Threats Tagged 'java'

Hackers are actively exploiting a vulnerability in the FastJson open-source Java library, allowing remote code execution without user interaction or elevated privileges. [...]

HighExploitUnited StatesChinaIndia+7#remote#rce#java

Spring Boot exposes the endpoint "/actuator/heapdump" to collect debug information. By default, the endpoint will return a file heapdump.hprof, which includes a binary heapdump that can be used to analyze the current state of the application. Non-Java readers may be familiar with a similar concept, core dumps, which are produced by binaries to expose a memory image at the time the software crashes. "heapdumps" are the Java analog to "core-dumps". The heapdump often includes secrets used by the application to connect to backend systems. API keys, database passwords, and other sensitive data may be exposed in the heapdump.

A large malvertising campaign uses fake Solana, Luno, and TradingView websites with malicious JavaScript that assembles malware directly in browser memory. The attack uses service workers and shared workers to build a unique malware executable locally, avoiding transmission of a complete file over the network. This technique helps evade static detection and complicates analysis. The campaign targets retail traders and crypto investors primarily in Asia Pacific and Latin America. The malware reportedly can intercept network traffic, steal credentials and cryptocurrency wallet data, record keystrokes, take screenshots, and maintain persistence. Users are advised to download financial software only from official sources and verify digital signatures.

Unit 42 details a Russian cyberespionage campaign targeting Zimbra webmail servers using JavaScript injection to steal credentials. The post Russian Global Webmail Espionage appeared first on Unit 42 .

MediumCampaignUkraine#web#java#javascript

Oracle addresses 1235 CVEs in its third quarterly update of 2026 with 1449 patches, including 261 critical updates. Key Takeaways The third Critical Patch Update (CPU) for 2026 contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates, the largest CPU release. 261 issues (18% of all patches) were assigned a critical severity rating Oracle E-Business Suite received the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of all patches Background On July 21, Oracle released its Critical Patch Update (CPU) for July 2026 , the third quarterly update of the year. This CPU contains fixes for 1235 unique CVEs in 1449 security updates across 32 Oracle product families. Out of the 1449 security updates published this quarter, 18% of patches were assigned a critical severity. High severity patches accounted for the bulk of security patches at 52.7%, followed by medium severity patches at 24.7%. This quarter's update includes 261 critical patches across 228 CVEs. Severity Issues Patched CVEs Critical 261 228 High 763 613 Medium 358 332 Low 67 62 Total 1449 1235 Analysis This quarter, the Oracle E-Business Suite product family contained the highest number of patches at 410, accounting for 28.3% of the total patches, followed by Oracle Fusion Middleware at 355 patches, which accounted for 24.5% of the total patches. A full breakdown of the patches for this quarter can be seen in the following table, which also includes a count of vulnerabilities that can be exploited over a network without authentication. Oracle Product Family Number of Patches Remote Exploit without Auth Oracle E-Business Suite 410 45 Oracle Fusion Middleware 355 219 Oracle Communications 168 122 Oracle PeopleSoft 84 45 Oracle MySQL 54 9 Oracle Siebel CRM 45 32 Oracle Commerce 39 26 Oracle Supply Chain 39 16 Oracle Financial Services Applications 31 26 Oracle GoldenGate 27 9 Oracle Enterprise Manager 27 13 Oracle Retail Applications 22 20 Oracle JD Edwards 20 4 Oracle Java SE 19 17 Oracle Virtualization 16 0 Oracle Database Server 15 6 Oracle TimesTen In-Memory Database 14 4 Oracle Utilities Applications 14 10 Oracle Construction and Engineering 7 7 Oracle Analytics 7 5 Oracle Systems 6 0 Oracle SQL Developer 5 5 Oracle Autonomous Health Framework 4 3 Oracle Application Testing Suite 4 4 Oracle Food and Beverage Applications 4 4 Oracle HealthCare Applications 4 4 Oracle APEX 3 2 Oracle Hospitality Applications 2 2 Oracle Essbase 1 1 Oracle Global Lifecycle Management 1 1 Oracle NoSQL Database 1 1 Oracle Spatial Studio 1 1 Solution Customers are advised to apply all relevant patches in this quarter's CPU. Please refer to the July 2026 advisory for full details. Identifying affected systems A list of Tenable plugins to identify these vulnerabilities will appear here as they're released. This link uses a search filter to ensure that all matching plugin coverage will appear as it is released. Get more information Oracle Critical Patch Update Advisory - July 2026 Oracle July 2026 Critical Patch Update Risk Matrices Oracle Advisory to CVE Map Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats. Learn more about Tenable One , the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface.

CriticalVulnerabilityUnited StatesIndiaChina+12#remote#rce#java

Attackers have shifted from hiding from AI tools to running inside them. By poisoning the config files that govern AI coding assistants, a new worm class achieves silent persistence, evades AI-based scanners, and spreads across an organization's repositories through developers' own tools. Key takeaways AI coding assistant configuration files, such as settings.json hooks, .cursorrules Cursor MDC rules, and similar harness files, are now explicit targets in supply-chain attacks, not collateral damage. These files simultaneously sit at the intersection of three trust relationships: The developer trusts them as config, the integrated development environment (IDE) executes them automatically, and the large language model (LLM) treats them as authoritative instructions, making them a uniquely powerful persistence vector. Defenders should treat harness config files as code that requires mandatory reviews and hash pinning in the CI/CD pipeline; enforce --ignore-scripts on package installs; and flag AI scanner refusals as a suspicious signal rather than a clean result. While analyzing a recent Mini Shai-Hulud campaign and its other variants, Tenable made a discovery: The payload wasn’t just stealing tokens and exfiltrating credentials. It was rewriting the configuration files that tell AI coding assistants what to do every time a developer opens a project. The Mini Shai-Hulud worm, which targets npm, PyPI, and other third-party registries simultaneously, includes a dedicated module that scans the developer’s home directory for configuration files belonging to AI coding tools by name, such as Anthropic’s Claude Code, Google’s Gemini CLI, Microsoft’s GitHub Copilot, SpaceX’s Cursor, OpenAI’s ChatGPT Codex, Cline’s eponymous tool, the open-source tool Aider, and others. For each one it finds, it injects a hook command which helps the malware stay persistent. From that point forward, every time the developer starts an AI coding session, the malware runs silently and automatically, and with the same level of trust the developer placed in their own tools. This is a deliberate architectural choice: The attacker modeled the execution environment, identified the highest-privilege auto-run mechanism available on a developer’s machine, and built the attack specifically for it. Supply-chain attacks used to end at credential theft. Now the AI agent’s harness is both the target and the propagation vector. Why AI agent harness files are a uniquely attractive target For years, defenders have focused supply-chain security on the package itself: Inspect the preinstall script, scan the tarball, verify the checksum. That model assumes the malicious payload lives only inside the installed artifact. The threat described here breaks that assumption: The payload lands in a completely different place. AI coding assistants’ configuration files occupy a structural position unlike any other file in a developer’s working environment. They are simultaneously trusted as developer configuration, so they survive aggressive code reviews focused on business logic; are executed automatically by the IDE, so no user interaction is required after initial compromise; and are treated as authoritative instructions by the AI model itself, so the LLM will act on their content without prompting the user. No other file class has all three properties at once. A malicious package.json script requires execution. A malicious comment in source code requires a developer to act on it. A malicious hook in .claude/settings.json runs every time the developer opens a session. The attack surface is also nearly invisible to conventional scanning. These files are small, structured, and look identical to legitimate developer config. A poisoned settings.json with a malicious SessionStart hook has the same schema and structure as a clean one; the only difference is what the command field points to. Meanwhile, the files are rarely subject to the same review discipline as production code. They live…

This content discusses the strategic integration of application security scanner data into exposure management platforms to improve visibility, prioritization, and remediation of code vulnerabilities. It highlights challenges posed by isolated application security data and accelerated code deployment, especially with AI-assisted coding increasing vulnerability rates. The integration enables security teams to contextualize vulnerabilities within the broader organizational risk, prioritize fixes effectively, and provide CISOs with actionable risk metrics. It is not a specific vulnerability or exploit but a security management approach to reduce organizational exposure to code flaws.