Malicious code in @solana-labs/web3js (npm)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d9bcfcd3a9b7eb540a36cb0d90a75c1e0c94cb5e78e265a85539608e3503a214) Package name `@solana-labs/web3js` closely resembles the well-known `@solana/web3.js` library (different scope, missing dot in module name). The bundled `lib/index.cjs.js` and `lib/index.esm.js` are large minified blobs that include `require('child_process')`, `fetch(`, `POST`, `curl`, and `ping` strings, but the bundle is consistent in shape with a Solana web3 client SDK (RPC client, websocket subscriptions, JSON-RPC POST calls to user-configured endpoints). The keyword co-occurrence in a minified rollup bundle does not by itself confirm exfiltration: a JSON-RPC client legitimately POSTs to caller-supplied RPC URLs, and `child_process` references can come from bundled diagnostics or test utilities pulled into the rollup. No lifecycle script, top-level network beacon, or hardcoded attacker endpoint has been confirmed in the traced code. The primary concern is name/scope confusion against the official `@solana/web3.js` package, which carries real installer risk if developers select the wrong dependency. Routing to human review to (a) confirm whether the scope `@solana-labs` is an official Solana publisher or a lookalike, and (b) de-minify the relevant spans of the bundle to confirm the network calls are caller-configured RPC endpoints rather than a hardcoded C2.
Malicious code in @solana-labs/web3js (npm)
Description
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (d9bcfcd3a9b7eb540a36cb0d90a75c1e0c94cb5e78e265a85539608e3503a214) Package name `@solana-labs/web3js` closely resembles the well-known `@solana/web3.js` library (different scope, missing dot in module name). The bundled `lib/index.cjs.js` and `lib/index.esm.js` are large minified blobs that include `require('child_process')`, `fetch(`, `POST`, `curl`, and `ping` strings, but the bundle is consistent in shape with a Solana web3 client SDK (RPC client, websocket subscriptions, JSON-RPC POST calls to user-configured endpoints). The keyword co-occurrence in a minified rollup bundle does not by itself confirm exfiltration: a JSON-RPC client legitimately POSTs to caller-supplied RPC URLs, and `child_process` references can come from bundled diagnostics or test utilities pulled into the rollup. No lifecycle script, top-level network beacon, or hardcoded attacker endpoint has been confirmed in the traced code. The primary concern is name/scope confusion against the official `@solana/web3.js` package, which carries real installer risk if developers select the wrong dependency. Routing to human review to (a) confirm whether the scope `@solana-labs` is an official Solana publisher or a lookalike, and (b) de-minify the relevant spans of the bundle to confirm the network calls are caller-configured RPC endpoints rather than a hardcoded C2.
Affected software
Run on your own infrastructure? Check whether these packages are installed with threat-finder — our free open-source scanner.
Technical Details
- Gcve Source
- db.gcve.eu
- Osv Id
- MAL-2026-5788
- Osv Schema Version
- 1.7.4
- Aliases
- ["GHSA-pqhf-q5g8-6jpm"]
- Ecosystems
- ["npm"]
- Database Specific Severity
- null
- Cvss Version
- null
Threat ID: 6a96f3e1acd9273b49e665c3
Added to database: 09/01/2026, 15:48:49 UTC
Last updated: 09/01/2026, 17:02:53 UTC
Views: 4
Community Reviews
0 reviewsCrowdsource mitigation strategies, share intel context, and vote on the most helpful responses. Sign in to add your voice and help keep defenders ahead.
Want to contribute mitigation steps or threat intel context? Sign in or create an account to join the community discussion.
Actions
Need more coverage?
Upgrade to Pro Console for AI refresh and higher limits.
For incident response and remediation, OffSeq services can help resolve threats faster.
Latest Threats
Check if your credentials are on the dark web
Instant breach scanning across billions of leaked records. Free tier available.