Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-config (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (a735f2991224bb86f5eb95f101289e2bab34cd241ca9207757c1525624ecb5a0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves malicious code injected into specific versions (6.11.3, 6.11.4, 6.11.6) of the @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-config npm package, part of a broader supply chain worm campaign targeting Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker inserted a preinstall hook that executes a multi-layer obfuscated payload, which downloads a Bun runtime to run the worm independently of the victim's Node.js environment. The malware harvests extensive credentials and tokens from various cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local configuration files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files, enabling passwordless sudo for CI runner accounts. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages using stolen credentials, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence is maintained through daemon installation and hijacking of AI and editor configuration files. The malware includes sandbox and EDR detection capabilities to evade analysis and detection. Systems with this package installed should be treated as fully compromised.
Potential Impact
Systems with affected versions of the package installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and tokens across multiple cloud platforms, CI environments, and local secrets, enabling extensive unauthorized access and potential lateral movement. Privilege escalation via Docker socket access allows the attacker to gain passwordless sudo rights, increasing control over the system. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting malicious workflows, potentially compromising additional repositories and systems. Persistence and evasion mechanisms reduce the likelihood of detection and removal. The compromise poses a severe risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems and associated cloud and CI environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is currently documented for this malicious package compromise. Immediate mitigation requires removing the affected package versions (6.11.3, 6.11.4, 6.11.6) from all systems. Because the malware grants full system compromise, all secrets and credentials stored on affected systems must be considered compromised and rotated immediately from a secure, uncompromised environment. Monitor for signs of persistence such as daemons in /tmp/kitty-*, hijacked AI agent and editor configurations, and unusual GitHub workflow commits. Review and revoke any suspicious npm publish tokens and GitHub PATs. Due to the complexity and persistence of the malware, consider full system rebuilds where feasible. Check vendor advisories and trusted security sources for updates or official remediation guidance.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-config (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (a735f2991224bb86f5eb95f101289e2bab34cd241ca9207757c1525624ecb5a0) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves malicious code injected into specific versions (6.11.3, 6.11.4, 6.11.6) of the @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-config npm package, part of a broader supply chain worm campaign targeting Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker inserted a preinstall hook that executes a multi-layer obfuscated payload, which downloads a Bun runtime to run the worm independently of the victim's Node.js environment. The malware harvests extensive credentials and tokens from various cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local configuration files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files, enabling passwordless sudo for CI runner accounts. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages using stolen credentials, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence is maintained through daemon installation and hijacking of AI and editor configuration files. The malware includes sandbox and EDR detection capabilities to evade analysis and detection. Systems with this package installed should be treated as fully compromised.
Potential Impact
Systems with affected versions of the package installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and tokens across multiple cloud platforms, CI environments, and local secrets, enabling extensive unauthorized access and potential lateral movement. Privilege escalation via Docker socket access allows the attacker to gain passwordless sudo rights, increasing control over the system. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting malicious workflows, potentially compromising additional repositories and systems. Persistence and evasion mechanisms reduce the likelihood of detection and removal. The compromise poses a severe risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of affected systems and associated cloud and CI environments.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is currently documented for this malicious package compromise. Immediate mitigation requires removing the affected package versions (6.11.3, 6.11.4, 6.11.6) from all systems. Because the malware grants full system compromise, all secrets and credentials stored on affected systems must be considered compromised and rotated immediately from a secure, uncompromised environment. Monitor for signs of persistence such as daemons in /tmp/kitty-*, hijacked AI agent and editor configurations, and unusual GitHub workflow commits. Review and revoke any suspicious npm publish tokens and GitHub PATs. Due to the complexity and persistence of the malware, consider full system rebuilds where feasible. Check vendor advisories and trusted security sources for updates or official remediation guidance.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5126
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-h43w-g623-gfmv","GHSA-r28x-h6v7-8rjj"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ed768715ace4390b620
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:27 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:03:21 UTC
Last updated: 07/22/2026, 01:11:04 UTC
Views: 6
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