CVE-2026-63311: NLTK · SSRF Fail-Open in validate_network_url() via DNS Resolution Failure
Affects acronymSource GCVE Database
Mentioned vulnerabilities
Not known to be exploited · CVSS 6.9 Medium : upgrade to 2.0.0_4 when convenient.
Data as of 30 Oct 2026, 07:30 UTC
- Patch
- Available – fixed in 2.0.0_4
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:LExploitation evidence
Disclosed: evidence found.
CVE published 28 Aug 2026
Detectable: no evidence on record.
No public nuclei template indexed
Weaponized: no evidence on record.
No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB
Exploited in the wildExploited: no evidence on record.
Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation
Observed by OffSeq MirageSeen by Mirage: no evidence on record.
No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors
A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 29 Oct 2026.
What to do
Upgrade acronym to 2.0.0_4.
Affected software
| Product | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
Homebrewacronympkg:brew/acronymOther threats | Affected
| Fixed in
|
Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.
Description
There is an SSRF vulnerability in NLTK 3.9.4's network URL validation. The validate_network_url() function in nltk/pathsec.py fails open when DNS resolution returns an error. The _resolve_hostname() helper at lines 193-234 catches OSError and ValueError during socket.getaddrinfo() and returns an empty list []. When this happens, the validation loop in validate_network_url() iterates over nothing (for addr in resolved: ... never executes), with no else/fallback check. The function returns normally, and urlopen() proceeds to make the request without any IP validation. This means: 1. If DNS is temporarily unavailable, ALL SSRF protections are disabled 2. DNS rebinding attacks bypass the check after the LRU cache entry expires 3. In environments with unreliable resolvers, the protection is permanently bypassed PoC: ```python import nltk.pathsec import unittest.mock # Simulate DNS failure with unittest.mock.patch('socket.getaddrinfo', side_effect=OSError('DNS unavailable')): # This SHOULD raise but doesn't -- fails open nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/') # Returns normally, allowing SSRF to cloud metadata ``` The correct behavior is fail-closed: if DNS resolution fails, the URL should be REJECTED (not allowed). The function should raise an exception or return a failure status when _resolve_hostname() returns an empty list. This is distinct from CVE-2024-39705 (which addressed pickle deserialization) and CVE-2026-33236 (which addressed XML path traversal). This finding targets the newly-added pathsec.py security layer introduced to fix those earlier issues. Suggested fix: Add an explicit check after _resolve_hostname() returns: if the result is empty, raise a SecurityError. Never allow a URL request to proceed when IP validation was impossible. CVSS Note: The CVSS use SC:H (High subsequent confidentiality) because the advisory explicitly identifies cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254) as an attack target. Access to AWS IMDS or GCP metadata exposes credentials or service account tokens, which constitutes High-impact disclosure on downstream systems. This justifies SC:H over NVD's SC:L.
References
- github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-3gqm-fcw5-w839 (opens in a new tab)
- nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63311 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3582 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/4a820afa58810cd05049b6c6eae306694d6cfe65 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0 (opens in a new tab)
- github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3723.yaml (opens in a new tab)
- vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-before-ssrf-via-dns-resolution-failure (opens in a new tab)