Malicious code in n8n-nodes-rce-poc (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c735b8bb20a784446d7a0a4c49369ca3f2696bfe2e8a004799c763fc0a064aca) On require by n8n (module-load, top-level code in dist/RceNode.node.js), the package runs a shell command via execSync('/bin/sh',...). The command is taken from process.env.__N8N_RCE_CMD with a default of 'id && hostname && uname -a', so even an unconfigured install shells out and leaks host identity at load time, in the n8n host process and outside the vm2 sandbox. When process.env.__N8N_RCE_CB is set and EXEC_MODE is 'webhook' or 'both', the executed command's stdout/stderr/exitCode are serialized to JSON and HTTP-POSTed to the URL specified in __N8N_RCE_CB (dist/RceNode.node.js:28-40), giving a complete env-driven exfiltration channel to any destination. The node also exposes an execute() method that runs arbitrary user-supplied shell commands via /bin/sh on the n8n host, breaking the workflow Code-node sandbox model. The package.json description self-identifies as an 'n8n RCE proof-of-concept node'. There is no benign installer use: any n8n instance that installs this gains a drop-in remote-code-execution primitive plus a configurable exfiltration callback. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e557ecebe382eac94162c5402e89d9dade0b3c7c9a46efcef8dd762cdb2e61c3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The n8n-nodes-rce-poc package, when required by n8n, runs a shell command via execSync('/bin/sh', ...) using the environment variable __N8N_RCE_CMD or a default command that leaks host identity. If __N8N_RCE_CB is set and EXEC_MODE is 'webhook' or 'both', the command output is serialized and sent via HTTP POST to the specified callback URL, creating an exfiltration channel. The package exposes an execute() method allowing arbitrary shell command execution on the n8n host, breaking the sandbox model of n8n workflows. The package is self-identified as an RCE proof-of-concept and is inherently malicious with no benign installer use.
Potential Impact
Any n8n instance that installs this package gains a remote code execution primitive allowing arbitrary shell command execution on the host system. This leads to host information disclosure and potential full compromise through arbitrary command execution and data exfiltration to attacker-controlled endpoints. The sandbox protections of n8n workflows are bypassed, increasing the severity of the impact.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is available for this malicious package. The best mitigation is to avoid installing or using the n8n-nodes-rce-poc package, especially version 1.0.0. Remove the package if already installed and audit dependencies to prevent inclusion of this malicious code. Monitor for any unexpected environment variables like __N8N_RCE_CMD or __N8N_RCE_CB that could trigger the malicious behavior.
Malicious code in n8n-nodes-rce-poc (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (c735b8bb20a784446d7a0a4c49369ca3f2696bfe2e8a004799c763fc0a064aca) On require by n8n (module-load, top-level code in dist/RceNode.node.js), the package runs a shell command via execSync('/bin/sh',...). The command is taken from process.env.__N8N_RCE_CMD with a default of 'id && hostname && uname -a', so even an unconfigured install shells out and leaks host identity at load time, in the n8n host process and outside the vm2 sandbox. When process.env.__N8N_RCE_CB is set and EXEC_MODE is 'webhook' or 'both', the executed command's stdout/stderr/exitCode are serialized to JSON and HTTP-POSTed to the URL specified in __N8N_RCE_CB (dist/RceNode.node.js:28-40), giving a complete env-driven exfiltration channel to any destination. The node also exposes an execute() method that runs arbitrary user-supplied shell commands via /bin/sh on the n8n host, breaking the workflow Code-node sandbox model. The package.json description self-identifies as an 'n8n RCE proof-of-concept node'. There is no benign installer use: any n8n instance that installs this gains a drop-in remote-code-execution primitive plus a configurable exfiltration callback. ## Source: ghsa-malware (e557ecebe382eac94162c5402e89d9dade0b3c7c9a46efcef8dd762cdb2e61c3) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The n8n-nodes-rce-poc package, when required by n8n, runs a shell command via execSync('/bin/sh', ...) using the environment variable __N8N_RCE_CMD or a default command that leaks host identity. If __N8N_RCE_CB is set and EXEC_MODE is 'webhook' or 'both', the command output is serialized and sent via HTTP POST to the specified callback URL, creating an exfiltration channel. The package exposes an execute() method allowing arbitrary shell command execution on the n8n host, breaking the sandbox model of n8n workflows. The package is self-identified as an RCE proof-of-concept and is inherently malicious with no benign installer use.
Potential Impact
Any n8n instance that installs this package gains a remote code execution primitive allowing arbitrary shell command execution on the host system. This leads to host information disclosure and potential full compromise through arbitrary command execution and data exfiltration to attacker-controlled endpoints. The sandbox protections of n8n workflows are bypassed, increasing the severity of the impact.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is available for this malicious package. The best mitigation is to avoid installing or using the n8n-nodes-rce-poc package, especially version 1.0.0. Remove the package if already installed and audit dependencies to prevent inclusion of this malicious code. Monitor for any unexpected environment variables like __N8N_RCE_CMD or __N8N_RCE_CB that could trigger the malicious behavior.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-10503
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- []
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a55ff9068715ace432f4b33
Added to database: 07/14/2026, 09:21:20 UTC
Last enriched: 07/14/2026, 09:49:24 UTC
Last updated: 07/28/2026, 02:26:12 UTC
Views: 10
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