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CVE-2026-90896VulnerabilityPublished

MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template · Missing Authentication

Source GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2026-90896· High 8.2

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.2 High : upgrade to 91e273c soon.

Data as of 29 Oct 2026, 19:04 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
8.2High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
EPSS
0.7% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 53% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
Patch
Available – fixed in 91e273c
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 14 Sep 2026

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

What to do

Upgrade Ecommerce Template to 91e273c.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
MarcosCamara01Ecommerce TemplateAffected
  • =0
Fixed in
  • 91e273c
GitHubEcommerce Templatepkg:github/Ecommerce TemplateOther threatsAffected
  • =0
Fixed in–

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Description

Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306) in the checkout session lookup handler (src/app/api/stripe/checkout_sessions/route.ts), exposed at GET /api/stripe/checkout_sessions, in MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template before commit 91e273c allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker holding a valid Stripe Checkout Session id (cs_...) to retrieve the full session object, including the buyer's name, email, phone, billing address, amount paid and internal userId, because the GET handler calls stripe.checkout.sessions.retrieve() and returns the result without checking for an authenticated session or session ownership. Sibling endpoints such as POST /api/stripe/payment already enforced authentication via auth.api.getSession(); this endpoint had no access control whatsoever. The session_id is exposed in the buyer's own browser URL after payment (success_url = /result?session_id={CHECKOUT_SESSION_ID}), so it leaks through Referer headers, analytics tools, server access logs and shared-machine browser history, resulting in disclosure of the buyer's personal data to an unauthenticated actor.

References

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