CVE-2026-80205: ReDoS in nltk.text.Text.findall() via unvalidated user-supplied regular expressions
Affects acronymSource GCVE Database
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 7.5 High : upgrade to 2.0.0_4 soon.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.0.0_4
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:HExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 3 Sep 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade acronym to 2.0.0_4.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
Homebrewacronympkg:brew/acronymOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
### Summary NLTK's `Text.findall()` and `TokenSearcher.findall()` methods accept user-supplied regular expressions and pass them to the Python `re` engine without timeout or validation, enabling catastrophic backtracking (ReDoS). This issue is isolated to the `nltk.text` module and was resolved in a prior commit. ### Affected Code `nltk/text.py` — `TokenSearcher.findall()` (line 255) / `Text.findall()` (line 620) `TokenSearcher.__init__` builds an internal string by wrapping each token in angle brackets. The `findall()` method preprocesses the caller-supplied regexp and runs it directly against this string with no timeout: ```python def findall(self, regexp): # Preprocessing does NOT prevent catastrophic backtracking regexp = re.sub(r"\s", "", regexp) regexp = re.sub(r"<", "(?:<(?:", regexp) regexp = re.sub(r">", ")>)", regexp) regexp = re.sub(r"(?<!\\)\.", "[^>]", regexp) # User-controlled regexp executed with no timeout hits = re.findall(regexp, self._raw) ``` The preprocessing transforms `<` and `>` angle-bracket syntax but does not inspect or reject catastrophically backtracking patterns. ### Proof of Concept ```python import nltk import time # Token of 25 'a' characters produces self._raw = "<aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!>" # The trailing '!' ensures no match, forcing full backtracking. text = nltk.Text(["a" * 25 + "!"]) # Pattern after transformation: # < → (?:<(?: # > → )>) # Becomes: (?:<(?:((a+)+)b)>) # re.findall runs this against "<aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!>" — hangs. start = time.time() text.findall(r"<((a+)+)b>") # Never returns ``` ### Impact Applications that expose `Text.findall()` to external input are vulnerable to a denial of service. An unauthenticated attacker can cause indefinite CPU saturation with one request, denying service to all other users of the Python process. ### Remediation This vulnerability was patched in commit `d8e4753`. Users should update to the patched version. ### Credit Tool: Kira by [Offgrid Security](https://www.offgridsec.com)
References
- github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-rrv8-h7p8-rx55 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-80205 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3674 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/d8e47539317b571ab1422981f5b9653d5eae1249 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3750.yaml (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-3.10.0-redos-via-text-findall-unvalidated-regex (opens in a new tab)
- openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/01/3 (opens in a new tab)