publish-poc-base (npm) · Malicious Code
Affects publish-poc-baseSource GCVE Database
Malicious package : remove publish-poc-base and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 15:55 UTC
Malicious package
Published to npm · OSV MAL-2026-18323
What to do
Remove publish-poc-base from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| npmpublish-poc-base | Affected
| Fixed in– |
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Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (9bf2f71038e46898cc03f9bf5081547bb6d725e6a480ef22b80f4dc259c721d9) On install, the postinstall script in package.json reads the first line of../../README.md from the installer's parent workspace, creates a mktemp directory, writes a generated package.json named publish-poc-found-<rand> using that README content as its description, and writes an.npmrc containing a hardcoded npm registry _authToken (prefix npm_DLcrGeNT…) pointing at //registry.npmjs.org/. The staged directory is removed with rm -rf before any publish or network call fires, so this version does not itself execute the publish step, but the shipped token is distributed in cleartext to every installer and the staging logic is a working template for auto-publishing packages under the token owner's identity using data harvested from the installer's workspace. The combination of a live third-party-usable publish credential distributed to all installers plus install-time reads of files outside the package directory raises installer-impacting supply-chain concerns beyond author self-harm: any installer receives the token, and any installer's local README content is read at install time.