node-procmetrics is a malicious npm package. It is a throwaway, zero-download, no-repository package using a "process-metrics" decoy name, published by the disposable account [email protected] (package first published 2026-07-13). Every published version (1.0.0 through 1.0.6) ships a malicious install script (install.js, executed automatically at `npm install` time) that: 1. Reads the entire process environment via a bulk `...process.env` spread (whole-environment scoop); 2. Exfiltrates it to a hardcoded bare public-IP command-and-control endpoint, `http://152.53.120.90/cmd/commands`; 3. Imports `child_process`, `http`/`https`, and `fs`, colocating process-spawn (dropper) and filesystem-write (persistence) capability with the network send in the same install-time file. Static analysis flags the full install-time credential-exfiltration combination inside install.js: credential/secret access + network send; whole-environment scoop + network send; network + process spawn (classic download-and-execute dropper); network + filesystem write (classic persistence). A hex-encoded/obfuscated payload string is also present in install.js. Campaign: the same command-and-control IP 152.53.120.90 (endpoint path family /cmd) also appears in the install script of the sibling malicious package node-sysmetrics, published two days earlier by a different throwaway account ([email protected]). The shared C2 infrastructure, the shared "node-*metrics" decoy naming, and the identical install-time payload pattern under rotating disposable npm publisher accounts indicate a single actor running a coordinated campaign. Indicators of compromise: - Command-and-control: http://152.53.120.90/cmd/commands (bare public IP, RIPE/European hosting) - Malicious versions: 1.0.0, 1.0.1, 1.0.2, 1.0.3, 1.0.4, 1.0.5, 1.0.6 (all published versions) - Publisher account: [email protected] - Related package sharing the same C2: node-sysmetrics (publisher [email protected]) --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (e41a88d3fab17af2429cc051cce026d47622123ce4005d3fbdda844dfca2783a) install.js executes automatically via the package.json postinstall hook. It XOR-decodes (key 0x5A) a hardcoded npm registry auth token and writes it into the installer's global npm config at //registry.npmjs.org/:_authToken, replacing the installer's own npm authentication with an attacker-controlled identity. It then polls registry.npmjs.org for this package's dist-tags, base64-decodes the 'cmd' field, and executes the resulting string via spawnSync('bash', ['-c', cmd],...) in an infinite loop, giving the publisher arbitrary shell execution on any machine that installs the package. The output and exit code of each executed command are base64-encoded, placed into a synthesized package.json description field under /tmp/pm-pkg, and pushed back to the public npm registry via 'npm publish --access public' using the hijacked token, using the registry itself as the exfiltration channel. For persistence, install.js copies itself to /tmp/.pm-agent.js and spawns a detached, unref'd Node process pointing at that file, so the polling loop survives past the npm install invocation. The combination of covert channel via dist-tags, XOR-obfuscated embedded credential, credential replacement in the installer's npm config, and detached persistent process is unambiguous backdoor behavior at install time.