The @marketfront/infopopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover. The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved. The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (206e60b923200a66a3a6bacec3f6ec998191bd648eb4bbc61b1cee008d2f3eec) On `npm install`, the declared `postinstall` script (`scripts/postinstall.js`) runs a heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style, RC4/XOR string-array decoded) payload that harvests installer-owned secrets and identity: reads `~/.aws/credentials`, `~/.ssh/known_hosts`, `~/.npmrc`, `~/.docker/config.json`, `~/.gitconfig`, and shell history files; bulk-serialises `process.env`; and collects hostname, user, network interfaces, CPU/OS. The collected data is encrypted and transmitted over two exfiltration channels: an HTTPS POST to a runtime-decoded remote endpoint, and a DNS-tunnel channel built via `new dns.Resolver().resolve4(...)` that splits the encrypted body into ≤50-character labels queried under an attacker-controlled parent domain to survive HTTPS egress filtering. Package metadata advertises a fabricated corporate identity (`*.marketfront.io` hosts that do not exist; README references an `internal-corp.io` auth endpoint) as a dependency-confusion cover story for what is otherwise a credential-stealer. Declared purpose ("internal authentication client") does not require reading AWS/SSH/npm/Docker/Git credential files or DNS-tunnelling encrypted blobs.