--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (955003be540a21f5e2fd1a7a5a5586276a5cc7f733c09d1f5412250fe0035f1b) On require of the package, index.js loads setup.js, which selects a platform-specific path, fetches an opaque binary from a rotating pool of Cloudflare Workers subdomains (oob-worker.cf99-9b3.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf103-070.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf102-baf.workers.dev, oob-worker.cf101-adf.workers.dev), writes it to /var/tmp/.cache_<rnd> or TEMP\dotnet_diag_<rnd>.exe, chmods it 0755, and spawns it detached via /bin/sh or cmd. Destination hostnames and the child_process require are constructed by joining split string fragments to evade static analysis. If the HTTPS fetch fails, the fallback path reassembles a base64 payload from numbered DNS TXT records under *.dl.wel1.ru (c.<domain> returns a chunk count, then 0.<domain>..N.<domain> are concatenated and base64-decoded) and executes the result the same way. The disguised filenames (dotnet_diag_*.exe,.cache_*,.analytics_state), anonymous Cloudflare Workers infrastructure, DNS covert channel, and opt-out gated only by DISABLE_TELEMETRY are all consistent with a hostile dropper delivering attacker-controlled code to the installer's machine at package load time.