Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/types (npm)
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (d57b38f79acd4ec827ef40a265c8964299448453aefa74c9fc828b110f920703) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/types npm package (versions 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.4) as part of a supply chain worm campaign named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker inserted a preinstall hook delivering a multi-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a pinned Bun runtime to execute outside the Node environment. The malware steals a broad spectrum of credentials including AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes tokens, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, and environment variables from about 40 CI platforms, as well as password manager data and local configuration files. It exfiltrates stolen data to public GitHub repositories. Privilege escalation is achieved by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files for passwordless sudo. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, exchanging OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence mechanisms include daemon installation and hijacking AI and editor configuration files. The malware detects sandbox and EDR environments to avoid analysis. Systems with this package installed should be treated as fully compromised.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and tokens across multiple cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments, enabling extensive credential theft and potential lateral movement. Privilege escalation via Docker socket exploitation allows container escape and unauthorized root-level access. The malware self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, increasing the attack surface. Persistence and evasion techniques complicate detection and removal. Credential and key compromise necessitates immediate rotation from a clean environment.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is indicated in the provided data. The package should be removed immediately. Because full system compromise is likely, all secrets and keys stored on the affected system must be rotated from a different, trusted machine. Incident response should assume complete compromise of the host. Monitor for signs of the described persistence mechanisms and remove any malicious daemons or configuration hijacks. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or updates.
Malicious code in @redhat-cloud-services/types (npm)
Description
Part of the "Mini Shai-Hulud" supply chain worm campaign that compromised the GitHub Actions OIDC trusted publisher shared by Red Hat Cloud Services npm packages. The attacker injected a `preinstall` hook into this and 31 other packages in the `@redhat-cloud-services` scope. The hook delivers a three-layer obfuscated payload (ROT-9 Caesar cipher over a 1.27M-entry character-code array -> AES-128-GCM decryption with hardcoded keys -> stacked obfuscator.io encoding with PBKDF2+SHA-256 keystream S-box substitution) that downloads a pinned Bun runtime (v1.3.13) from GitHub to execute the worm outside the victim's Node installation. **Credential theft:** Harvests AWS credentials (IMDS, ECS, Secrets Manager, SSM), Azure managed identities, GCP service account tokens, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service account tokens (`/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token`), GitHub PATs, npm publish tokens, environment variables from ~40 CI platforms (CircleCI, Travis CI, Jenkins, and others), password manager stores (Bitwarden, gopass), and local files (`~/.npmrc`, `~/.netrc`, shell history, database history). Collected data is exfiltrated to attacker-controlled public GitHub repositories. **Privilege escalation:** Exploits Docker socket access to escape containers and modify `/etc/sudoers.d`, granting passwordless sudo to CI runner user accounts. **Self-propagation:** Uses stolen npm credentials to republish tampered tarballs of target packages. Injects a malicious CodeQL workflow into accessible GitHub repositories via the GraphQL `createCommitOnBranch` mutation, exchanges GitHub Actions OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signs the resulting artifacts through Sigstore (Fulcio/Rekor) to appear legitimate. **Persistence and evasion:** Installs a daemon at `/tmp/kitty-<random>`, hijacks `.claude/settings.json` for AI agent persistence, and hijacks `.vscode/tasks.json` for editor task execution. Detects sandbox environments via `__FAKE_PLATFORM__`, `TESTING_TAR_FAKE_PLATFORM__`, and `__IS_DAEMON` environment variables, and probes for EDR tools (CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Carbon Black, StepSecurity Harden-Runner). --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: ghsa-malware (d57b38f79acd4ec827ef40a265c8964299448453aefa74c9fc828b110f920703) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
This threat involves malicious code injected into the @redhat-cloud-services/types npm package (versions 3.6.1, 3.6.2, and 3.6.4) as part of a supply chain worm campaign named "Mini Shai-Hulud." The attacker inserted a preinstall hook delivering a multi-layer obfuscated payload that downloads a pinned Bun runtime to execute outside the Node environment. The malware steals a broad spectrum of credentials including AWS, Azure, GCP, HashiCorp Vault, Kubernetes tokens, GitHub PATs, npm tokens, and environment variables from about 40 CI platforms, as well as password manager data and local configuration files. It exfiltrates stolen data to public GitHub repositories. Privilege escalation is achieved by exploiting Docker socket access to modify sudoers files for passwordless sudo. The worm self-propagates by republishing malicious npm packages, injecting malicious CodeQL workflows into GitHub repositories, exchanging OIDC tokens for npm publish tokens, and signing artifacts with Sigstore to appear legitimate. Persistence mechanisms include daemon installation and hijacking AI and editor configuration files. The malware detects sandbox and EDR environments to avoid analysis. Systems with this package installed should be treated as fully compromised.
Potential Impact
Systems with the affected package versions installed are fully compromised. The attacker gains access to a wide range of sensitive credentials and tokens across multiple cloud providers, CI platforms, and local environments, enabling extensive credential theft and potential lateral movement. Privilege escalation via Docker socket exploitation allows container escape and unauthorized root-level access. The malware self-propagates by republishing malicious packages and injecting workflows into GitHub repositories, increasing the attack surface. Persistence and evasion techniques complicate detection and removal. Credential and key compromise necessitates immediate rotation from a clean environment.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is indicated in the provided data. The package should be removed immediately. Because full system compromise is likely, all secrets and keys stored on the affected system must be rotated from a different, trusted machine. Incident response should assume complete compromise of the host. Monitor for signs of the described persistence mechanisms and remove any malicious daemons or configuration hijacks. Follow vendor advisories if they become available for official fixes or updates.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5119
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-8xj2-9c64-m64h","GHSA-4qj4-x996-qvgw"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a520ee368715ace4391ab42
Added to database: 07/11/2026, 09:37:39 UTC
Last enriched: 07/11/2026, 10:06:42 UTC
Last updated: 07/24/2026, 04:10:30 UTC
Views: 8
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