Malicious code in ag-charts-test (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29c50b5a47dde18daf83760926662df3b9890de074cc00938de04892ac79a4d9) [email protected] is a hollow package (empty index.js, no scripts, no documented functionality) whose sole effect on installers is resolving its single dependency `ltidisafe` from a direct HTTPS tarball URL on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.9.tgz`) rather than through the npm registry. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from that bucket and its contents — including any lifecycle scripts — execute on the installer's machine. The bucket owner can mutate the tarball at any time, so the executed bytes are attacker-controlled. The package name mimics the AG Charts / AG Grid namespace and the inflated `99.9.1` version, combined with the `depenconf` path segment on the bucket URL, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape (outbidding an internal `ag-charts-*` name to force resolution of the attacker's package into a private build). No legitimate purpose is documented and the package ships no code of its own. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9075915150ed433ba9729068a51b48f233c3f5366b8fb5ace97015824510c3cc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The [email protected] npm package is a hollow package with no legitimate functionality. Its sole purpose is to resolve a dependency named 'ltidisafe' from a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket URL rather than the npm registry. During npm install, the tarball from this bucket is fetched and executed on the installer's machine, allowing attacker-controlled code execution. The attacker can modify the tarball at any time, making the installed code fully controlled by the attacker. The package name and version are designed to outbid legitimate internal packages, enabling dependency confusion attacks that force private builds to use this malicious package. There is no documented legitimate use, and the package ships no code of its own.
Potential Impact
Any system that installs or runs [email protected] is fully compromised, as the attacker-controlled tarball executes arbitrary code during installation. This can lead to complete system takeover, including theft or manipulation of secrets and keys stored on the compromised machine. Removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious artifacts, as the attacker may have established persistent control.
Mitigation Recommendations
Remove the [email protected] package immediately from all systems. Rotate all secrets and keys that were stored or used on any compromised machine from a secure, uncompromised environment. Avoid installing packages from untrusted sources or those that resolve dependencies from non-standard URLs. Monitor package dependencies for suspicious names or versions that could indicate dependency confusion attacks. Patch status is not applicable as this is a malicious package, not a vulnerability with a vendor fix.
Malicious code in ag-charts-test (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (29c50b5a47dde18daf83760926662df3b9890de074cc00938de04892ac79a4d9) [email protected] is a hollow package (empty index.js, no scripts, no documented functionality) whose sole effect on installers is resolving its single dependency `ltidisafe` from a direct HTTPS tarball URL on a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket (`https://ltidi.storage.googleapis.com/depenconf/ltidisafe-3.1.9.tgz`) rather than through the npm registry. On `npm install`, the tarball is fetched from that bucket and its contents — including any lifecycle scripts — execute on the installer's machine. The bucket owner can mutate the tarball at any time, so the executed bytes are attacker-controlled. The package name mimics the AG Charts / AG Grid namespace and the inflated `99.9.1` version, combined with the `depenconf` path segment on the bucket URL, is the canonical dependency-confusion shape (outbidding an internal `ag-charts-*` name to force resolution of the attacker's package into a private build). No legitimate purpose is documented and the package ships no code of its own. ## Source: ghsa-malware (9075915150ed433ba9729068a51b48f233c3f5366b8fb5ace97015824510c3cc) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The [email protected] npm package is a hollow package with no legitimate functionality. Its sole purpose is to resolve a dependency named 'ltidisafe' from a third-party Google Cloud Storage bucket URL rather than the npm registry. During npm install, the tarball from this bucket is fetched and executed on the installer's machine, allowing attacker-controlled code execution. The attacker can modify the tarball at any time, making the installed code fully controlled by the attacker. The package name and version are designed to outbid legitimate internal packages, enabling dependency confusion attacks that force private builds to use this malicious package. There is no documented legitimate use, and the package ships no code of its own.
Potential Impact
Any system that installs or runs [email protected] is fully compromised, as the attacker-controlled tarball executes arbitrary code during installation. This can lead to complete system takeover, including theft or manipulation of secrets and keys stored on the compromised machine. Removing the package does not guarantee removal of all malicious artifacts, as the attacker may have established persistent control.
Mitigation Recommendations
Remove the [email protected] package immediately from all systems. Rotate all secrets and keys that were stored or used on any compromised machine from a secure, uncompromised environment. Avoid installing packages from untrusted sources or those that resolve dependencies from non-standard URLs. Monitor package dependencies for suspicious names or versions that could indicate dependency confusion attacks. Patch status is not applicable as this is a malicious package, not a vulnerability with a vendor fix.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-6989
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-p9cr-rm9c-q8mg"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ed368715ace43901ad6
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:23 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:00:58 UTC
Last updated: 07/24/2026, 20:19:24 UTC
Views: 4
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