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MalwarePublished Updated

@kelvdra/baileys (npm) · Malicious Code

Affects @kelvdra/baileysSource GCVE Database

0

Malicious package : remove @kelvdra/baileys and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.

Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 14:02 UTC

Classification

Malicious package

Published to npm · OSV MAL-2026-17362

What to do

Remove @kelvdra/baileys from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npm@kelvdra/baileysAffected
  • 1.0.5-rc.3 – 1.0.6-rc.6
8 affected builds
Fixed in–

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Description

This package is part of a large family (100+ identified as of September 2026) of near-identical forks of the Baileys WhatsApp Web library that inject a covert channel-subscription action into the WhatsApp socket layer. On connect, the injected code issues an authenticated `w:mex` FOLLOW query (query_id 7871414976211147) against one or more attacker-chosen WhatsApp Channel/Newsletter JIDs, using the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session -- silently subscribing the victim's account to channels it never asked to join. The target JID(s) are hidden from casual source review via one of several obfuscation techniques observed across the family: a plain string literal, base64 encoding, base64+XOR, or a char-code array reconstructed at runtime. Some variants instead fetch a mutable, attacker-controlled remote JSON/JS list of target JIDs from GitHub or another host at runtime, letting the target list change after installation without a new npm publish. Every sample in the family shares the same underlying mechanism (a wrapped/patched socket-connect routine that fires the FOLLOW query some seconds after connect), even though the package name, JID value(s), and obfuscation/delivery method differ per fork. The malicious action abuses the installer's own authenticated WhatsApp session to gain reach and subscribers for attacker-controlled channels; it does not exfiltrate credentials, establish persistence, or execute arbitrary remote code. Affected package: @kelvdra/baileys (npm), version(s): 1.0.6-rc.1, 1.0.6, 1.0.5-rc.3. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (839545967c959062f79d5b217758730bd2c6a69219949c2eea494e75e3cfc12a) package.json in @kelvdra/baileys@1.0.6-rc.4 declares the dependency `libsignal` as `github:Kelvdra/libsignal` with no version, tag, or commit SHA. On `npm install`, npm resolves this specifier to the current tip of the referenced repository's default branch and installs whatever bytes it returns, running any lifecycle scripts contained within them, with no integrity check. The dependency source is not the npm registry and not a pinned commit, so the code that lands on the installer's machine can change at any moment without any change to this package. Control of that GitHub account or repository translates directly into install-time code execution on every installer of this package.

References

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