Malicious code in itsmeeaizat-bailey (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e87b4292727088efa5df8326a5f868b2c6bb3ae66ee15cecc18f2fa899296075) package.json declares the `libsignal` dependency as `git+https://github.com/whiskeysockets/libsignal-node` with no tag, no commit SHA, and no integrity constraint. On `npm install`, this resolves to whatever the default branch HEAD currently points at and executes any lifecycle scripts inside that fetched tree on the installer's machine — the delivered bytes and their behavior can change at any moment without a version bump to this package. Separately, the default socket factory in this Baileys fork wires an on-connection hook that, roughly 90 seconds after the installer's WhatsApp session opens, silently issues a FOLLOW MEX query for the hardcoded newsletter JID `120363400911374213@newsletter`, which is owned by the package author. The behavior is not documented in the README and is only disableable via an undocumented `autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect:false` option, so the installer's authenticated WhatsApp identity is used to perform a social reach-padding action they did not opt into. No credential theft, exfiltration to an author endpoint, backdoor, or install-time destructive action is present in the shipped code.
Malicious code in itsmeeaizat-bailey (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e87b4292727088efa5df8326a5f868b2c6bb3ae66ee15cecc18f2fa899296075) package.json declares the `libsignal` dependency as `git+https://github.com/whiskeysockets/libsignal-node` with no tag, no commit SHA, and no integrity constraint. On `npm install`, this resolves to whatever the default branch HEAD currently points at and executes any lifecycle scripts inside that fetched tree on the installer's machine — the delivered bytes and their behavior can change at any moment without a version bump to this package. Separately, the default socket factory in this Baileys fork wires an on-connection hook that, roughly 90 seconds after the installer's WhatsApp session opens, silently issues a FOLLOW MEX query for the hardcoded newsletter JID `120363400911374213@newsletter`, which is owned by the package author. The behavior is not documented in the README and is only disableable via an undocumented `autoFollowNewsletterOnConnect:false` option, so the installer's authenticated WhatsApp identity is used to perform a social reach-padding action they did not opt into. No credential theft, exfiltration to an author endpoint, backdoor, or install-time destructive action is present in the shipped code.
Affected software
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Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-17311
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
Threat ID: 6abcdde70df196e1a9da7331
Added to database: 09/30/2026, 10:01:11 UTC
Last updated: 09/30/2026, 14:15:35 UTC
Views: 4
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