CVE-2026-59902: Netty · Memory Exhaustion in SctpMessageCompletionHandler
Affects io.netty:netty-transport-sctpSource GCVE Database
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 4.2.17.Final soon.
Data as of 26 Oct 2026, 13:47 UTC
- EPSS
- 0.3% chance of exploitation in 30 days – higher than 30% of CVEsExploit Prediction Scoring System: the likelihood attackers will use this flaw soon.
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 4.2.17.Final, 4.1.137.Final
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 17 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponised: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 26 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade io.netty:netty-transport-sctp to 4.2.17.Final; io.netty:netty-transport-sctp to 4.1.137.Final.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| Mavenio.netty:netty-transport-sctp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
| Mavenio.netty:netty-transport-sctp | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary SctpMessageCompletionHandler does not limit the total size of buffered fragments, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to cause an OutOfMemoryError by sending large SCTP fragments. ### Details `io.netty.handler.codec.sctp.SctpMessageCompletionHandler` buffers fragments for incomplete SCTP messages. The fix for CVE-2026-46340 fixed unbounded memory growth by introducing limits on the number of concurrent incomplete messages (maxIncompleteSctpMessages) and the number of fragments per message (maxFragments). While the count of fragments is now bounded, the handler still does not enforce a maximum size in bytes. With the default limits of 128 messages and 128 fragments, and a typical max SCTP chunk size of 64KB, an attacker can consume up to ~1GB per connection. By opening a small number of concurrent connections, an attacker can easily exhaust the server's memory, causing an OutOfMemoryError. ### Impact Memory Exhaustion. Any application using Netty's SCTP transport with SctpMessageCompletionHandler is impacted.
References
- github.com/netty/netty/security/advisories/GHSA-2qj4-mmr9-4v2f (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/pull/17213 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/pull/17217 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/commit/1b5abc6443b63726c72cdd285af2feb7ddbb8ff7 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.137.Final (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.17.Final (opens in a new tab)