Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (495ecd6839a9e4c4fd16156aed3c3f34148ecf5be8fe33d83edf3b7f9499ae5c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client npm package as part of a supply chain attack targeting Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The injected preinstall hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a specific Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests credentials from multiple cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories controlled by the attacker. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files, enabling passwordless sudo for CI runner accounts. The worm self-propagates by republishing tampered npm packages using stolen credentials, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence is achieved through daemon installation and hijacking configuration files for AI agents and editor tasks. The malware includes sandbox and EDR detection capabilities to evade analysis and detection. The affected versions are exactly 5.0.3, 5.0.4, and 5.0.6 of the package.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The malware steals a broad range of sensitive credentials and tokens, enabling attackers to access cloud services, CI environments, source code repositories, and local secrets. Privilege escalation allows attackers to gain root-level access on compromised hosts. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, increasing the risk of widespread infection. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult. Credential theft and unauthorized access can lead to further compromise of organizational infrastructure and data.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently provided in the available data. Systems with affected versions (=5.0.3, =5.0.4, =5.0.6) of @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client should consider the host fully compromised. Immediate removal of the package is recommended, but this alone may not eliminate all malicious components. All secrets and credentials exposed on the compromised system must be rotated from a separate, clean environment. Monitor for unauthorized npm package republishing and GitHub repository workflow injections. Investigate and remediate any persistence mechanisms such as daemons or hijacked configuration files. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or further guidance.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (495ecd6839a9e4c4fd16156aed3c3f34148ecf5be8fe33d83edf3b7f9499ae5c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client npm package as part of a supply chain attack targeting Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The injected preinstall hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a specific Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests credentials from multiple cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories controlled by the attacker. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files, enabling passwordless sudo for CI runner accounts. The worm self-propagates by republishing tampered npm packages using stolen credentials, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence is achieved through daemon installation and hijacking configuration files for AI agents and editor tasks. The malware includes sandbox and EDR detection capabilities to evade analysis and detection. The affected versions are exactly 5.0.3, 5.0.4, and 5.0.6 of the package.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The malware steals a broad range of sensitive credentials and tokens, enabling attackers to access cloud services, CI environments, source code repositories, and local secrets. Privilege escalation allows attackers to gain root-level access on compromised hosts. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, increasing the risk of widespread infection. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult. Credential theft and unauthorized access can lead to further compromise of organizational infrastructure and data.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently provided in the available data. Systems with affected versions (=5.0.3, =5.0.4, =5.0.6) of @redhat-cloud-services/host-inventory-client should consider the host fully compromised. Immediate removal of the package is recommended, but this alone may not eliminate all malicious components. All secrets and credentials exposed on the compromised system must be rotated from a separate, clean environment. Monitor for unauthorized npm package republishing and GitHub repository workflow injections. Investigate and remediate any persistence mechanisms such as daemons or hijacked configuration files. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or further guidance.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5141
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-4hcm-2c2r-2rhm"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ed768715ace4390b485
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:27 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:02:16 UTC
Last updated: 07/19/2026, 18:55:42 UTC
Views: 5
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