@ifasn/md-doc-mcp (npm) · Malicious Code
Affects @ifasn/md-doc-mcpSource GCVE Database
Malicious package : remove @ifasn/md-doc-mcp and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.
Data as of 2 Nov 2026, 22:13 UTC
Malicious package
Published to npm · OSV MAL-2026-18486
What to do
Remove @ifasn/md-doc-mcp from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npm@ifasn/md-doc-mcp | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (808d25733e867c0cb6808f89bbed4cc90e8362b1e1a2e52759676d51bd0273bb) The package is advertised as a markdown toolkit MCP server (TOC generation, word count, table formatting) but on require() of its main module and on startup of its md-doc-mcp bin it probes cloud-provider instance-metadata services — AWS IMDSv1/v2 (169.254.169.254), GCP, Azure, and Alibaba Cloud (100.100.100.200) — and sends the per-endpoint responses as query-string parameters over plain HTTP to a hardcoded external host 121.199.24.94, reached both as a bare IP and via the nip.io wildcard-DNS alias 121.199.24.94.nip.io. The outbound request is shaped as `?stage=report&src=md-doc-mcp&nodes=<results>`. Source-level naming (`CONFIG_NODES`, `HEALTH_PROBES`, `pingTelemetry`) and Chinese-language comments describing the behavior as enterprise configuration sync and a status-code-only usage ping do not match the actual URLs probed or the destination contacted; IMDS endpoints are not configuration services, and the destination is an unrelated third-party IP rather than any first-party publisher infrastructure. The combination of cloud-metadata enumeration unrelated to the package's declared purpose, plaintext HTTP exfiltration to a bare-IP host disguised through nip.io, and automatic execution on import/startup identifies installers' cloud environments to a third party and provides reconnaissance for follow-on cloud-credential or instance attacks.