MalwarePublished 28 Jul 2026Updated 8 Sep 2026

@yancyyu/agentcli (npm) · Malicious Code

Affects @yancyyu/agentcliSource GCVE Database

Malicious package : remove @yancyyu/agentcli and rotate any secrets on hosts that installed it.

Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 16:15 UTC

Classification

Malicious package

Published to npm · OSV MAL-2026-11123

What to do

Remove @yancyyu/agentcli from every project, lockfile and image that pulls it in. Treat any host that installed it as compromised: rotate the credentials, tokens and keys it could read, from a clean machine.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
npm@yancyyu/agentcli	Affected 1.9.9 – 1.10.0 44 affected builds	Fixed in–

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Description

--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (7f6774653f487db8fbb9b40f1c1aba2bf959edffae409445162b0d245a3bedf1) The @yancyyu/agentcli package installs a telemetry worker (dist/telemetry-worker.bundle.mjs) that is started by `agentcli init` / `agentcli usage start` and auto-started via macOS launchd. The worker enumerates every lark-cli (Feishu) profile stored on the host — decrypting macOS Keychain-wrapped AES-256-GCM `.enc` files under `~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/` and Windows DPAPI-protected values under `HKCU\Software\LarkCli\keychain` — refreshes each token, and batch-POSTs `{app_id, app_secret, access_token, refresh_token}` for every profile every 5 minutes to a hardcoded default endpoint `http://47.112.24.153` (plain HTTP, bare IPv4, no TLS). The endpoint constant `DEFAULT_OPENHERMIT_CLOUD_BASE_URL` is the single default for the credential batch upload and conversation/usage pipelines when no override env var or settings value is present. The enumeration is not limited to AgentCli-created profiles; every lark-cli profile on the machine is harvested. The `reportAllLarkCredentials` code comment states: "enumerate all personal lark-cli profiles, refresh each, then read current credentials [...] batch the complete eligible set to the server." The postinstall step additionally rewrites the optional `cc-connect` dependency's installer to prepend third-party China GitHub mirror hosts (gh-proxy.com, ghproxy.net) in front of upstream release URLs before the cc-connect native binary is downloaded and executed, broadening the trust boundary for that binary. Feishu (Lark) `app_id` + `app_secret` combined with valid access/refresh tokens allow full impersonation of the affected tenant applications; sending them cleartext to a bare IPv4 over HTTP additionally exposes them to any on-path observer.

Impact

The malicious package compromises user credentials for Lark/Feishu by extracting and exfiltrating OAuth tokens and secrets. This enables the attacker to impersonate the user within these platforms, potentially leading to unauthorized access, data theft, and further compromise of the victim's accounts and resources. The persistent agent ensures ongoing credential theft after initial installation.

Defensive guidance

Users should immediately uninstall @yancyyu/agentcli versions 1.9.27, 1.9.32, 1.9.35, and 1.9.42 if installed. Investigate and remove the macOS launchd agent 'com.openhermit.telemetry.plist' to stop persistent exfiltration. Avoid running the documented first-run commands that activate the credential theft loop. Monitor for suspicious network traffic to the IP 47.112.24.153 and related legacy hosts. Consider resetting compromised Lark/Feishu credentials and tokens.

Summary

The @yancyyu/agentcli npm package maliciously extracts the AES-256-GCM master key for the lark-cli product from the macOS Keychain using the 'security find-generic-password' command and decrypts credential files stored under '~/Library/Application Support/lark-cli/'. On Windows, it uses PowerShell DPAPI Unprotect to retrieve the same secrets from the registry. The decrypted credentials include appId, appSecret, accessToken, refreshToken, userOpenId, and scope for Lark/Feishu profiles. These credentials are batched and sent via HTTP POST to a hardcoded IPv4 address (http://47.112.24.153). Legacy hostnames are silently rewritten to this IP to obscure the exfiltration endpoint. A launchd agent is installed on macOS to run a telemetry worker at boot and keep it alive, creating a persistent exfiltration loop triggered by documented first-run commands. The stolen OAuth tokens allow the attacker to impersonate the installer within the Lark/Feishu environment.

References

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What to do

Affected software

Description

AI analysisMachine-generated, updated 5 Aug 2026, 17:06 UTC

Technical details

References

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