Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/remediations-client (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (68b3f3ba592e9127f77806490aa6d31774861f0578c0979acb3927221b5553eb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/remediations-client npm package (versions 4.0.4, 4.0.5, and 4.0.7) as part of a supply chain worm campaign named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker added a preinstall hook delivering a multi-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a pinned Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests a broad spectrum of credentials and secrets from cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to enable passwordless sudo for CI runner users. The worm self-propagates by republishing compromised npm packages using stolen credentials and injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories via GraphQL mutations. It uses Sigstore signing to appear legitimate. Persistence mechanisms include daemon installation and hijacking AI agent and editor config files. The malware detects sandbox and EDR environments to avoid detection. Systems with this package installed are fully compromised, requiring secret rotation and package removal, though full remediation cannot be guaranteed due to potential system control by attackers.
Potential Impact
The impact is severe: full system compromise is likely on any computer with the affected package installed or running. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and secrets across multiple cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments. Privilege escalation allows container escape and passwordless sudo access, increasing attacker control. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, potentially spreading the compromise further. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult. All secrets and keys on compromised systems should be considered exposed and rotated immediately from a clean environment.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is indicated in the provided data. The affected package versions are 4.0.4, 4.0.5, and 4.0.7. Immediate removal of these package versions is recommended. Because the malware likely grants full system compromise, all secrets and credentials stored on affected systems must be rotated from a different, uncompromised computer. Full remediation cannot be guaranteed by package removal alone due to persistence and privilege escalation mechanisms. Monitor vendor advisories for any updates or official fixes. Incident response should assume complete system compromise.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/remediations-client (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (68b3f3ba592e9127f77806490aa6d31774861f0578c0979acb3927221b5553eb) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/remediations-client npm package (versions 4.0.4, 4.0.5, and 4.0.7) as part of a supply chain worm campaign named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker added a preinstall hook delivering a multi-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a pinned Bun runtime to execute the worm outside Node.js. The malware harvests a broad spectrum of credentials and secrets from cloud providers (AWS, Azure, GCP), CI platforms, password managers, and local files, exfiltrating data to public GitHub repositories. It escalates privileges by exploiting Docker socket access to enable passwordless sudo for CI runner users. The worm self-propagates by republishing compromised npm packages using stolen credentials and injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories via GraphQL mutations. It uses Sigstore signing to appear legitimate. Persistence mechanisms include daemon installation and hijacking AI agent and editor config files. The malware detects sandbox and EDR environments to avoid detection. Systems with this package installed are fully compromised, requiring secret rotation and package removal, though full remediation cannot be guaranteed due to potential system control by attackers.
Potential Impact
The impact is severe: full system compromise is likely on any computer with the affected package installed or running. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and secrets across multiple cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments. Privilege escalation allows container escape and passwordless sudo access, increasing attacker control. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, potentially spreading the compromise further. Persistence and evasion techniques make detection and removal difficult. All secrets and keys on compromised systems should be considered exposed and rotated immediately from a clean environment.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or fix is indicated in the provided data. The affected package versions are 4.0.4, 4.0.5, and 4.0.7. Immediate removal of these package versions is recommended. Because the malware likely grants full system compromise, all secrets and credentials stored on affected systems must be rotated from a different, uncompromised computer. Full remediation cannot be guaranteed by package removal alone due to persistence and privilege escalation mechanisms. Monitor vendor advisories for any updates or official fixes. Incident response should assume complete system compromise.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5146
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-cc5x-qv4h-qjgj"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ed768715ace4390b3c2
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:27 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:01:52 UTC
Last updated: 07/29/2026, 15:38:43 UTC
Views: 6
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