CVE-2026-59929VulnerabilityPublished 13 Aug 2026Updated 29 Oct 2026

jupyterlab · Mistune renderers/html.safe_url: HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS list misses legacy and chained schemes that historically chain to

Affects jupyterlabSource GCVE Database

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Mentioned vulnerabilities

CVE-2009-1938

Authoritative record:CVE-2026-59929· Medium 6.1

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.1 Medium : upgrade to 4.6.1 when convenient.

Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score

6.1Medium

How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Patch: Available – fixed in 4.6.1

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Attack Vector: Network
Attack Complexity: Low
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Required
Scope: Changed
Confidentiality: Low
Integrity: Low
Availability: None

Bold values are the worst case: easiest to exploit or largest impact.

Attack Vector: Network: The vulnerable component is bound to the network stack and the set of possible attackers extends beyond the other options listed, up to and including the entire Internet. Such a vulnerability is often termed 'remotely exploitable' and can be thought of as an attack being exploitable at the protocol level one or more network hops away (e.g., across one or more routers).
Attack Complexity: Low: Specialized access conditions or extenuating circumstances do not exist. An attacker can expect repeatable success against the vulnerable component.
Privileges Required: None: The attacker is unauthorized prior to attack, and therefore does not require any access to settings or files to carry out an attack.
User Interaction: Required: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires a user to take some action before the vulnerability can be exploited.
Scope: Changed: An exploited vulnerability can affect resources beyond the security scope managed by the security authority of the vulnerable component. In this case, the vulnerable component and the impacted component are different and managed by different security authorities.
Confidentiality: Low: There is some loss of confidentiality. Access to some restricted information is obtained, but the attacker does not have control over what information is obtained, or the amount or kind of loss is limited. The information disclosure does not cause a direct, serious loss to the impacted component.
Integrity: Low: Modification of data is possible, but the attacker does not have control over the consequence of a modification, or the amount of modification is limited. The data modification does not have a direct, serious impact on the impacted component.
Availability: None: There is no impact to availability within the impacted component.

Definitions: FIRST CVSS v3.1 specification.

Exploitation evidence

Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 8 Jul 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.

Disclosed: The CVE record is public on cve.org. Its publication is t = 0.
Detectable: A public nuclei template can find exposed instances, for defenders and attackers alike.
Weaponized: A Metasploit exploit module or Exploit-DB entry exists (Metasploit scanner modules do not count), or CISA SSVC or the CVSS exploit maturity reports a public proof of concept.
Exploited in the wild: CISA KEV lists it, CISA SSVC rates exploitation active, or a source reports attacks.
Observed by OffSeq Mirage: OffSeq Mirage honeypot sensors recorded attack traffic for this CVE, or found exposed hosts without attack traffic.

Moments are spaced evenly, not to scale; a dashed line marks a gap of six months or more. Deltas count from t = 0. Sources that give only a date (CISA KEV, Exploit-DB, or a time of exactly 00:00Z) read “same day” rather than hours. Metasploit modules carry the flaw’s disclosure date, not their release date, and nuclei templates carry no date, so both appear above but not on the timeline.

What to do

Upgrade jupyterlab to 4.6.1.

Affected software

Product	Affected	Fixed in
Homebrewjupyterlab`pkg:brew/jupyterlab`Other threats	Affected >=1.2.0 <4.6.1	Fixed in 4.6.1

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

## Summary **Type:** URL-scheme allowlist gap. The `safe_url` filter only blocks the four schemes `javascript:`, `vbscript:`, `file:`, `data:`. Several other schemes are accepted into rendered `<a href="...">` and `<img src="...">` tags despite being known XSS vectors in legacy or chain-handling browsers. The same gap applies to direct links, reference links, and autolinks. **File:** `src/mistune/renderers/html.py`, line 11-23 (HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS list). **Root cause:** the HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS tuple is a hardcoded, opt-out denylist of four entries. Browsers historically supported (and some still partially support) several other schemes that either execute JavaScript directly (`livescript:`, `mocha:`) or wrap a `javascript:` payload (`feed:javascript:`, `view-source:javascript:`, `jar:javascript:`, `ms-its:javascript:`, `mk:@MSITStore:javascript:`). On user-agents that still recognise these schemes (older Firefox builds for `feed:`/`jar:`, all Internet Explorer / Edge Legacy for `ms-its:`/`mk:`/`res:`, niche chrome-style browsers, browser extensions that register custom protocol handlers), clicking a link rendered by mistune executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in the page's origin. ## Affected Code **File:** `src/mistune/renderers/html.py`, lines 10-62. ```python class HTMLRenderer(BaseRenderer): HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS: ClassVar[Tuple[str, ...]] = ( "javascript:", "vbscript:", "file:", "data:", ) # <-- BUG: incomplete denylist GOOD_DATA_PROTOCOLS: ClassVar[Tuple[str, ...]] = ( "data:image/gif;", "data:image/png;", "data:image/jpeg;", "data:image/webp;", ) def safe_url(self, url: str) -> str: if self._allow_harmful_protocols is True: return escape_text(url) _url = url.lower() if self._allow_harmful_protocols and _url.startswith(tuple(self._allow_harmful_protocols)): return escape_text(url) if _url.startswith(self.HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS) and not _url.startswith(self.GOOD_DATA_PROTOCOLS): return "#harmful-link" return escape_text(url) # <-- BUG: any scheme not in HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS passes through ``` **Why it's wrong:** an opt-out denylist for URL schemes is the wrong shape. The set of schemes a user-agent might honour is unbounded (registered handlers, browser extensions, OS-level protocol registrations, custom intent handlers on Android, etc.), but the set of schemes a markdown renderer needs to allow is small (`http://`, `https://`, `mailto:`, optionally `tel:`, `ftp:`, fragment-only `#anchor`, and a few image-only `data:` types). Switching to an opt-in allowlist with a `safe_extra_protocols` knob for callers who need others would close every variant of this bug class permanently. The current code accepts every chained-scheme XSS vector for as long as the project remembers to keep the denylist current. ## Exploit Chain 1. Application accepts attacker-supplied markdown and renders it with mistune. The default `escape=True` prevents raw HTML, but link href/image src filtering is the only XSS defense for `[click](...)` and `![alt](...)` syntax. 2. Attacker writes `[click here](feed:javascript:alert(document.cookie))`. mistune's `safe_url` checks `feed:javascript:alert(document.cookie)` against `HARMFUL_PROTOCOLS = ('javascript:', 'vbscript:', 'file:', 'data:')` — none match. The href is escape_text'd (HTML-entity escape) and emitted as `<a href="feed:javascript:alert(document.cookie)">click here</a>`. 3. Victim using a Firefox build that still has the feed handler registered (extension, configuration, or LTS that retained the feed reader past the 64.0 removal — including some forks and ESR builds) clicks the link. Firefox's feed handler invokes the inner URL, which is `javascript:alert(...)`. JS executes in the page's origin. Victim's session cookie is exfiltrated. 4. Same pattern for `livescript:alert(1)` (Netscape Communicator era, still recognised by some niche browsers / browser-emulator tools), `view-source:javascript:alert(1)` (Firefox, see CVE-2009-1938), `jar:javascript:alert(1)` (older Firefox), `ms-its:javascript:` (IE/Edge Legacy), `res:javascript:` (IE), `mk:@MSITStore:javascript:` (IE CHM viewer). Each user-agent that recognises one of these is exploitable; the user-agent population that recognises at least one is not negligible (corporate environments still running Edge Legacy compatibility mode, locked-down kiosk browsers, Android WebView in apps that register custom intent handlers, Linux distros with old Firefox ESR plus the `feed:` extension, etc.). The same primitive applies to image src (`![](feed:javascript:...)` rendered as `<img src="feed:...">`) — though most browsers don't fetch javascript: from img src, the same chained handler quirk applies on a few user-agents — and to reference links and autolinks (verified in the PoC below; the rendered HTML

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