The @marketfront/livestreampreviewpopup package is part of a 25-package malicious campaign batch-published to the @marketfront npm scope by npm user 'marketfront' ([email protected]) within a roughly 3-minute window on 2026-07-01. All packages in the campaign were published at version 7.0.0 and use e-commerce/marketing frontend component names as cover. The package declares a postinstall hook (node scripts/postinstall.js) that executes heavily obfuscated (obfuscator.io-style) code automatically at npm install time. Static analysis of the decoded payload revealed a credential harvester that dynamically requires fs, os, http, https, zlib, path and dns, then reads approximately 20 sensitive credential files including ~/.ssh, ~/.aws/credentials, ~/.kube/config, ~/.docker/config.json, ~/.npmrc, ~/.netrc, ~/.pgpass, ~/.git-credentials, ~/.env and ~/.bash_history. Collected data is exfiltrated via a gzip-compressed HTTPS POST with a custom X-Secret header to the path /api/v1/events, alongside a DNS resolver beacon. The command-and-control host is concealed behind an additional RC4+XOR encryption layer around an embedded configuration blob and was not statically resolved. The decoded behavioral payload (module requires, credential-file target list, exfiltration headers and endpoint) is byte-for-byte identical across sampled packages in the campaign. The campaign shares tooling and infrastructure patterns (obfuscated postinstall credential harvester, X-Secret header, /api/v1/events exfiltration path, RC4-concealed C2) with the earlier @emcd-vue campaign, indicating the same actor rotating scopes and disposable maintainer emails. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (93ffdd19e32de6c0b06508d32fac098925466ac85dbc28da3c20984abc72d4ef) The package declares a postinstall hook (`node scripts/postinstall.js`) whose contents are an obfuscator.io-packed payload (string-array + RC4 decoder, hex identifiers, control-flow flattening) that runs automatically on `npm install`. On execution it collects installer host and identity data (os.hostname, os.userInfo, os.networkInterfaces, os.platform/release/arch, cwd, npm_config_user_agent, running-process enumeration, and the full process.env) and reads installer-owned secret files under the home directory (SSH keys, cloud credential files, npmrc/pypirc, browser profile data, shell history). The collected data is RC4-encrypted and transmitted to a hardcoded remote endpoint reassembled at runtime via atob() fragments over HTTPS POST, plus a base32-chunked DNS subdomain side-channel (`require('dns').Resolver` with `setServers([hostname])` and `resolve4` on `<index>.<random>.<chunk>.<random>.<attacker-domain>`) to bypass HTTP egress filtering. The advertised library surface is decorative: `main` points at `dist/index.js`, which re-exports `../src/index.js`, but `src/` is not shipped in the tarball, so consumers requiring the package error immediately. The package presents itself as an internal `@marketfront` Platform-Engineering package with homepage/repo/bugs URLs at nonexistent `*.marketfront.io` hosts and instructs installers to configure `registry=https://npm.marketfront.io`, consistent with a dependency-confusion attack against organizations using a private `@marketfront` scope. Version 7.0.0 with no prior public history reinforces the shadow-a-private-name staging pattern.