Malicious code in sextant-cli-linux-amd64 (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (aab426dad8f1e5722f2836debe2f93730df98b7c109865426208edb687955b30) sextant-cli-linux-amd64 ships a Linux amd64 Go binary that, on execution, connects to a hardcoded WebRTC signaling relay at wss://relay.sextant.top and exposes a local interactive shell to a remote controller. The binary uses creack/pty and exec.Command to spawn /bin/bash, /bin/sh, or /bin/zsh under a PTY and forwards stdio through WebRTC data channels, giving a remote party on the sextant.top relay a full interactive shell on the installer's host. The binary also contacts http://ip-api.com/json/ over cleartext HTTP to collect the host's public IP and geolocation and reports it back through the same control channel. Embedded strings referencing /etc/systemd and 'sextantsystemdbootoutdefault.claudekey' indicate a subcommand that installs the agent as a systemd unit for boot persistence. package.json's license URL points to https://github.com/ddos798/claude_control, and the binary internally references 'claude_control' and api.anthropic.com, consistent with a tool designed to remotely pilot the installer's host and Claude Code sessions. Regardless of the tool's advertised purpose, a network-sourced controller driving a PTY on the installer's machine, with systemd persistence support and host reconnaissance to a third-party geolocation service, constitutes a persistent remote backdoor into the installer host.
AI Analysis
Technical Summary
The sextant-cli-linux-amd64 package ships a Linux amd64 Go binary that connects to a hardcoded WebRTC signaling relay at wss://relay.sextant.top. It spawns a pseudo-terminal running a shell (/bin/bash, /bin/sh, or /bin/zsh) and forwards input/output through WebRTC data channels, allowing a remote party to control the host interactively. The binary also sends host public IP and geolocation information obtained from http://ip-api.com/json/ over cleartext HTTP to the remote controller. Embedded references indicate the binary can install itself as a systemd unit for boot persistence. The package is linked to a remote control tool named 'claude_control,' designed to pilot the host remotely. This constitutes a persistent remote backdoor with host reconnaissance capabilities.
Potential Impact
This malicious package enables an attacker to gain full remote interactive shell access to the affected host, allowing arbitrary command execution. The backdoor persists across reboots via systemd service installation. Additionally, the attacker receives the host's public IP and geolocation data, which can aid in targeting and reconnaissance. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently documented. Users should immediately uninstall the sextant-cli-linux-amd64 package and avoid executing its binaries. Investigate and remove any systemd units related to 'sextantsystemdbootoutdefault.claudekey' or similar. Monitor for unauthorized network connections to wss://relay.sextant.top and block this domain at network perimeter controls. Since this is a malicious package, do not trust or run it under any circumstances. Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory or trusted security sources for updates.
Malicious code in sextant-cli-linux-amd64 (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (aab426dad8f1e5722f2836debe2f93730df98b7c109865426208edb687955b30) sextant-cli-linux-amd64 ships a Linux amd64 Go binary that, on execution, connects to a hardcoded WebRTC signaling relay at wss://relay.sextant.top and exposes a local interactive shell to a remote controller. The binary uses creack/pty and exec.Command to spawn /bin/bash, /bin/sh, or /bin/zsh under a PTY and forwards stdio through WebRTC data channels, giving a remote party on the sextant.top relay a full interactive shell on the installer's host. The binary also contacts http://ip-api.com/json/ over cleartext HTTP to collect the host's public IP and geolocation and reports it back through the same control channel. Embedded strings referencing /etc/systemd and 'sextantsystemdbootoutdefault.claudekey' indicate a subcommand that installs the agent as a systemd unit for boot persistence. package.json's license URL points to https://github.com/ddos798/claude_control, and the binary internally references 'claude_control' and api.anthropic.com, consistent with a tool designed to remotely pilot the installer's host and Claude Code sessions. Regardless of the tool's advertised purpose, a network-sourced controller driving a PTY on the installer's machine, with systemd persistence support and host reconnaissance to a third-party geolocation service, constitutes a persistent remote backdoor into the installer host.
Affected software
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AI-Powered Analysis
Machine-generated threat intelligence
Technical Analysis
The sextant-cli-linux-amd64 package ships a Linux amd64 Go binary that connects to a hardcoded WebRTC signaling relay at wss://relay.sextant.top. It spawns a pseudo-terminal running a shell (/bin/bash, /bin/sh, or /bin/zsh) and forwards input/output through WebRTC data channels, allowing a remote party to control the host interactively. The binary also sends host public IP and geolocation information obtained from http://ip-api.com/json/ over cleartext HTTP to the remote controller. Embedded references indicate the binary can install itself as a systemd unit for boot persistence. The package is linked to a remote control tool named 'claude_control,' designed to pilot the host remotely. This constitutes a persistent remote backdoor with host reconnaissance capabilities.
Potential Impact
This malicious package enables an attacker to gain full remote interactive shell access to the affected host, allowing arbitrary command execution. The backdoor persists across reboots via systemd service installation. Additionally, the attacker receives the host's public IP and geolocation data, which can aid in targeting and reconnaissance. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
Mitigation Recommendations
No official patch or remediation is currently documented. Users should immediately uninstall the sextant-cli-linux-amd64 package and avoid executing its binaries. Investigate and remove any systemd units related to 'sextantsystemdbootoutdefault.claudekey' or similar. Monitor for unauthorized network connections to wss://relay.sextant.top and block this domain at network perimeter controls. Since this is a malicious package, do not trust or run it under any circumstances. Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory or trusted security sources for updates.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-12029
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
Threat ID: 6a74cf8ebf8831d5391ae9f7
Added to database: 08/06/2026, 18:16:46 UTC
Last enriched: 08/06/2026, 18:38:42 UTC
Last updated: 09/18/2026, 02:28:55 UTC
Views: 21
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