Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-translations (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (36b45af60e80d9abdc8d1ce1bd7a54acd6f958ce3c6558ce6b55af06b2538894) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves a malicious code injection into the @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-translations npm package (versions 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.4) as part of a supply chain worm campaign targeting the Red Hat Cloud Services npm scope. The attacker inserted a preinstall hook that executes a complex, three-layer obfuscated payload which downloads a pinned Bun runtime to run the worm outside the Node environment. The malware steals a broad spectrum of credentials including AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes tokens, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, and environment variables from numerous CI platforms. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers for passwordless sudo, propagates by republishing tampered npm packages and injecting malicious GitHub workflows, and maintains persistence through daemon installation and hijacking of AI agent and editor configuration files. It also detects sandbox and EDR environments to evade detection. The compromise implies full system control by the attacker and requires immediate secret rotation and package removal.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials across cloud providers, CI/CD platforms, local password managers, and configuration files. Privilege escalation allows container escape and passwordless sudo access, increasing the attack surface. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, potentially spreading the compromise further. Persistence mechanisms and sandbox/EDR evasion increase the difficulty of detection and remediation. Overall, this results in complete loss of system integrity and confidentiality.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently provided. Immediate removal of the affected package versions (=4.4.1, =4.4.2, =4.4.4) is advised. All secrets and credentials stored on compromised systems must be rotated from a separate, trusted environment. Because the attacker may have full control of the system, simply removing the package does not guarantee eradication of the malware. Comprehensive incident response and forensic analysis are recommended to identify and remove all malicious artifacts. Monitor for signs of persistence and unauthorized GitHub workflow modifications. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or updates.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-translations (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (36b45af60e80d9abdc8d1ce1bd7a54acd6f958ce3c6558ce6b55af06b2538894) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves a malicious code injection into the @redhat-cloud-services/frontend-components-translations npm package (versions 4.4.1, 4.4.2, and 4.4.4) as part of a supply chain worm campaign targeting the Red Hat Cloud Services npm scope. The attacker inserted a preinstall hook that executes a complex, three-layer obfuscated payload which downloads a pinned Bun runtime to run the worm outside the Node environment. The malware steals a broad spectrum of credentials including AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes tokens, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, and environment variables from numerous CI platforms. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers for passwordless sudo, propagates by republishing tampered npm packages and injecting malicious GitHub workflows, and maintains persistence through daemon installation and hijacking of AI agent and editor configuration files. It also detects sandbox and EDR environments to evade detection. The compromise implies full system control by the attacker and requires immediate secret rotation and package removal.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials across cloud providers, CI/CD platforms, local password managers, and configuration files. Privilege escalation allows container escape and passwordless sudo access, increasing the attack surface. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, potentially spreading the compromise further. Persistence mechanisms and sandbox/EDR evasion increase the difficulty of detection and remediation. Overall, this results in complete loss of system integrity and confidentiality.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently provided. Immediate removal of the affected package versions (=4.4.1, =4.4.2, =4.4.4) is advised. All secrets and credentials stored on compromised systems must be rotated from a separate, trusted environment. Because the attacker may have full control of the system, simply removing the package does not guarantee eradication of the malware. Comprehensive incident response and forensic analysis are recommended to identify and remove all malicious artifacts. Monitor for signs of persistence and unauthorized GitHub workflow modifications. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or updates.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5137
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-h5c9-cj46-7p79"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ee668715ace4391cebe
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:42 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:07:48 UTC
Last updated: 07/23/2026, 07:02:10 UTC
Views: 26
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