The slds-lsp-client package on npm was published by user 'click2ai' as part of a dependency confusion and reconnaissance campaign. It mimics a private Salesforce SLDS LSP tooling namespace to be installed mistakenly by misconfigured package resolvers. The package's preinstall hook runs automatically during npm install, executing a script that initializes the @sentry/node client with a hardcoded attacker-controlled DSN. It collects the host's public IP by querying Cloudflare's trace endpoint and captures a runtime exception to send telemetry including default PII (hostname, OS username, runtime metadata) to the attacker's Sentry project. Each package in the campaign uses a distinct Sentry project ID to attribute installs to specific victims. The payload is identical across packages except for the package name and target DSN. This is a reconnaissance beacon rather than a direct exploit.

The malicious package exfiltrates telemetry data including the host's public IP address, hostname, OS username, and runtime environment metadata to an attacker-controlled Sentry endpoint during installation. This can reveal information about the victim environment and confirm successful installation of the malicious package. There is no indication of further exploitation beyond reconnaissance in the provided data.

Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance. Users should audit their package dependencies and resolver configurations to prevent dependency confusion attacks. Avoid installing packages from untrusted or unexpected namespaces. Monitor for suspicious preinstall scripts in npm packages. Since no official fix is indicated, manual mitigation by correcting dependency resolution and removing the malicious package is advised.