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VulnerabilityPublished

github.com/nhost/nhost · nhost has Session Persistence After Password Change

Affects github.com/nhost/nhostSource GCVE Database

0

CVSS 2.3 Low : upgrade to 0.0.0-20260430132514-52c70664a7e9 when convenient.

Data as of 27 Oct 2026, 00:07 UTC

CVSS 4.0 base score
2.3Low
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.0.0-20260430132514-52c70664a7e9
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

What to do

Upgrade github.com/nhost/nhost to 0.0.0-20260430132514-52c70664a7e9.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
Gogithub.com/nhost/nhostAffected
  • <0.0.0-20260430132514-52c70664a7e9
Fixed in
  • 0.0.0-20260430132514-52c70664a7e9

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Description

## Description When a user changes their password, either through the authenticated password change endpoint or a password reset ticket, the [`ChangePassword`](https://github.com/nhost/nhost/blob/main/services/auth/go/controller/workflows.go#L731-L759) workflow correctly hashes and persists the new password via [`UpdateUserChangePassword`](https://github.com/nhost/nhost/blob/main/services/auth/go/sql/query.sql#L314-L318). However, it does not revoke existing sessions. The `auth.refresh_tokens` and `auth.oauth2_refresh_tokens` tables are left untouched, meaning all previously issued refresh tokens remain valid and can continue generating new access tokens indefinitely. This vulnerability affects all password change paths (handled in [`change_user_password.go`](https://github.com/nhost/nhost/blob/main/services/auth/go/controller/change_user_password.go)), since they share the same underlying workflow: - Authenticated password change via the Nhost dashboard or client SDK - Ticket-based password reset (magic links / recovery flows) - OAuth2/OIDC sessions managed via `auth.oauth2_refresh_tokens` ## Attack Scenario 1. An attacker steals a victim's refresh token via XSS or a compromised device. 2. The victim changes their password, expecting it to terminate all active sessions. 3. The server updates `password_hash` but performs no session cleanup, the stolen token remains fully functional. ## Impact The attacker retains persistent access even after the victim's password change. This is especially severe in credential theft scenarios, where the victim's only recovery action does nothing against an active session. Depending on configured TTL, the attacker's window could be days or weeks.

References

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