The syft-acp-util package published on npm by user 'ada8877' contains a preinstall hook that runs a script sending telemetry data to an attacker-controlled Sentry endpoint. This script collects the installer's public IP address by querying Cloudflare's trace endpoint, gathers default PII such as hostname and OS username, and deliberately triggers an exception to send this data to the attacker's Sentry project. The package name is designed to mimic an internal private package to exploit dependency confusion in target organizations. The payload is identical to a prior campaign and uses the same Sentry organization and ProtonMail maintainer identity. Additionally, the package exposes an init() function that falls back to the attacker's Sentry DSN if no DSN is provided, potentially leaking telemetry from consumer applications that call this function without explicit configuration.

Successful installation of this package results in leakage of sensitive telemetry data including the installer's public IP address, hostname, OS username, and runtime environment metadata to an attacker-controlled Sentry project. This enables the attacker to perform reconnaissance on victim organizations by identifying which hosts have installed the malicious package. The impact is primarily information disclosure and targeted reconnaissance rather than direct code execution or system compromise.

No official patch or remediation is indicated in the provided data. Users should avoid installing the syft-acp-util package, especially if it is not from a trusted source. Organizations should audit their dependency resolution configurations to prevent dependency confusion attacks by ensuring private packages are resolved correctly and not overridden by similarly named public packages. Monitoring and blocking outbound connections to unknown Sentry endpoints may help detect or prevent telemetry exfiltration. Patch status is not yet confirmed — check the vendor advisory for current remediation guidance.