The @edgecommons/streamlog-node package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name uses an '@edgecommons' scope that mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511632673275909. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (d6742bcf7d8adfc30c36847b6920710617c0017729bc4935631e81d838640a99) The @edgecommons/streamlog-node package was published to the npm registry by user 'ada8877' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name uses an '@edgecommons' scope that mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization, so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical to the earlier 'click2ai' campaign, sharing the same Sentry organization (o4510485815754752) and a related ProtonMail maintainer identity, and differs only in the package name and target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511632673275909. --- Credit: [OpenSSF](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages) ([source](https://github.com/ossf/malicious-packages/blob/207f837f50fab9eb1a1e621f23d3cbb814689355/osv/malicious/npm/@edgecommons/streamlog-node/MAL-2026-10763.json))