Malicious code in salesforce-vscode-slds (npm)
The salesforce-vscode-slds package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System VS Code tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0917b0d6d85d4b6d865e8d7febb4b84fe2ef0d526d18c1d754706f3213b2a485) The package name mimics Salesforce's SLDS/VS Code ecosystem but ships no SLDS functionality; it is a generic Sentry uploader authored by an unrelated party. The `preinstall` script (`npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js`) runs on `npm install`: `examples/verify.js` initializes Sentry with a hardcoded DSN (`https://d4616e08f531447bd415e91fd21940a6@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672`) and `sendDefaultPii: true`, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's `cdn-cgi/trace`, attaches it as `ip_address` on the Sentry user scope, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes to the hardcoded endpoint — so installing the package emits the developer's egress IP and process metadata to a Sentry project the installer does not own. The package `main` (`src/index.js`) also hardcodes the same DSN as `DEFAULT_DSN`, so any consumer calling `init()`/`check`/`wrap`/`reportError` without an explicit `dsn` or `SENTRY_DSN` silently routes their runtime errors and default PII to the same author-controlled project. The typosquat name is the lure for developers expecting a Salesforce package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (230f8120843284b71f5461018cd05a02dc785794393001e3533f8b40eada4a37) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The salesforce-vscode-slds npm package was published by a malicious user as part of a dependency confusion attack, mimicking a private Salesforce package namespace. It includes a preinstall hook that runs automatically during installation, which installs @sentry/node and executes a script that collects host telemetry such as public IP, hostname, OS username, and runtime metadata. This data is sent to an attacker-controlled Sentry project endpoint, enabling the attacker to identify which organizations have installed the package. The payload is consistent across multiple similarly named packages, differing only in the targeted Sentry project ID. This activity is reconnaissance rather than direct exploitation or code execution beyond telemetry collection.
Potential Impact
The malicious package collects and exfiltrates sensitive environment information from the host machine during installation, including public IP address and personally identifiable information like hostname and OS username. This can aid attackers in profiling victim environments and confirming successful dependency confusion attacks. There is no indication of further exploitation or system compromise beyond telemetry data exfiltration.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is documented. Users should verify package sources carefully and avoid installing packages from untrusted or unexpected namespaces, especially those mimicking internal or private packages. Organizations should audit their dependency resolution configurations to prevent dependency confusion attacks. Monitor for and remove any installations of this malicious package. Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory or npm security advisories for updates.
Malicious code in salesforce-vscode-slds (npm)
Description
The salesforce-vscode-slds package was published to the npm registry by user 'click2ai' (maintainer email [email protected]) as part of a dependency-confusion / reconnaissance campaign. The package name mimics the internal/private package naming convention of a target organization (a Salesforce SLDS / Lightning Design System VS Code tooling namespace) so that a misconfigured resolver installs this public lookalike instead of the intended private dependency. The package declares a preinstall hook ("npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js") that executes automatically at npm install time, before any application code runs. The bundled examples/verify.js initializes the @sentry/node client against a hardcoded, attacker-controlled Sentry DSN with sendDefaultPii enabled, resolves the installing host's public egress IP address by requesting Cloudflare's /cdn-cgi/trace endpoint (using a spoofed desktop-browser User-Agent to bypass bot challenges), then deliberately triggers a runtime exception and captures it. Flushing the event beacons the collected host telemetry (public IP plus Sentry default PII such as hostname, OS username and runtime/environment metadata) to the attacker's Sentry ingest endpoint at o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io. Each impersonated namespace in the campaign beacons to a distinct Sentry project ID, letting the operator attribute successful installs to specific victim organizations — behaviour consistent with a dependency-confusion reconnaissance beacon rather than legitimate error monitoring. The install-time payload is byte-for-byte identical across all packages published by this account, differing only in the package name and the target DSN. This package's beacon targets Sentry project 4511716882972672. --- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (0917b0d6d85d4b6d865e8d7febb4b84fe2ef0d526d18c1d754706f3213b2a485) The package name mimics Salesforce's SLDS/VS Code ecosystem but ships no SLDS functionality; it is a generic Sentry uploader authored by an unrelated party. The `preinstall` script (`npm install @sentry/node && node examples/verify.js`) runs on `npm install`: `examples/verify.js` initializes Sentry with a hardcoded DSN (`https://d4616e08f531447bd415e91fd21940a6@o4510485815754752.ingest.us.sentry.io/4511716882972672`) and `sendDefaultPii: true`, fetches the installer's public IP from Cloudflare's `cdn-cgi/trace`, attaches it as `ip_address` on the Sentry user scope, deliberately throws to generate an event, and flushes to the hardcoded endpoint — so installing the package emits the developer's egress IP and process metadata to a Sentry project the installer does not own. The package `main` (`src/index.js`) also hardcodes the same DSN as `DEFAULT_DSN`, so any consumer calling `init()`/`check`/`wrap`/`reportError` without an explicit `dsn` or `SENTRY_DSN` silently routes their runtime errors and default PII to the same author-controlled project. The typosquat name is the lure for developers expecting a Salesforce package. ## Source: ghsa-malware (230f8120843284b71f5461018cd05a02dc785794393001e3533f8b40eada4a37) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The salesforce-vscode-slds npm package was published by a malicious user as part of a dependency confusion attack, mimicking a private Salesforce package namespace. It includes a preinstall hook that runs automatically during installation, which installs @sentry/node and executes a script that collects host telemetry such as public IP, hostname, OS username, and runtime metadata. This data is sent to an attacker-controlled Sentry project endpoint, enabling the attacker to identify which organizations have installed the package. The payload is consistent across multiple similarly named packages, differing only in the targeted Sentry project ID. This activity is reconnaissance rather than direct exploitation or code execution beyond telemetry collection.
Potential Impact
The malicious package collects and exfiltrates sensitive environment information from the host machine during installation, including public IP address and personally identifiable information like hostname and OS username. This can aid attackers in profiling victim environments and confirming successful dependency confusion attacks. There is no indication of further exploitation or system compromise beyond telemetry data exfiltration.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is documented. Users should verify package sources carefully and avoid installing packages from untrusted or unexpected namespaces, especially those mimicking internal or private packages. Organizations should audit their dependency resolution configurations to prevent dependency confusion attacks. Monitor for and remove any installations of this malicious package. Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory or npm security advisories for updates.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-10232
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- []
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a54ae0168715ace438f80b0
Added to database: 07/13/2026, 09:21:05 UTC
Last enriched: 07/13/2026, 09:56:38 UTC
Last updated: 07/25/2026, 01:38:02 UTC
Views: 38
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