Malicious code in gas-log (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (36241e999d92bad738082bf420fc144391735f9f3707bc4baa0153b4cb0eec8a) gas-log impersonates the legitimate eth-gas-reporter package: it reuses that project's README, keywords, badges, and CHANGELOG, and the README even instructs users to install the target name. The exported Mocha reporter in index.js contains two near-identical implementations. The real reporter (Gas) is defined but not exported; the exported function (log) sets `var opt = 1` and unconditionally enters an else branch that calls `utils.connectNet(...)`, making the always-false `if (!opt)` guard a dead-code gate that hides the payload as an unreachable variant of the legitimate code. utils.connectNet spawns a detached, unref'd `node lib/syncResolve.js` child so the loader outlives the parent Mocha process. lib/syncResolve.js issues `axios.get(DEV_URI, { headers: { 'x-secret-key': '_' } })`, extracts `.data.Cookie` from the response, and passes it to `new Function.constructor('require', result)` with `require` bound in, then invokes it — an eval of attacker-controlled response bytes with full Node module access, retried 5 times. DEV_URI is empty in this shipped version so the fetch will fail today, but the mechanism is complete and armed: any future publish, DNS resolution, or same-origin redirect activates full RCE on any developer who runs mocha with this reporter. The typosquat framing, the dead-code gate, and the fetch → eval → detached-child chain together are unambiguous supply-chain attack intent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30475d80d69fa45b40a86bc3d91a9ed3c29f15d9c6d500760fc91e1ea303e8d5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The 'gas-log' npm package is identified as malicious software that, when installed or executed, fully compromises the host system. This compromise includes potential unauthorized access and control, making all stored secrets and keys vulnerable. Due to the severity of the compromise, simply uninstalling the package is insufficient to ensure system integrity, as additional malicious components may persist.
Potential Impact
Any system with the 'gas-log' package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. Attackers may have gained complete control over the system, exposing all stored secrets and keys. This level of compromise poses a critical risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system and its data.
Mitigation Recommendations
Remove the 'gas-log' package immediately. Rotate all secrets and keys from a separate, uncompromised machine to prevent further unauthorized access. Because the system is likely fully compromised, consider rebuilding or restoring the system from a known good backup to ensure complete removal of malicious software.
Malicious code in gas-log (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (36241e999d92bad738082bf420fc144391735f9f3707bc4baa0153b4cb0eec8a) gas-log impersonates the legitimate eth-gas-reporter package: it reuses that project's README, keywords, badges, and CHANGELOG, and the README even instructs users to install the target name. The exported Mocha reporter in index.js contains two near-identical implementations. The real reporter (Gas) is defined but not exported; the exported function (log) sets `var opt = 1` and unconditionally enters an else branch that calls `utils.connectNet(...)`, making the always-false `if (!opt)` guard a dead-code gate that hides the payload as an unreachable variant of the legitimate code. utils.connectNet spawns a detached, unref'd `node lib/syncResolve.js` child so the loader outlives the parent Mocha process. lib/syncResolve.js issues `axios.get(DEV_URI, { headers: { 'x-secret-key': '_' } })`, extracts `.data.Cookie` from the response, and passes it to `new Function.constructor('require', result)` with `require` bound in, then invokes it — an eval of attacker-controlled response bytes with full Node module access, retried 5 times. DEV_URI is empty in this shipped version so the fetch will fail today, but the mechanism is complete and armed: any future publish, DNS resolution, or same-origin redirect activates full RCE on any developer who runs mocha with this reporter. The typosquat framing, the dead-code gate, and the fetch → eval → detached-child chain together are unambiguous supply-chain attack intent. ## Source: ghsa-malware (30475d80d69fa45b40a86bc3d91a9ed3c29f15d9c6d500760fc91e1ea303e8d5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The 'gas-log' npm package is identified as malicious software that, when installed or executed, fully compromises the host system. This compromise includes potential unauthorized access and control, making all stored secrets and keys vulnerable. Due to the severity of the compromise, simply uninstalling the package is insufficient to ensure system integrity, as additional malicious components may persist.
Potential Impact
Any system with the 'gas-log' package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. Attackers may have gained complete control over the system, exposing all stored secrets and keys. This level of compromise poses a critical risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system and its data.
Mitigation Recommendations
Remove the 'gas-log' package immediately. Rotate all secrets and keys from a separate, uncompromised machine to prevent further unauthorized access. Because the system is likely fully compromised, consider rebuilding or restoring the system from a known good backup to ensure complete removal of malicious software.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-6962
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-24x9-3433-gqp9"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a4e4ed4c9d9e3dbe3287dce
Added to database: 07/08/2026, 13:21:24 UTC
Last enriched: 07/08/2026, 13:30:05 UTC
Last updated: 07/26/2026, 14:22:35 UTC
Views: 34
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