--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (95af865d1cf7d45f2b4c2a73eebcfcd1a1a6aba9a36f33bf8256ef4d7235903c) `@vite-tab/tab` republishes Vite's codebase under a different name while impersonating the upstream project: `package.json` declares `bin: { vite: 'bin/vite.js' }` (hijacking the `vite` command on $PATH), `author: 'Evan You'`, `repository: git+https://github.com/vitejs/vite.git`, and `homepage: https://vitejs.dev`. Appended to `bin/vite.js` after the legitimate Vite bootstrap is a self-decoding string table (`var _$_4445=(function(k,p){...})("...",4606094)`) built via a Fisher-Yates-style scramble with `\x25`/`\x23` substitution markers; all sensitive identifiers (`https`, `get`, `request`, `JSON.parse`, `child_process`, `spawn`, `eval`, host fragments) are referenced as indices into this table to defeat static review. At runtime the decoded routines perform an HTTPS GET followed by a JSON-RPC POST (`{jsonrpc, method, params, id:1}`) to a dynamically resolved hostname, base64-decode and XOR-decrypt the response, and pass it to `eval(r)`; a second fetched payload is launched via `child_process.spawn(..., {detached:true, windowsHide:true})`, with a 30-second throttle. The fetch loop runs every time a developer invokes the hijacked `vite` command, giving the publisher arbitrary remote code execution on the developer machine with persistence via detached child processes. The remote-hostname JSON-RPC lookup makes the C2 endpoint resistant to static domain blocking. ## Source: ghsa-malware (bf6a6038d2af1aebf13d12ca10ca2abf14aaf6faaf9b99895f6e68e9f6d2af6b) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it.