Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/notifications-client (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (62b590cb39801aeb73d3e75b28245fff0f542abc81a2956b82901f4ec307afc5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves a malicious code injection into the @redhat-cloud-services/notifications-client npm package (versions 6.1.4, 6.1.5, 6.1.7) as part of a supply chain attack named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker inserted a preinstall hook delivering a three-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests credentials from multiple cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), secret management systems, Kubernetes tokens, CI platform environment variables, password managers, and local files. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to gain passwordless sudo rights. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages using stolen credentials and injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, signing artifacts to appear legitimate. Persistence is achieved via daemon installation and hijacking of AI agent and editor configuration files. The malware detects sandbox environments and probes for EDR tools to evade detection. Systems with this package installed are considered fully compromised.
Potential Impact
The impact includes full system compromise on any machine with the affected package installed. The attacker gains access to a broad range of sensitive credentials and tokens across cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments, enabling further unauthorized access and lateral movement. Privilege escalation allows the attacker to execute commands with elevated rights. The worm self-propagates by tampering with npm packages and GitHub workflows, increasing the attack surface. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult, potentially allowing long-term unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
Mitigation Recommendations
There is no patch or official fix indicated for this malicious package compromise. The affected package versions (=6.1.4, =6.1.5, =6.1.7) should be removed immediately. Because the system is considered fully compromised, all secrets and credentials stored on the affected system must be rotated from a different, secure machine. Incident response should assume full compromise and include thorough system investigation and remediation. Monitor for and remove any persistence mechanisms such as daemons or hijacked configuration files. There is no indication that vendor-managed remediation or cloud service patching applies here.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/notifications-client (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (62b590cb39801aeb73d3e75b28245fff0f542abc81a2956b82901f4ec307afc5) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves a malicious code injection into the @redhat-cloud-services/notifications-client npm package (versions 6.1.4, 6.1.5, 6.1.7) as part of a supply chain attack named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker inserted a preinstall hook delivering a three-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests credentials from multiple cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), secret management systems, Kubernetes tokens, CI platform environment variables, password managers, and local files. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to gain passwordless sudo rights. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages using stolen credentials and injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, signing artifacts to appear legitimate. Persistence is achieved via daemon installation and hijacking of AI agent and editor configuration files. The malware detects sandbox environments and probes for EDR tools to evade detection. Systems with this package installed are considered fully compromised.
Potential Impact
The impact includes full system compromise on any machine with the affected package installed. The attacker gains access to a broad range of sensitive credentials and tokens across cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments, enabling further unauthorized access and lateral movement. Privilege escalation allows the attacker to execute commands with elevated rights. The worm self-propagates by tampering with npm packages and GitHub workflows, increasing the attack surface. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult, potentially allowing long-term unauthorized access and data exfiltration.
Mitigation Recommendations
There is no patch or official fix indicated for this malicious package compromise. The affected package versions (=6.1.4, =6.1.5, =6.1.7) should be removed immediately. Because the system is considered fully compromised, all secrets and credentials stored on the affected system must be rotated from a different, secure machine. Incident response should assume full compromise and include thorough system investigation and remediation. Monitor for and remove any persistence mechanisms such as daemons or hijacked configuration files. There is no indication that vendor-managed remediation or cloud service patching applies here.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5144
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-rfq7-3pmv-5h3h"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ee368715ace4391ac6b
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:39 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:07:01 UTC
Last updated: 07/30/2026, 04:21:09 UTC
Views: 8
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