PoC Reproduced against the official, unmodified `netty-codec-http2-4.2.15.Final.jar` from Maven Central, using real netty classes and measuring `ByteBuf.refCnt()` directly (the leaking logic is not mocked). Reproduction steps: 1. Download the official artifacts and their dependencies from Maven Central (version `4.2.15.Final`): `netty-common`, `netty-buffer`, `netty-transport`, `netty-resolver`, `netty-handler`, `netty-codec-base`, `netty-codec`, `netty-codec-http`, `netty-codec-http2`, `netty-codec-compression`. 2. Build a real `Http2Decompressor` wrapping a real gzip decoder `EmbeddedChannel` (`ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibDecoder(ZlibWrapper.GZIP)`). 3. Close the internal decompressor channel (equivalent to the end state of `cleanup()` / `finishAndReleaseAll()`). 4. Encode a real gzip `DATA` payload with `ZlibCodecFactory.newZlibEncoder(GZIP)` (`refCnt = 1`). 5. Call `decompress(...)` on the closed channel. 6. Observe: `writeInbound(...)` throws `ClosedChannelException` at its `ensureOpen()` entry (`EmbeddedChannel.java:360`), reached from `DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java:433`; `data.refCnt()` is now `2`. 7. Release once as the frame reader would; `refCnt` stays at `1` (`release()` returns `false`) → leaked. Observed reference-count trace: ``` gzipData initial refCnt = 1 decompress -> data.retain() -> refCnt = 2 (retain applied, never rolled back) caller releases once -> refCnt = 1 (release() returns false; not deallocated) => buffer never reaches 0 -> direct memory leaked ``` Observed exception stack (confirms the leak point): ``` java.nio.channels.ClosedChannelException at io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel.checkO

CVSS v3.1

Score 7.5high

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
High
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Affected software

Mavenghsa
io.netty:netty-codec-http2
Affected versions
>=4.2.0 <4.2.16.Final
Mavenghsa
io.netty:netty-codec-http2
Affected versions
>=4.1.0.Final <4.1.136.Final

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AI-Powered Analysis

Machine-generated threat intelligence

AILast updated: 07/31/2026, 19:48:49 UTC

Technical Analysis

The vulnerability occurs in the DelegatingDecompressorFrameListener.java class, specifically in the Http2Decompressor.decompress(...) method. When processing a DATA frame for a stream whose decompressor channel is closed, the call decompressor.writeInbound(data.retain()) increments the ByteBuf reference count before checking if the channel is open. If the channel is closed, writeInbound throws ClosedChannelException, but the extra retain() is not rolled back, causing the buffer to leak. Repeated exploitation over a long-lived HTTP/2 connection exhausts direct memory, crashing the JVM with OutOfMemoryError. The decompressor channel is closed during stream removal, so sending DATA frames after END_STREAM triggers the leak. The suggested fix involves tracking whether writeInbound succeeded and releasing the buffer if it did not enter the pipeline, preventing the leak.

Potential Impact

An unauthenticated remote attacker can cause a denial of service by exhausting direct memory in the JVM hosting the vulnerable Netty HTTP/2 codec. This is achieved by sending DATA frames on streams whose decompressor channels have been closed, causing ByteBuf reference counts to leak and eventually leading to OutOfMemoryError and application crash. There is no impact on confidentiality or integrity reported.

Mitigation Recommendations

A patch is available for this vulnerability. Users should upgrade to a fixed version of io.netty:netty-codec-http2 that includes the fix for proper reference count handling in Http2Decompressor.decompress(...). Until patched, mitigating this issue by configuration or workaround is not described. Patch status is confirmed; apply the official fix from the vendor or project repository.

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Technical Details

Gcve Source
db.gcve.eu
Osv Id
GHSA-93wv-jw9v-4972
Osv Schema Version
1.4.0
Aliases
["CVE-2026-56819"]
Ecosystems
["Maven"]
Database Specific Severity
HIGH
Cvss Version
3.1

Threat ID: 6a6cf7f1bf32cb7a342b3ec5

Added to database: 07/31/2026, 19:30:57 UTC

Last enriched: 07/31/2026, 19:48:49 UTC

Last updated: 07/31/2026, 21:42:11 UTC

Views: 2

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